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Some confusions must be cleared up here. The first thing to note is that evolution does not necessary contradict telos. The metaphysical position called evolut

Some confusions must be cleared up here. The first thing to note is that evolution does not necessary contradict telos. The metaphysical position called evolutionism does by definition, but evolution as biological subject matter does not. Second, the question about the stability or reality of human nature is separate from the question of telos. Even if we suppose that there is no such thing as human nature, we would still need to admit kinds, each with some telos, but more importantly, the very notion of efficient causality already presupposes telos. Without telos, you cannot explain the regularity of the effects of efficient causes. The effects of efficient causes are not arbitrary, or else science would be impossible. And biology, per my observations, is showing signs of slowly moving toward open acknowledgement of telos. The notion of "function" is teleological, after all! Third, it is odd to speak of human nature changing. For if there is such a thing, then it is predicable, and predicates do not change. You seem to be making a nominalist sort of claim, i.e., the collection of beings, over time, that we have, for whatever reason, classified as "human" do not actually share the same nature. I cannot make heads or tails of nominalism, nobody can, because I cannot determine why the label "human" was used in the first place and why a mislabeling should be regarded as something significant, as something more than a mislabeling. Nominalism renders the word unintelligible. You might say "Oh, well, we have adaptation!", and I would agree, that human beings have adapted and continue to adapt, but the nature of a thing concerns what is essential or substantial about something. Everything else is either a proper consequence of that (speech), or an accidental adaptation or variation (eye color). As a metaphysician would say, intelligent beings on other planets are, ontologically speaking, also human by virtue of their intellects, even if phylogenetically there is a difference. So, the nominalist claim doesn't even rise to the level of being wrong. I claim that there were humans thousands of years ago, and there are human beings today, and because both instantiate the same human nature. In any case, Etienne Gilson has written a book[0] on this subject. I wouldn't call it a magisterial or exhaustive philosophical work on the subject (others have produced better [1] if you want more heft), but as an introduction to some basic ideas, IIRC, it isn't bad. [0] https://a.co/d/iugLuek https://a.co/d/iugLuek [1] https://a.co/d/eGMDJ61 https://a.co/d/eGMDJ61

keiferski 2y ago
Your comment makes some valid points in a broad philosophical sense, but misses the context and actual specifics we’re talking about. I think it’s probably been downvoted because you strayed away from the point in your first comment. It seemed like you had a particular concept of telos and human nature in mind, so I’m not sure why you’ve gone meta and abstract here in the reply. I made a simple point about the human organism changing, and you’ve made this into an abstract discussion about nominalism. Very much not my intention or interest.
- AlexeyBelov 2y ago
  [flagged]
- lo_zamoyski 2y ago
  It may not be your intention or interest, but that doesn't matter, because you've tread onto metaphysical ground whether you like it or not. Similar criticisms can be wielded against scientism. Scientism is often characterized by an open disdain for metaphysics and philosophical inquiry, but in doing so, it necessarily takes up the mantle of philosophy and necessarily makes metaphysical claims and presuppositions that support their claims, and do so very poorly. And telos is a metaphysical topic. The "simple" point that the "human organism changes" is not so simple. It makes certain presuppositions that are either trivial or incoherent, and yet your point relies on them. Hence, the necessity of my remarks. Also, the only substantive remark I made about human nature is that what is most definitive is the possession of intellect, that is, the ability to abstract from particulars. But that doesn't matter here, as the discussion is about the very existence of human nature, or really any nature as such, not a particular definition, and how nature determines the telos of a thing. Furthermore, the notion of telos I make use of is the "usual" (which is to say, the correct one; the popular misconception common among materialists that involves conscious intent is crude, as conscious intent is only a special case, whereas telos is a broader concept that is needed to explains any change whatever).
  - keiferski 2y ago
    If you had a concrete, straightforward point to make, you'd have made it already. Since you haven't done that, and are instead retreating into this meta-philosophical discussion, I'm going to guess that you don't have one. It's really quite unclear how any of this has anything to do with the original question of what one should prioritize, or what your specific teleological answer to that question is. Having a philosophical discussion requires one to communicate ideas in an understandable way. If you can't do that, there is no conversation to have here. And before you ramble into another jargon-laded comment, let me stop you: I have a degree in philosophy, these terms aren't unfamiliar to me, and yet this is very much not how professionals have philosophical discussions about complex issues. I really can't make heads or tails of what you're trying to say here, because you aren't communicating your ideas in a direct manner. From what I understand, it seems like you're saying that the concept of human nature cannot change, because it's inherent in the definition of a thing's nature that it doesn't change. You might say "Oh, well, we have adaptation!", and I would agree, that human beings have adapted and continue to adapt, but the nature of a thing concerns what is essential or substantial about something. ...which is not a very interesting point, frankly. So let me put it this way, again: 1. The organism which comprises the thing we call "human" has changed, over time, and will continue to change. This seems...scientifically uncontroversial to me. 2. And therefore, my argument is that trying to derive some sort of ultimate teleological purpose from this clearly changing thing is fruitless, and one's effort is better used toward accepting change. 3. Additionally, this way of talking about telos is also quite embedded in a worldview that was pre-evolutionary, which IMO makes it suspect from the start. What precisely do you agree or disagree with above? Edit: I just clicked on the books you mentioned, and it seems to me that 1) there is some deeper argument at work here, and 2) you are just repeating the argument from the book, or at least not explaining its argument in a more coherent form amenable to a HN discussion. If that's the case, I obviously cannot read and reply to a book-length argument in a HN comment. However, I'll definitely give these a read – and thanks for the suggestion.

