3 ms·
Then you’re still at the mercy of the TTY application being secure. Having to go through the analog hole makes it much more difficult. As for patching, you wou
by vlovich123 2y ago
Then you’re still at the mercy of the TTY application being secure. Having to go through the analog hole makes it much more difficult.
As for patching, you would ensure a secure root of trust and only allow read-only media to deliver said updates as another sibling points out
Air gapping is still valuable but it’s still hard to impossible. For example, stuxnet was delivered by an insider. So good physical security and monitoring is also needed to prevent against insider threats.
- gorgoiler 2y agoI think of the sensitive, air-gapped information as an infection. If an old and “infected” machine needs upgrading then it’s easier to put a new, freshly upgraded machine into the infected area, copy the sensitive data over to the new machine, then incinerate the old one. Anything that does come out of the infected area in-tact has to be cleaned or inspected carefully to ensure it is free of the “sensitive data” infection.
- vlovich123 2y agoThat would happen in a secure environment with auditors and multiple sysadmins who would have the ability to do things normally disallowed. Different threat model
- closeparen 2y agoAssuming the goal of the air gap is to prevent information getting out. Stuxnet was not about exfiltrating any data, just causing havoc.