> but the separation is ... weaker than an air-gapped system Not necessarily: https://www.qubes-os.org/faq/#how-does-qubes-os-compare-to-using-a-separate-physi

> but the separation is ... weaker than an air-gapped system Not necessarily: https://www.qubes-os.org/faq/#how-does-qubes-os-compare-to-using-a-separate-physical-machine https://www.qubes-os.org/faq/#how-does-qubes-os-compare-to-u... > But the air-gapped system turned out to be hacked because of the way USB devices are handled by the OS, something that can be very finely controlled in Linux. This is one the key features of Qubes: All USB devices are isolated with hardware virtualization into a dedicated VM. It would protect against the USB attack.