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The problem with this, and with Aristotle-esque ways of defining “ultimate ends”, is that they are from a world before evolution was understood in any real sens

The problem with this, and with Aristotle-esque ways of defining “ultimate ends”, is that they are from a world before evolution was understood in any real sense. Because once you realize that “human” is a label describing a point of time in the development of a constantly changing organism, it becomes difficult or impossible to determine exactly what “human nature” is in the first place. This problem is a more fundamental one and it’s only going to get more complex as genetic engineering, cyborgization, etc. continue to develop. In general I think it’s more fruitful to find purpose in change, even if that means singular fleeting moments, for example, mono no aware in Japanese aesthetics. https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/japanese-aesthetics/#MonoNoAwarPathThin https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/japanese-aesthetics/#Mono...

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brightball 2y ago
> it becomes difficult or impossible to determine exactly what “human nature” is in the first place. I understand the perspective and the rationale is certainly sound on a long timeline (millions of years), but on the timeline of known human history and civilization "human nature" can be observed and defined much more easily. Even reading the Old Testament and other very old books that give us a picture into a range of a few thousand years, it becomes clear that human nature has not changed in at least that time period. Because of that, observing human nature within the range of a few millennia is perfectly reasonable. If evolution turns us into something else, then Human 2.0 Nature will become a thing.
- keiferski 2y ago
  But that's only if you take a very narrow definition of what "human" is. I think a better definition wouldn't be as limited on the specific isolated organism, but rather on the organism within its environment – and that includes society as well as the actual physical environment. Nature/biology isn't very exclusionary and a lot of things are better looked at as ecosystems. From that perspective, the "human" has definitely changed since a few thousand years ago.
  - brightball 2y ago
    It really hasn't though. Customs and laws may change but the behaviors of people in their environments remain pretty much the same. It's very eye opening.
lo_zamoyski 2y ago
Some confusions must be cleared up here. The first thing to note is that evolution does not necessary contradict telos. The metaphysical position called evolutionism does by definition, but evolution as biological subject matter does not. Second, the question about the stability or reality of human nature is separate from the question of telos. Even if we suppose that there is no such thing as human nature, we would still need to admit kinds, each with some telos, but more importantly, the very notion of efficient causality already presupposes telos. Without telos, you cannot explain the regularity of the effects of efficient causes. The effects of efficient causes are not arbitrary, or else science would be impossible. And biology, per my observations, is showing signs of slowly moving toward open acknowledgement of telos. The notion of "function" is teleological, after all! Third, it is odd to speak of human nature changing. For if there is such a thing, then it is predicable, and predicates do not change. You seem to be making a nominalist sort of claim, i.e., the collection of beings, over time, that we have, for whatever reason, classified as "human" do not actually share the same nature. I cannot make heads or tails of nominalism, nobody can, because I cannot determine why the label "human" was used in the first place and why a mislabeling should be regarded as something significant, as something more than a mislabeling. Nominalism renders the word unintelligible. You might say "Oh, well, we have adaptation!", and I would agree, that human beings have adapted and continue to adapt, but the nature of a thing concerns what is essential or substantial about something. Everything else is either a proper consequence of that (speech), or an accidental adaptation or variation (eye color). As a metaphysician would say, intelligent beings on other planets are, ontologically speaking, also human by virtue of their intellects, even if phylogenetically there is a difference. So, the nominalist claim doesn't even rise to the level of being wrong. I claim that there were humans thousands of years ago, and there are human beings today, and because both instantiate the same human nature. In any case, Etienne Gilson has written a book[0] on this subject. I wouldn't call it a magisterial or exhaustive philosophical work on the subject (others have produced better [1] if you want more heft), but as an introduction to some basic ideas, IIRC, it isn't bad. [0] https://a.co/d/iugLuek https://a.co/d/iugLuek [1] https://a.co/d/eGMDJ61 https://a.co/d/eGMDJ61
- keiferski 2y ago
  Your comment makes some valid points in a broad philosophical sense, but misses the context and actual specifics we’re talking about. I think it’s probably been downvoted because you strayed away from the point in your first comment. It seemed like you had a particular concept of telos and human nature in mind, so I’m not sure why you’ve gone meta and abstract here in the reply. I made a simple point about the human organism changing, and you’ve made this into an abstract discussion about nominalism. Very much not my intention or interest.

