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Security research on Private Cloud Compute
- dewey 2y agoLooks like they are really writing everything in Swift on the server side. Repo: https://github.com/apple/security-pcc https://github.com/apple/security-pcc
- tessela 2y agoI hope this helps people to consider Swift 6 as a viable option for server-side development, since it offers many of the modern safety features of Rust, including simpler memory management through ARC, compared to Rust’s more complex ownership system and more predictable than Go's garbage collector.
- willtemperley 2y agoI'd love to use Swift on Cloudflare Workers, but SwiftWASM doesn't seem production ready whereas Rust just works (mostly) on workers. Swift on AWS Lambda looks promising though.
- pjmlp 2y agoThere are lots of sane alternatives to Go. Also don't bet on ARC for performance. https://github.com/ixy-languages/ixy-languages https://github.com/ixy-languages/ixy-languages
- danielhep 2y agoIs using something other than XCode viable? I'd love to do more with swift but I hate that IDE.
- selectodude 2y agoVS Code? https://marketplace.visualstudio.com/items?itemName=sswg.swift-lang https://marketplace.visualstudio.com/items?itemName=sswg.swi...
- dewey 2y agoMost editors will do, Xcode is mostly needed for iOS / macOS development if you want to submit to the App Store or work with a lot of Apple frameworks.
- iforgotmysocks 2y agoThere is a Swift LSP. See - https://github.com/swiftlang/sourcekit-lsp https://github.com/swiftlang/sourcekit-lsp
- russelg 2y agoIf you're a Jetbrains user, they have their AppCode IDE.
- ceejayoz 2y agoThat was discontinued in 2022.
- willtemperley 2y agoHave you used it recently, on an M series Mac? I used to feel the same, it was sluggish and crashed frequently. It's become usable now, even pleasant to use. Also it's great they support Vim keybindings now out-of-the-box.
- miki123211 2y agoIt's worth keeping in mind that these AI machines run an environment very similar to Mac OS, XNU kernel and all, and are powered by Apple Silicon. Using Swift in that context makes sense. At least according to what we publicly know, no other backend Apple services follow this model.
- valleyjo 2y agoWhat do we know about apples other backend services? I’ve worked in compute infra in big tech for 8 years and I don’t know anything about apple’s backend.
- withzombies 2y agoApple has a lot of Java WebObjects running on old Unix servers
- kfreds 2y agoWow! This is great! I hope you'll consider adding witness cosignatures on your transparency log though. :)
- mmastrac 2y agoI feel like this is all smoke and mirrors to redirect from the likelihood intentional silicon backdoors that are effectively undetectable. Without open silicon, there's no way to detect that -- say -- when registers r0-rN are set to values [A, ..., N] and a jump to address 0xCONSTANT occurs, additional access is granted to a monitor process. Of course, this limits the potential attackers to 1) exactly one government (or N number of eyes) or 2) one company, but there's really no way that you can trust remote hardware. This _does_ increase the trust that the VMs are safe from other attackers, but I guess this depends on your threat model.
- yalogin 2y agoThis is an interesting idea. However what does open hardware mean? How can you prove that the design or architecture that was “opened” is actually what was built? What does the attestation even mean in this scenario?
- dented42 2y agoThis is my thought exactly. I really love the idea of open hardware, but I don’t see how it would protect against cover surveillance. What’s stopping a company/government/etc from adding surveillance to an open design? How would you determine that the hardware being used is identical to the open hardware design? You still ultimately have to trust that the organisations involved in manufacturing/assembling/installing/operating the hardware in question hasn’t done something nefarious. And that brings us back to square one.
- mdhb 2y agoThis website in particular tends to get very upset and is all too happy to point out irrelevant counter examples every time I point this out but the actual ground truth of the matter here is that you aren’t going to find yourself on a US intel targeting list by accident and unless you are doing something incredibly stupid you can use Apple / Google cloud services without a second thought.
- kfreds 2y ago
- ngneer 2y agoHow is this different than a bug bounty?
- davidczech 2y agoSimilar, but a lot of documentation is provided, source code for cross reference, and a VM based research environment instead of applying for a physical security research device.
