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Yeah but I imagine the ice is getting thin. Sure, use of key pinning on the web failed - but for instance banking apps commonly use it. Once monitoring Certific
by blablabla123 2y ago
Yeah but I imagine the ice is getting thin. Sure, use of key pinning on the web failed - but for instance banking apps commonly use it. Once monitoring Certificate transparency logs gets more traction, things like that could get noticed.
- davisr 2y agoHow does the use of certificate pinning mean anything when a FISA court can demand the keys and issue a gag order to prevent public disclosure?
- gruez 2y ago1. AFAIK no government, even authoritarian ones, coerced a CA to misissue a certificate. There have, however, been plenty of other ways governments are able to get certificates, like seizing the domains/servers. 2. Even if they did, chrome has enforced certificate transparency, so a gag order on the CA/CT provider would simply result in the certificate being rejected.
- hulitu 2y ago> 1. AFAIK no government, even authoritarian ones, coerced a CA to misissue a certificate. As far as you and i know. Those things are not public. Helps with espionage (see Crypto AG).
- blablabla123 2y agoSure, but then it isn't related to the CA system anymore and any action from them wouldn't be under the radar anymore. Also this problem would apply to any key like gpg. Well, as long as it's not in a Hardware security module. Of course they could also seize that but at some point it becomes logistically impractical, at least for mass surveillance.