keiferski 2y ago

Your comment makes some valid points in a broad philosophical sense, but misses the context and actual specifics we’re talking about. I think it’s probably been downvoted because you strayed away from the point in your first comment. It seemed like you had a particular concept of telos and human nature in mind, so I’m not sure why you’ve gone meta and abstract here in the reply. I made a simple point about the human organism changing, and you’ve made this into an abstract discussion about nominalism. Very much not my intention or interest.

AlexeyBelov 2y ago
[flagged]
lo_zamoyski 2y ago
It may not be your intention or interest, but that doesn't matter, because you've tread onto metaphysical ground whether you like it or not. Similar criticisms can be wielded against scientism. Scientism is often characterized by an open disdain for metaphysics and philosophical inquiry, but in doing so, it necessarily takes up the mantle of philosophy and necessarily makes metaphysical claims and presuppositions that support their claims, and do so very poorly. And telos is a metaphysical topic. The "simple" point that the "human organism changes" is not so simple. It makes certain presuppositions that are either trivial or incoherent, and yet your point relies on them. Hence, the necessity of my remarks. Also, the only substantive remark I made about human nature is that what is most definitive is the possession of intellect, that is, the ability to abstract from particulars. But that doesn't matter here, as the discussion is about the very existence of human nature, or really any nature as such, not a particular definition, and how nature determines the telos of a thing. Furthermore, the notion of telos I make use of is the "usual" (which is to say, the correct one; the popular misconception common among materialists that involves conscious intent is crude, as conscious intent is only a special case, whereas telos is a broader concept that is needed to explains any change whatever).
- keiferski 2y ago
  If you had a concrete, straightforward point to make, you'd have made it already. Since you haven't done that, and are instead retreating into this meta-philosophical discussion, I'm going to guess that you don't have one. It's really quite unclear how any of this has anything to do with the original question of what one should prioritize, or what your specific teleological answer to that question is. Having a philosophical discussion requires one to communicate ideas in an understandable way. If you can't do that, there is no conversation to have here. And before you ramble into another jargon-laded comment, let me stop you: I have a degree in philosophy, these terms aren't unfamiliar to me, and yet this is very much not how professionals have philosophical discussions about complex issues. I really can't make heads or tails of what you're trying to say here, because you aren't communicating your ideas in a direct manner. From what I understand, it seems like you're saying that the concept of human nature cannot change, because it's inherent in the definition of a thing's nature that it doesn't change. You might say "Oh, well, we have adaptation!", and I would agree, that human beings have adapted and continue to adapt, but the nature of a thing concerns what is essential or substantial about something. ...which is not a very interesting point, frankly. So let me put it this way, again: 1. The organism which comprises the thing we call "human" has changed, over time, and will continue to change. This seems...scientifically uncontroversial to me. 2. And therefore, my argument is that trying to derive some sort of ultimate teleological purpose from this clearly changing thing is fruitless, and one's effort is better used toward accepting change. 3. Additionally, this way of talking about telos is also quite embedded in a worldview that was pre-evolutionary, which IMO makes it suspect from the start. What precisely do you agree or disagree with above? Edit: I just clicked on the books you mentioned, and it seems to me that 1) there is some deeper argument at work here, and 2) you are just repeating the argument from the book, or at least not explaining its argument in a more coherent form amenable to a HN discussion. If that's the case, I obviously cannot read and reply to a book-length argument in a HN comment. However, I'll definitely give these a read – and thanks for the suggestion.