- alemanek 2y agoWell they are providing a dedicated environment from which to attack their infrastructure. But also they have a section called “ Apple Security Bounty for Private Cloud Compute” in the linked article so this is a bug bounty + additional goodies to help you test their security.
- floam 2y agoThere is a bug bounty too, but the ability to run one the same infrastructure, OS, models locally is big.
- kfreds 2y agoI've been working on technology like this for the past six years. The benefits of transparent systems are likely considerable. The combination of reproducible builds, remote attestation and transparency logging allows trivial detection of a range of supply chain attacks. It can allow users to retroactively audit the source code of remote running systems. Yes, there are attacks that the threat model doesn't protect against. That doesn't mean it isn't immensely useful.
- deleted 2y ago[deleted]
- dboreham 2y agoI've also worked in this field but it feels like a foundation built on quicksand. You depend on so many turtle layers and only one of them has to be adversarial and game over.
- bitexploder 2y agoEach layer needs more than one safeguard then. If breaking the layer breaks the system then the layer needs better safe guards.
- kfreds 2y ago> it feels like a foundation built on quicksand. You depend on so many turtle layers and only one of them has to be adversarial and game over Interesting. Please elaborate. Here's how I see it. Reproducible builds: I think we'll eventually see Linux distributions like Debian make reproducible builds mandatory by enforcing it in apt-get's trust policy. The trust policy could be expressed as "I will only trust .deb packages where their build hash and source hash are signed by three different build pipelines I trust". Remote attestation: If you ensure that the server's CPU SoC and the TPM have different supply chains, you could construct a protocol where the supply chain attacker would have to own both supply chains in order to impersonate the server. Transparency logging: One of the projects I've been working on for the past four years is Sigsum (sigsum.org). It is a transparency log with distributed trust assumptions. Our goal was to figure out the essence of transparency logging technology, identify the most significant design parameters, and for each parameter minimise the attack surface. You'll find the threat model on our website. Here's a recent presentation by my colleague Rasmus on the subject: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Mp23yQxYm2c https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Mp23yQxYm2c Here's a recent presentation by me on the subject of system transparency / runtime transparency / the technology underlying Apple PCC: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Lo0gxBWwwQE https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Lo0gxBWwwQE
- aabhay 2y agoA lot of people seem to be focusing on how this program isn’t sufficient as a guarantee, but those people are missing the point. The real value of this system is that Apple is making legally enforceable claims about their system. Shareholders can, and do, sue companies that make inaccurate claims about their infrastructure. I’m 100% sure that Apple’s massive legal team would never let this kind of program exist if _they_ weren’t also confident in these claims. And a legal team at Apple certainly has both internal and external obligations to verify these claims. America’s legal system is in my opinion what allows the US to dominate economically, creating virtuous cycles like this.
- layer8 2y agoUnfortunately that doesn’t help anyone outside the US, not because of differences in the legal systems, but because as an American company Apple will always have to defer to the US agencies first.
- aabhay 2y agoI’m pretty sure a foreign shareholder can sue in a US court of law. While I agree that “shareholder” in this case means extra-massive moneyed entity, I firmly believe that even this provides a deterrence effect. At the very least, for the scale of operations in the US, there’s an extremely high trust environment. That level of trust doesn’t exist even for orders of magnitude smaller issues in most other countries
- saagarjha 2y agoYes, this is why we don't see bad behavior and willful abuse of the legal system by companies in the US.
- gigel82 2y agoNo amount of remote attestation and "transparency logs" and other bombastic statements like this would make up for the fact that they are fully in control of the servers and the software. There is absolutely no way for a customer to verify their claims that the data is not saved or transferred elsewhere. So unless they offer a way for us to run the "cloud services" on our own hardware where we can strictly monitor and firewall all network activity, they are almost guaranteed to be misusing that data, especially given Apple's proven track record of giving in to government's demands for data access (see China).
