3 ms·
> What's not a rarity though is apps (or code in general) that you don't fully trust, and that you don't want to give a chance to exfiltrate all your data for e
by eikenberry 2y ago
> What's not a rarity though is apps (or code in general) that you don't fully trust, and that you don't want to give a chance to exfiltrate all your data for example.
How many of these do you have? I have 1 and I have it installed via a flatpak with sandboxing (that has no access to /tmp).
Flatpak's are an implementation of that container model for software on Linux.
- Quekid5 2y agoAs an obvious example: You should not trust your browser to have access to all of your file system(s) without explicitly allowing at the time of access. The only thing it should (usually) have access to is your "Downloads" folder... and that's about it. Browser security would be a lot less time-sensitive if that were the case. The same logic applies to games, etc. etc. I do NOT trust the developers of these things to get things right 100% of the time, so why even take the risk of allowing their programs unfettered access to all of my files? As a dev, I don't even trust myself to be perfect and I'd like to be able (in my program) to state up from "my code will never touch anything outside Downloads/" or whatever. ETA: The point is minimal trust for any given program to do its thing. I'd like to be even more pithy with something about "trust but verify", but that doesn't quite fit, alas.
- anyfoo 2y agoOn my phone? Tons. My phone has a boatload of data, and I readily install apps. I don't want one rogue update of a rarely used app (supply chain attacks are very real as we know) to get access to all my text messages and email, or to whatever my banking apps keep as state. On my Mac? Less, but it happens. But text messages, photos, and the banking apps installed there etc. are still inaccessible by anything except the thing's I've explicitly given access.