4 ms·
Lately I've been pondering how one might create a "probably a human"/skin-in-the-game system. For example, imagine visiting an "attestor" site where you can mak
by Terr_ 2y ago
Lately I've been pondering how one might create a "probably a human"/skin-in-the-game system. For example, imagine visiting an "attestor" site where you can make a one-time donation of $5 to a charity of your choice, and in exchange it gives you some proof-you-spent-money tokens. Those tokens can be spent (burned) by some collaborating site (e.g. HN) to mark your account there as likely a human, or at least a bot whose owner will feel pain if it is banned.
This would be far more privacy-preserving that dozens of national-ID lookup systems, and despite the appearance of "money for speech" it could actually be _cheaper_ than whatever mix of time and bus-fare and paperwork in a "free" system.
____________
I imagine the big problems would be things like:
* How to handle fraudulent payments, e.g. someone buying tokens with a stolen credit card. Easiest fix would be some long waiting-period before the token becomes usable.
* How to protect against a fraudulent attestor site that just takes your money, or one whose tokens are value-less.
* How to protect against a fraudulent destination site that secretly harvests your proof-token for its own use, as opposed to testing/burning it properly. Possible social fix: Put in a fake token, if the site "accepts" then you know it's misbehaving.
* Handling decentralization, where multiple donation sites may be issuing their own tokens and multiple account-sites that may only want to support/trust a subset of those tokens.
- doctorpangloss 2y ago> Lately I've been pondering how one might create a "probably a human"/skin-in-the-game system. This has the same energy as the "we need benchmarks for LLMs" startups. Like sure it's obvious and you can imagine really complex cathedrals about it. But nobody wants that. They "just" want Apple and Google to provide access to the same APIs their apps and backends use, associating authentic phone activity with user accounts. You already get most of the way there by supporting iCloud login, which should illuminate to you what you are really asking for is to play outside of Apple's ecosystem, a totally different ask.
- tim333 2y agoThere is the much slagged off but maybe effective Worldcoin.
- LoganDark 2y agoNothing like this or Worldcoin ever will be useful in any capacity for qualifying non-fraudsters, because fraudsters will have an infinite supply from people they tricked while non-fraudsters will only have what they've personally been given. So it'll basically do the opposite of what you want.
- tim333 2y agoWorldcoin IDs are one per person and I've not heard of people tricked to give them away. Some have been bought for cash but there's a limit to how many of those will be available. In practice they are no good for verifying humans on blogs and the like though because only about 0.0003% of humans have one. But maybe something a bit like that that's easier to get?
- LoganDark 2y ago> I've not heard of people tricked to give them away. People can be tricked to give anything away. > In practice they are no good for verifying humans on blogs and the like though because only about 0.0003% of humans have one. Even if every human had one it'd still be useless.
- mandibles 2y agoHave you checked out the L402[0] protocol? It's basically using the HTTP 402: Payment Required status code and serving up a Lightning Network payment invoice. Edit to add: it basically solves all of the caveat issues you identified. [0]: https://l402.org/ https://l402.org/
- akoboldfrying 2y ago>Possible social fix: Put in a fake token, if the site "accepts" then you know it's misbehaving. IIUC the tokens would need to be cheaply verifiable by anyone as authentically issued, so a fake token would never be accepted (or if it somehow was, it would only tell you that the acceptor is fantastically lazy/incompetent). I think that that verifiability, plus a guarantee that tokens will not be spent twice, plus visibility of all transactions, suffice: Then anyone can check the public ledger x minutes after they spent their and verify that the acceptor sent it straight to the burn address after receiving it. IOW, blockchain suffices. OTOH, it would be nice not to have to need the public ledger.
- Terr_ 2y agoI think blockchain is (as usual) the wrong tool for the job here, since it would dramatically increase code/bugs/complexity/onboarding-cost while also introducing new privacy risks. After all, we're already trusting that a given attestor/issuer isn't just handing out tokens willy-nilly. By comparison, here's a simpler "single HTTP call" approach, where a site like HN makes a POST to the issuer's API, which would semantically be like: "Hey, here is a potential token T and a big random confirmation number C. If T is valid, burn it and record C as the cause. Otherwise change nothing. Finally tell me whether-or-not that same T was burned in the last 7 days along with the same C that I gave." The benefits of this approach are: 1. The issuer just has to maintain a list of surviving tokens and a smaller short-lived list of recent (T,C) burning activity, and use easy standard DB transactions to stop conflicts or double-spending. 2. All the social-media site has to do is create a random number C for burning a given T, and temporarily remember the pair until it gets a yes-or-no answer. 3. A malicious social-media site cannot separate testing the token from spending it on a legitimate site, which deters a business model of harvest-and-resale. However it could spend it immediately for its own purposes, which is worth further discussion. 4. The idempotent API call resists connection hiccups and works for really basic retry logic, avoiding "wasted" tokens. 5. The issuer doesn't know how or where a given token is being used, beyond what it can infer from the POST request source IP. It certainly doesn't know which social-media account it just verified, unless the two sites collude or the social-media site is stupid and doesn't use random C values.