- kfreds 2y ago> No amount of remote attestation and "transparency logs" and other bombastic statements like this would make up for the fact that they are fully in control of the servers and the software. There is absolutely no way for a customer to verify their claims that the data is not saved or transferred elsewhere. You are right. Apple is fully in control of the servers and the software, and there is no way for a customer to verify Apple's claims. Nevertheless system transparency is a useful concept. It can effectively reduce the number of things you have to blindly trust to a short and explicit list. Conversely it forces the operator, in this case Apple, to explicitly lie. As others have pointed out, that is quite a business risk. As for transparency logs, it is an amazing technology which I can highly recommend you take a look at in case you don't know what it is or how it works. Check out transparency.dev or the project I'm involved in, sigsum.org. > they are almost guaranteed to be misusing that data That is very unlikely because of the liability, as others have pointed out. They are making claims which the Apple PCC architecture helps make falsifiable.
- astrange 2y ago> There is absolutely no way for a customer to verify their claims that the data is not saved or transferred elsewhere. Transparency logs are capable of verifying that, it's more or less the whole point of them. (Strictly speaking, you can make it arbitrarily expensive to fake it.) Also, if they were "transferring your data elsewhere" it would be a GDPR violation. Ironically wrt your China claim, it would also be illegal in China, which does in fact have privacy laws.
- ram_rattle 2y agoSomething similar published by samsung, but sad that they are not as agile as apple in this area https://research.samsung.com/blog/The-Next-New-Normal-in-Computing-On-Device-Confidential-Computing https://research.samsung.com/blog/The-Next-New-Normal-in-Com...
- axoltl 2y agoThis doesn't look to be the same. Apple's talking about performing computation in their cloud in a secure, privacy-preserving fashion. Samsung's paper seems to be just on local enclaves (which Apple's also been doing since iPhone 5S in the form of the Secure Enclave Processor (SEP)).
- ram_rattle 2y agoRe read the article again, it's exactly same idea with open source "From a computational perspective, a trusted end-to-end data path will be established, ensuring the security of the entire process. This encompasses data collection on user devices and data processing on servers as well as the processing of privacy-sensitive data directly on user devices."
- oldpersonintx 2y ago[dead]
- doulouUS 2y agoWill there be SDKs to enable any developer to build things leveraging PCC? Like building a performant RAG system on personal/sensitive data.
- KaiserPro 2y agoThe thing that is interesting about PCC is what appears to be a microkernel that runs the virtualisation. That to me is the innovation here, everything else is just standard bits. I haven't had time to dig through the splunklogger, but I had hoped that logging was mostly disabled and you could only emit metrics. That was my reading of the PCC manifesto.
- magicloop 2y agoI was studying the code they posted on GitHub. One line of attack is to study the bugs/workarounds in the code. For example, https://github.com/search?q=repo%3Aapple%2Fsecurity-pcc%20rdar&type=code https://github.com/search?q=repo%3Aapple%2Fsecurity-pcc%20rd..., lists out all references to `rdar` which is a link schema for Apple's bug management system. Also, it is clear that the code is cross platform (it references iOS and macOS). So the code here gives clues as to the security operation of iOS as well in case you wanted to do iOS security research. It is lovely to see the middleware here written in Swift. It is quite chunky. Reading all that XPC code gives me the shivers (as I've personal experience with how tricky that can get). Overall it is a very interesting offering. I wish I had two weeks to burn through the details... [I am the author of The Road to Zero, and iOS Crash Dump Analysis].
- nerdjon 2y agoMaybe it is too soon, but I would love it if they included a section of "security research discussion" or something. A place linking to those who talk about the system (good and bad) that understand this far better than I do. I have been trying to look for that but I guess it will likely be a bit longer.
- 1oooqooq 2y agosmoke and mirrors. there is no private other-people-computer, by definition. what those attempts try to do, is to change the definition.
- NightlyDev 2y agoThis marketing is dumb, and if Apple believes that not even they themselves can get access to the information running on the platform, then they could put their money where their mouth is. Increase the max bounty reward from $50 000 to $50 000 000 000 with no other rules than if you can get access to users' request data without having the phone it's sent from, then you get the money, and Apple will not legally pursue the attacker. Is it as secure as they say? Then it doesn't matter if all the money Apple has is the reward, because nobody can get it. A max bounty of $50 000 for "Accidental or unexpected data disclosure due to deployment or configuration issue" is silly low.