4 ms·
There shouldn't be. Secure enclaves aren't secure if they can be copied
by HeatrayEnjoyer 2y ago
There shouldn't be. Secure enclaves aren't secure if they can be copied
- lucianbr 2y agoHow does this suddenly become a problem when as the user I want access to my keys, but it isn't a problem when corporations copy my keys between them, which is what this post is about?
- deleted 2y ago[deleted]
- jasonjayr 2y agoSecured against who?
- eikenberry 2y agoSo you are against this new spec becoming a standard then?
- benlivengood 2y agoThe exchange spec suggests that the sending secure enclave sends encrypted credentials to the receiving secure enclave; they're never unwrapped in public between 'trusting' enclaves; which enclaves will trust each other enough to perform the credential transfer is another question.
- noirscape 2y agoIn that case, the keys would be a non-starter. The overwhelming majority of tech requests relate to people forgetting their passwords and getting in trouble because the browser's password manager forgot the password itself. The reality is that the biggest pushers of Passkeys are the providers with the least amount of infrastructure stability. If you want people to get to use Passkeys, providing an exit tool from Google and Apple is a must, because both providers are godawful at not accidentally mushing up your data. That's not so important if all you're using their infrastructure for is a periodic backup/use it to transfer photos to your PC, but it's a problem for anything that has to be stored long-term.
- HeatrayEnjoyer 2y agoAny exit tool just becomes the latest focus of phishers and credential stealing malware.
- lxgr 2y agoPasskeys and secure enclaves are only loosely related. You can implement one using the other, but it’s by no means a requirement. And even when they are, nothing says that secure enclaves can’t have importable or exportable keys. Many schemes do both on a regular basis.
- deleted 2y ago[deleted]