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The problem with the hair splitting is that it requires differentiating between different brain states over time where the only difference is the content. On J

The problem with the hair splitting is that it requires differentiating between different brain states over time where the only difference is the content. On Jan 1 2024 I "know" X. Time passes. On Jan 1 2028, I "know" !X. In both cases, there is (a) something it is like to "know" either X or !X (b) discernible brain states the correspond to "knowing" either X or !X and that are distinct from "knowing" neither Thus, even if you don't want to call "knowing X" actually "knowing", it is in just about every sense indistinguishable from "knowing !X". Also, a belief that we had the knowledge that relates to X is indistinguishable from a belief that we had the knowledge that relates to !X. In both cases, we possess knowledge which may be true or false. The knowledge we have at different times alters; at all times we have a belief that we have the knowledge that justifies X or !X, and we are correct in that belief - it is only the knowledge itself that is false.

kragen 2y ago
Maybe the people who use "know" in the way you don't are talking about something other than brain states or qualia. There are lots of propositions like this; if I say, "I fathered Alston", that may be true or false for reasons that are independent of my brain state. Similarly with "I will get home tomorrow before sunset". It may be true or false; I can't actually tell. The same is true of the proposition "I know there are coins in the pocket of the fellow who will get the job", if by "know" we mean something other than a brain state, something we can't directly observe. You evidently want to use the word "know" exclusively to describe a brain state, but many people use it to mean a different thing. Those people are the ones who are having this debate. It's true that you can render this debate, like any debate, into nonsense by redefining the terms they are using, but that in itself doesn't mean that it's inherently nonsense. Maybe you're making the ontological claim that your beliefs about X don't actually become definitely true or false until you have a way to tell the difference? A sort of solipsistic or idealistic worldview? But you seem to reject that claim in your last sentence, saying, "it is only the knowledge itself that is false."
- PaulDavisThe1st 2y ago
  "I know I fathered Alston" .. the reasons it may be true or false are indeed independent of brain state. But "knowing" is not about whether it is true or false, otherwise this whole question becomes tautological. If someone is just going to say "It is not possible to know false things", then sure, by that definition of "know" any brain state that involves a justified belief in a thing that is false is not "knowing". But I consider that a more or less useless definition of "knowing" in context of both Gettier and TFA.
  - mistermann 2y ago
    How about "beliefs that seem to be true are not necessarily true, and the causes of those beliefs may not be valid, especially if examined more closely"? Or, try renaming the variables and see if it still bothers you identically.
  - kragen 2y ago
    I wasn't talking about whether it was true or false that I know I fathered Alston. I didn't say anything about knowing I fathered Alston at all. I was talking about whether it was true or false that I fathered Alston, which (I hope you'll agree) is not a question of my brain state; it's a question of Alston's genetic constitution, and my brain state is entirely irrelevant. I think that, without using a definition of "knowing" that fits the description of definitions you are declaring useless, you won't be able to make any sense of either Gettier or TFA. So, however useful or useless you may find it in other contexts, in the context of trying to understand the debate, it's a very useful family of definitions of "knowing"; it's entirely necessary to your success in that endeavor.

kragen 2y ago

Maybe the people who use "know" in the way you don't are talking about something other than brain states or qualia. There are lots of propositions like this; if I say, "I fathered Alston", that may be true or false for reasons that are independent of my brain state. Similarly with "I will get home tomorrow before sunset". It may be true or false; I can't actually tell. The same is true of the proposition "I know there are coins in the pocket of the fellow who will get the job", if by "know" we mean something other than a brain state, something we can't directly observe. You evidently want to use the word "know" exclusively to describe a brain state, but many people use it to mean a different thing. Those people are the ones who are having this debate. It's true that you can render this debate, like any debate, into nonsense by redefining the terms they are using, but that in itself doesn't mean that it's inherently nonsense. Maybe you're making the ontological claim that your beliefs about X don't actually become definitely true or false until you have a way to tell the difference? A sort of solipsistic or idealistic worldview? But you seem to reject that claim in your last sentence, saying, "it is only the knowledge itself that is false."

PaulDavisThe1st 2y ago
"I know I fathered Alston" .. the reasons it may be true or false are indeed independent of brain state. But "knowing" is not about whether it is true or false, otherwise this whole question becomes tautological. If someone is just going to say "It is not possible to know false things", then sure, by that definition of "know" any brain state that involves a justified belief in a thing that is false is not "knowing". But I consider that a more or less useless definition of "knowing" in context of both Gettier and TFA.
- mistermann 2y ago
  How about "beliefs that seem to be true are not necessarily true, and the causes of those beliefs may not be valid, especially if examined more closely"? Or, try renaming the variables and see if it still bothers you identically.
- kragen 2y ago
  I wasn't talking about whether it was true or false that I know I fathered Alston. I didn't say anything about knowing I fathered Alston at all. I was talking about whether it was true or false that I fathered Alston, which (I hope you'll agree) is not a question of my brain state; it's a question of Alston's genetic constitution, and my brain state is entirely irrelevant. I think that, without using a definition of "knowing" that fits the description of definitions you are declaring useless, you won't be able to make any sense of either Gettier or TFA. So, however useful or useless you may find it in other contexts, in the context of trying to understand the debate, it's a very useful family of definitions of "knowing"; it's entirely necessary to your success in that endeavor.