4 ms·

It might be that its vastly more minimal than it appears I'm stating. I already agree with the high adaptability of the motor system -- indeed, that's a core pa

It might be that its vastly more minimal than it appears I'm stating. I already agree with the high adaptability of the motor system -- indeed, that's a core part of my point, since its this system which does the heavy lifting of thinking. Eg., it might be that the kind of "theory" which exists is un/pre-conscious. So that it takes a long time, comparatively, for the baby to become aware of it. Until the baby has a self-conception it cannot consciously form the thought "I am grasping" -- however, consciousness imv is a derivative-abstracting process over-and-above the sensory motor system. So the P(Shape|do(Grasp), BasicTheory(Grasp, Shape)) actually describes something like a sensory-motor 'structure' (eg., a distribution of shapes associated with sensory-motor actions). The proposition that "I am grasping" which allows expressing a propositional confidence requires (self-)consciousness: P(Shape|"I have grasped", Theory(Grasp, Shape)) -- bayesianism only makes sense when the arguments of probability are propositions (since its about beliefs). What's the relationship between the bayesian P(Shape|"I have...") and the causal P(Shape|do(Grasp)) ? The baby requires a conscious bridge from the 'latent structural space' of the sensory-motor system to the intentional belief-space of consciousness. So P(Shape|do(Grasp)) "consciously entails" P(Shape| "I have..") iff the baby has to developed a theory, Theory(MyGrasping|Me) But, perhaps counter-intutively, it is not this theory which allows the baby to reliably compute the shape based on knowing "its their action". It's only the sensory-motor system which needs to "know" (metaphorically) that the grapsing is of the shape. Maybe a better way of putting it then is that the baby requires a procedural mechanism which (nearly-) guarentees that it's actions are causally associated with its sensations such that it's sensations and actions are in a reliable coupling. This 'reliable coupling' has to provide a theory, in a minimal sense, of how likely/relevant/salient/etc. the experiences are given the actions It is this sort of coupling which allows the baby, eventually, to develop an explicit conscious account of its own existence.

bumby 2y ago
I think that makes sense as a philosophical thought, but do you think it's testable to actually tell us anything about the human condition? E.g., If motor movement and causal inference are coupled, would you expect a baby born with locked in syndrome to have a limited notion of self?
- mjburgess 2y ago
  Probably one of the most important muscles is in the eye. If all the muscles of the body are paralysed from birth, yes, no concepts would develop. This is not only testable, but central to neuroscience, and i'd claim, to any actual science of intelligence -- rather the self-aggrandising csci mumbojumbo. On the testing side, you can lesion various parts of the sensory-motor system of mice, run them in various maze-solving experiments under various conditions (etc.) and observe their lack of ability to adapt to novel environments.

bumby 2y ago

I think that makes sense as a philosophical thought, but do you think it's testable to actually tell us anything about the human condition? E.g., If motor movement and causal inference are coupled, would you expect a baby born with locked in syndrome to have a limited notion of self?

mjburgess 2y ago
Probably one of the most important muscles is in the eye. If all the muscles of the body are paralysed from birth, yes, no concepts would develop. This is not only testable, but central to neuroscience, and i'd claim, to any actual science of intelligence -- rather the self-aggrandising csci mumbojumbo. On the testing side, you can lesion various parts of the sensory-motor system of mice, run them in various maze-solving experiments under various conditions (etc.) and observe their lack of ability to adapt to novel environments.