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I once designed and built an air-gapped system and it did not involve operators plugging USB devices to and from MS Windows machines. (We used data diodes). It
by computerfriend 2y ago
I once designed and built an air-gapped system and it did not involve operators plugging USB devices to and from MS Windows machines. (We used data diodes).
It is strange to me that a security-conscious organisation such as a ministry of foreign affairs would build an air-gapped system this way. Possibly it's a compliance checklist item from their parent organisation, but with no oversight?
The US has "forward deployed" state department personnel that handle information security of embassies and consulates in a standardised way, probably this SE asian country (and the EU organisation) should follow suit.
- varjag 2y agoThe US has a history of major data breaches by low rank IT security personnel throughout multiple branches of the government. A security monoculture is not necessarily a great approach on the balance of things.
- pasiaj 2y ago> Security monoculture is not necessarily a great approach See: Hezbollah & pagers.
- lukan 2y agoThey do and did use many methods of communication and the pagers were just one part of it. Excatly to not be reliant on conventional computers and their insecurities, but seemingly easy and secure devices. They just did not expect the sophistication of the Mossad to hijack the production facilities. (Also their walkie talkies also exploded.)
- zahlman 2y agoMy understanding from the description of the attack is that it didn't rely on any vulnerability in USB, only social engineering made possible by the Windows UI.