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It's too far outside the Overton Window: not only should KYC not be mandatory, KYC should be illegal. MoneyGram should not be permitted to collect its customer
by kragen 2y ago
It's too far outside the Overton Window: not only should KYC not be mandatory, KYC should be illegal. MoneyGram should not be permitted to collect its customers' personally identifiable information. That's because breaches like this are a national security vulnerability. Privacy is the foundation of civil defense.
This policy will remain outside the Overton Window until several more digital Pearl Harbors like the one that just happened in Lebanon, where Israel was able to leverage its surveillance of Hizbullah members into an almost total annihilation of Hizbullah as an organization. Many other armed forces around the world are going to experience the same thing over the next decade, because it's far too late for soldiers' and politicians' family members to avoid ever signing up for Facebook, Zelle, PayPal, MoneyGram, etc.
I don't know what the landing looks like, but before we get there, this flight may experience some turbulence.
- sofixa 2y ago> not only should KYC not be mandatory, KYC should be illegal. MoneyGram should not be permitted to collect its customers' personally identifiable information. That's because breaches like this are a national security vulnerability. Privacy is the foundation of civil defense Personal opinion: that's a pipe dream and it's never going to happen. Moving money is an extremely vital part of modern economies, and importantly, of underground ones. You mention Hizbollah - without KYC they would have been able to more easily receive donations from sympathisers and use those funds to buy stuff from everywhere. Their surveillance by Israeili services wasn't online surveillance, because the group has already been burned by advanced Israeli cybersecurity attacks. They were using pagers ffs, do you really think their members were tracked and surveilled online? And the same would apply for stuff like criminal regimes evading sanctions even more, cartels laundering their money, financial scams like Wirecard proliferating even more. Look at the crypto space that promised to change that - outside of the absurd lack of practicality, it led to millions of scams, money laundering operations, North Korea abusing it to fund itself, and the like.
- squigz 2y ago> should not be permitted to collect its customers' personally identifiable information. No. They should not be permitted to retain and/or sell that information. Out of curiosity, why do you think we have KYC laws in the first place?
- CatWChainsaw 2y agoThey exist so the obscenely wealthy can have financial privacy via shell companies, and the non-obscenely wealthy can be financially surveilled.
- hakfoo 2y agoA sensible approach might be to outsource the KYC process to a central state agency. We already have rudimentary forms of that-- like the fingerprint-clearance cards you sometimes need for working with the vulnerable. Why would it be any harder to grep the database for financial criminals than sex offenders? Give me the ability to generate a signed certificate that says "hakfoo is not currently denylisted for financial crimes" and let me submit it as part of account onboarding. Maybe include some new, non-SSN, low-stakes identifier so I can't make forty different certificates and pretend to be forty people. Such an agency can be more privacy forward than any private player: there's no financial motivation for them to be "sharing data with our partners and affiliates", and is structurally disinterested in expanding its reach into other data-grab products (looking at you, credit reporting services). If the banks and such really have to do some sort of data-derived KYC-theatre-- looking for structuring and spurious patterns-- it could still be done with minimal personal data-- tracking the accounts by UUIDs.
- kragen 2y agoThis would certainly help with reducing the structural incentives to sell the data, and it might help with preventing its theft. But it might instead make the theft problem worse, because the database it created would be both larger and more comprehensive and reliable. Such a database would be a more valuable prize, whether for a military coup, an invasion, employee corruption, or simply an infosec failure like this one. The reduction in attack surface and improvements in defender competence enabled by such centralization might not be enough to compensate. See Stuxnet for one such example—it wasn't related to privacy, but it seems unlikely that the Iran's National Organization For Civil Registration is any better able to prevent foreign penetration of its systems than its nuclear energy agency was, so presumably the Mossad has a complete and up-to-date copy of its national identity database. Such information seems likely to be very valuable in circumstances such as the assassination of Ismail Haniyeh and the next few months of open war between Israel and Iran.