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brightball 2y ago

> it becomes difficult or impossible to determine exactly what “human nature” is in the first place. I understand the perspective and the rationale is certainly sound on a long timeline (millions of years), but on the timeline of known human history and civilization "human nature" can be observed and defined much more easily. Even reading the Old Testament and other very old books that give us a picture into a range of a few thousand years, it becomes clear that human nature has not changed in at least that time period. Because of that, observing human nature within the range of a few millennia is perfectly reasonable. If evolution turns us into something else, then Human 2.0 Nature will become a thing.

keiferski 2y ago
But that's only if you take a very narrow definition of what "human" is. I think a better definition wouldn't be as limited on the specific isolated organism, but rather on the organism within its environment – and that includes society as well as the actual physical environment. Nature/biology isn't very exclusionary and a lot of things are better looked at as ecosystems. From that perspective, the "human" has definitely changed since a few thousand years ago.
- brightball 2y ago
  It really hasn't though. Customs and laws may change but the behaviors of people in their environments remain pretty much the same. It's very eye opening.

lo_zamoyski 2y ago

Some confusions must be cleared up here. The first thing to note is that evolution does not necessary contradict telos. The metaphysical position called evolutionism does by definition, but evolution as biological subject matter does not. Second, the question about the stability or reality of human nature is separate from the question of telos. Even if we suppose that there is no such thing as human nature, we would still need to admit kinds, each with some telos, but more importantly, the very notion of efficient causality already presupposes telos. Without telos, you cannot explain the regularity of the effects of efficient causes. The effects of efficient causes are not arbitrary, or else science would be impossible. And biology, per my observations, is showing signs of slowly moving toward open acknowledgement of telos. The notion of "function" is teleological, after all! Third, it is odd to speak of human nature changing. For if there is such a thing, then it is predicable, and predicates do not change. You seem to be making a nominalist sort of claim, i.e., the collection of beings, over time, that we have, for whatever reason, classified as "human" do not actually share the same nature. I cannot make heads or tails of nominalism, nobody can, because I cannot determine why the label "human" was used in the first place and why a mislabeling should be regarded as something significant, as something more than a mislabeling. Nominalism renders the word unintelligible. You might say "Oh, well, we have adaptation!", and I would agree, that human beings have adapted and continue to adapt, but the nature of a thing concerns what is essential or substantial about something. Everything else is either a proper consequence of that (speech), or an accidental adaptation or variation (eye color). As a metaphysician would say, intelligent beings on other planets are, ontologically speaking, also human by virtue of their intellects, even if phylogenetically there is a difference. So, the nominalist claim doesn't even rise to the level of being wrong. I claim that there were humans thousands of years ago, and there are human beings today, and because both instantiate the same human nature. In any case, Etienne Gilson has written a book[0] on this subject. I wouldn't call it a magisterial or exhaustive philosophical work on the subject (others have produced better [1] if you want more heft), but as an introduction to some basic ideas, IIRC, it isn't bad. [0] https://a.co/d/iugLuek https://a.co/d/iugLuek [1] https://a.co/d/eGMDJ61 https://a.co/d/eGMDJ61

keiferski 2y ago
Your comment makes some valid points in a broad philosophical sense, but misses the context and actual specifics we’re talking about. I think it’s probably been downvoted because you strayed away from the point in your first comment. It seemed like you had a particular concept of telos and human nature in mind, so I’m not sure why you’ve gone meta and abstract here in the reply. I made a simple point about the human organism changing, and you’ve made this into an abstract discussion about nominalism. Very much not my intention or interest.