> If the key is 'revokable' that is a weakness in it self. Ish. The threat of that is part of a different risk model, and probably less serious. A long-lived

> If the key is 'revokable' that is a weakness in it self. Ish. The threat of that is part of a different risk model, and probably less serious. A long-lived certificate that ends up being able to be used by a malicious party (perhaps due to a leak of the private key) could be serious for many users if the certificate can't be reliably revoked, which they currently can't be. A mistaken or malicious revocation if someone were to manage that could be an issue to the service operator (users can't get in) but this is a safer failure than users connecting to a malicious shadow service due, for example, to an accidentally exposed private key and a DNS poisoning attack. As others have mentioned: if revocation worked better currently, this would be less of an issue.