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The philosopher of science Pamela Lyon writes that “taking seriously modern evolutionary and cell biology arguably now requires recognition that the information
by brudgers 2y ago
The philosopher of science Pamela Lyon writes that “taking seriously modern evolutionary and cell biology arguably now requires recognition that the information-processing dynamics of ‘simpler’ forms of life are part of a continuum with human cognition.”
Cognition as a property of all matter is the simplest premise for any materialist theory of the mind.
Any and all theories that divide matter into cognitive and non-cognitive types are logically equivalent to Cartesian dualism. Socially of course, scientific-dualism is often more palatable to contemporary intellects.
- 7e 2y agoIs life not necessary for cognition, then? I would say almost certainly that some forms of matter are not alive. Similarly, it’s hard to imagine some forms of matter having a cognition level that isn’t zero, even if it is a continuum.
- altruios 2y agowell... Which parts of the (skin) cell are alive? Here are the options: 1: All of it is irreducibly together alive. 2: Some of it is alive, some of it is not. If 1: then life is made of non living material. If 2: repeat the above options with this new smallest piece of life. If there are no parts left to examine without reaching 1: then it is all alive. Then we are left with two options. A: Life is made of non-living material in specific arrangements. B: life is a property of all material. More than likely we are dealing with the first option. Life from non-living material. Which implies life could be created from other arrangements of materials that function analogously to a cell (at a different scale, maybe). This question may be settled soon... well, as soon as someone builds a x-sized replica of a cell and proves it 'works' (given proper input/output/environment). My gut also tells me this is true: with the following reasoning. A chair isn't actually any particular chair, but a template: a pattern, which can be expressed in other materials besides any one particular example. A pattern can be expressed in different mediums, and life looks like such a template... to me at least. That's my two cents: add some salt.
- p1esk 2y agoWhat about AI software running on silicon chips? Soon it will reach levels of complexity vastly exceeding any human brain. To these systems we will look like bugs, or maybe even just cells - they might not even classify us as being alive, let alone intelligent.
- dkersten 2y ago“Soon it will reach levels of complexity vastly exceeding any human brain.” I doubt the “soon” part. Artificial neurons are vast simplifications of real neurons, and even complex networks like GPT don’t come close the complexity of biological networks, both in network structure and in terms of what goes on between the neurons (eg chemical processes, as opposed to just the activity of the neurons themselves). Individual neurons have been shown to have capability to both process and store information, something which artificial ones don’t do. Besides, we are only scratching the surface in our understanding of biological neurons and brains. How can we say “this thing we built that is a vast simplification of this thing we barely understand will soon exceed the complexity of the thing we don’t yet understand”?
- p1esk 2y agoBecause it’s already able to do almost everything a brain can? State of the art AI models can already learn, reason, communicate, and even create - better than most humans. Using a lot less neurons, and much simpler neuronal structures. All trends indicate we’re only a couple years away from an AI superintelligence. No additional understanding of biological brains is required to get there.
- altruios 2y agoI remember a similar argument made since the 1980's... 40 years later and a lot of stall-outs... It could be hubris to assume we know enough yet to replicate our 'kind' of intelligence. Just as it might be hubris to assert AI doesn't have some 'kind' of experience. A minimum (which will be raised once we have a better understanding) is still: change of state, to have an experience - we simply don't know what else exactly is required, so that threshold minimum remains to be raised.
- brudgers 2y ago“It’s hard to imagine” is a statement about one’s imagination and knowledge. It is not evidence (absent an arbitrary metaphysics giving humans special status within the world (or cognition being universal)).
- cosignal 2y agoJust to be clear, "the information-processing dynamics of ‘simpler’ forms of life" being "part of a continuum with human cognition" does not strictly imply "Cognition as a property of all matter". Also, I fail to see how the latter is the "simplest premise for any materialist theory of the mind". How is it simpler to say that "all matter has cognition as a basic property" than to assume "certain arranges of matter exhibit cognition"?
- Lerc 2y ago"certain arranges of matter exhibit cognition" This is the threshold I talk about in my sibling comment. It is very difficult to come up with a materialist argument for what about that 'certain arrangement' makes cognition. I am unsure if it is possible to prove that there is no such argument, but I don't think we have made any progress in finding one either.
- brudgers 2y ago“Exhibit cognition” is weak sauce anyway. Do we doubt people we know think when they are absent? Is our phone exhibiting cognition when we have telephone conversations?
- tshaddox 2y agoIsn’t that just the sorites paradox?
- Lerc 2y agoI don't think so. The distinction is about whether or not there is a point of transition. The sorites paradox is more about identifying where the transition is. You can apply sorites paradox to a colour gradient going from red to , green arguing you can't pinpoint the threshold but you wouldn't deny that the transition point is somewhere within the range. I never found the sorites paradox to be a terribly challenging argument in itself. Formal proofs rely on the assumption that a tiny change to a state is the same is no change and thus an an accumulation of tiny changes is also no change. I just don't accept the base premise. The common sense arguments with grains of sand in a pile, trees in a forest etc. just seem to rely on the vagueness of definition allowing individual judgement to place the threshold at different places.
- Lerc 2y agoIt needn't be dualism if there is some threshold that makes things conscious, but then people can ask what that threshold is and why, without a good answer people will think you're leaning on dualism again. I doubt there is such a threshold, I think the issue people have with the idea that rocks might have cognition is it too difficult to perceive the difference in scale of complexity of a brain compared to a rock. People have trouble comprehending the idea of a millionth, going further than that there is the intrinsic difficulty of accepting something existing at a scale you cannot perceive or even conceive of what that might be.
- woopsn 2y agoBut we go to sleep, into deep anaesthesia, and to lesser degrees can lose or have degraded our various senses and cognitive capabilities - doesn't this show that the "thresholds" exist, evidently? Drink a bottle of vodka and you will slowly, and then completely, "lose consciousness". The issue folks have with the idea rocks are cognizant is that we can't see any reason to suppose that they are.
- whythre 2y ago‘I think, therefore all matter must think’ is just such an unsubstantiated jump. Creatures having limited cognitive process, sure, of course. Rocks or other unliving matter thinking? That requires a lot of faith in materialism, so much so it starts looking a lot like primitive spiritism/shamanism.
- MattPalmer1086 2y agoNo, the simplest explanation is that cognition is the result of arranging matter into structures that can process information in cognitive ways. There is no division into cognitive and non cognitive matter. Cognition is not a direct property of matter at all.
- slowmovintarget 2y agoNo. That's panpsychism, and that's nonsense. Cognition may be a property of all neural systems, but it is certainly not a property of all matter.