> it's a very strong proof of identity My point is that it is not stronger than the corresponding ability to unlock a private PGP key. OAuth/OIDC is convenien

> it's a very strong proof of identity My point is that it is not stronger than the corresponding ability to unlock a private PGP key. OAuth/OIDC is convenient and has more friendly tooling, I concede this easily. But to make a claim that it's a strong proof of identity would require the account provider behind the OAuth to follow some sort of "know your customer"-like verification to claim more than "the request came from a system which has access to the account." > I don't think anybody was doing this even at the peak of the SKS network. Maybe not? Most of my interaction with PGP was as an attestation of content, I really produced this text. That was relevant in sub-networks of contacts which had mutual trust via signatures, or fingerprints shared through another medium. But that doesn't change my perspective on the threat model. If there is an "evil PyPI" and end users need to have trust of the author, it seems to me the same trust relationship graph needs to be constructed. And that sigstore provides some means to do that means it's less work, and that's great and compelling. But it doesn't actually change the number of points to inspect to conclude "trusted," which seems to fail a simple test of either being more or less difficult to consider as the same number of trust checks need to occur. > But even this assumes more sophistication than the average user is putting into verification Is there some user story for how an end user might "build warm fuzzies" about trusting packages in the post-PEP 740 world? If pip (or some tool) ends up with functionality to effect the verification, the "expecting users to manage keyrings" argument seems to go away, as that tool would also be the logical place to drop that functionality. Or is it that `cosign --verify` is expected to be a lighter lift to document than `gpg --verify`? I see how the ephemeral keys mean revocation of the signing keys is less of a concern. And even how transparency provides an avenue to discover misuse, so long as it is monitored. It seems like PyPI doing some consistency monitoring on behalf of authors would be required to make a claim of trustworthiness, which strikes me as an expanded operational concern.