- brian_cunnie 2y ago> you can make a one-time donation of $5 to a charity of your choice ... The Alcoholics Anonymous San Francisco website had to implement CAPTCHAs on their website because scammers were making one-time donations to make sure their stolen credit cards were still valid. Every morning we had to invalidate a dozen obviously-fake donations.
- Terr_ 2y agoDefinitely an issue. I don't really like the idea of long-term Patreon-eseque relationship between the individual user and the attestor/issuer site, but it could be done. The charitable giving is more of a means-to-and-end than a goal, functioning as a kind of "observed spending" which is harder to fake than, say, buying something from yourself on ebay. If tokens had to mature for X days before being used that could deter laundering pretty handily, but stopping "tests" of cards would require hiding payment errors from the user for a certain period... which would not be a great experience.
- LorenPechtel 2y agoYup. Charitable donations are a way to spend money without it pointing to you and thus a common test for a stolen card.
- ackbar03 2y agowhat happens if you don't invalidate them?
- schnitzelstoat 2y agoIt's an unauthorised payment so I guess at that point the police get involved.
- deleted 2y ago[deleted]
- homero 2y agoYou'll get a chargeback when the owner sees it
- esperent 2y agoIt seems to me that ideas like this are unworkable due to income inequality. $5 isn't much for a wealthy westerner. It's a reasonable amount for an unemployed westerner. It's 12% of their weekly budget for someone earning median wage ($160/month) in Vietnam. But if you put in place regional pricing, it'll be cheap enough that spammers will just operate out of low income countries and buy thousands of cheap accounts.
- Terr_ 2y ago> It seems to me that ideas like this are unworkable due to income inequality. There's no reason you can't have an attestation entity that's based on volunteer hours, provided you can convince sites-in-general that your proof-units are good. The core theme isn't about cash, but that:that: 1. There are kinds of activity someone can do which demonstrates some kind of distinct actual expenditure of time or effort (not self-dealing.) 2. A trusted agent could attest to that activity. 3. Requiring (proof of) activity gives you an decent way to ward off the majority of bots/spam in a relatively simple way that doesn't become a complex privacy nightmare. It's a similar outcome to sending CPU-bound challenges to a client, except without the deliberate-waste and without a strong bias towards people who can afford their own fast computer.
- Woeps 2y agoThe issue is that it another system that puts the "blame" and/or work people instead of dealing with the root cause. So in that case nothing changes. Because I wonder how are people going to do volunteering hours, get it recognized trough red tape/bureaucracy if they're already struggling to survive.
- nkrisc 2y agoIs still completely asymmetric in that the poorer you are, the harder you have to work to now simply access the same resources online as everyone else. And the poor get poorer.
- tim333 2y ago
- squigz 2y agoAs a poor disabled citizen who also cares about privacy and freedom, I haven't heard a single idea for attestation that doesn't scare the shit out of me. But then, I'm a poor, disabled citizen, so my opinion doesn't hold much weight.
- Terr_ 2y agoGiven that being summarily blocked from participation by paranoid site-operators is already a existing scary problem, what kind of fix would you suggest that adds the least additional scariness? Personally, I am particularly concerned with avoiding the scariness of a government agency that inherently knows all the websites all people are using.
- squigz 2y agoI would at least hope we'd consider whether more 'fixes' are actually worth it. It seems to me that 40 years of 'fixes' haven't done much to combat spam and the like, and has instead just made it harder for people like me to access and browse the Internet.
- Terr_ 2y agoI'm trying to discern a positive proposal from that, and the best I can extract seems to be "stop fighting and just let the bad people operate unopposed", which doesn't seem workable to me. Security/anti-spam is probably not biggest accessibility factor in the last 40 years of change anyway: It's easier to make an alternate CAPTCHA route than to convince management a phone-app is unnecessary, or to correctly annotate everything with aria/alt-text properties in all the languages.
- squigz 2y ago> I'm trying to discern a positive proposal from that, and the best I can extract seems to be "stop fighting and just let the bad people operate unopposed." That's not a very generous reading, I think. I am suggesting that the "bad people" seem to be doing fine, so at a certain point we might want to ask ourselves how far we take this "fight" in terms of sacrificing accessibility and privacy (to only name 2 concerns) to stop some percentage of bad actors. As someone who has been hurt by these efforts over the past 20+ years, and who has yet to hear a proposal for next steps that doesn't greatly worry me, I'm not going to be in favor of propositions just because "well we have to do something" > It may also be blaming the wrong factors and growing pains. It's easier to make an alternate CAPTCHA route than to convince management to not rely on a phone app or to correctly annotate everything with aria-properties in all the languages. We've had 20 years to make CAPTCHAs more accessible, yet they've gotten worse. Not to mention their efficacy being in question, hence the discussion about next steps (i.e., attestation)