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One would think that putting a kill switch on many but not all missiles would be the way to go. Say you have a missile field with 400 ICBMs and 300 of them, sel
by jjk166 2y ago
One would think that putting a kill switch on many but not all missiles would be the way to go. Say you have a missile field with 400 ICBMs and 300 of them, selected at random, are kill switched, and the selection changes every couple of months. You can respond to a limited first strike immediately and if it's a false alarm you avoid armageddon. If your kill switch is compromised you still have enough nukes to devastate a continent, and your adversary still needs to be able to counter the whole lot. In the case of an accidental or unauthorized launch, the odds that any of them will not be kill switched is low, and even if some are, the in flight detonation of those that aren't demonstrates a good faith effort to minimize damage.
The big downside would be the potential for increased nuclear brinkmanship, as a state might deliberately launch a few missiles and then destroy them to demonstrate just how on edge they are, or to test their opponent's resolve, but that's a reason to not want your adversaries to have a kill switch, not a reason to avoid a kill switch on your own missiles.
- a_vanderbilt 2y agoOne would argue that armageddon is triggered the moment any nuclear warheads are detonated. The dual capability of many launch vehicles keeps things ambiguous until something explodes, but make no mistake that nuclear retaliation would be imminent if not immediate. World leaders love being alive, but the chain of command trends towards an inevitable outcome. Strike before all your arrows are broken. In my experience, a limited-destruction but full-scale launch would not be supported by leadership. We already have vehicles designed to fail, they are called penetration aids. Once terminal descent is achieved the fate of the target is sealed. PALs and intentional weak links are the fail-safes. If a warhead makes it into orbit, the die is cast and we are committed to that scenario. If a warhead is detected by the target, luck alone might prevent a full-scale exchange. This has happened before, but it wasn't a missile launch that triggered it. Tangential but relevant: Modern doctrine is not centered around population centers, although some are certainly included due to proximity or extreme tactical value. If you know why the Black Hills in NC would be targeted then you understand. Military forces with occupational capacity are concerned with counter-force, not counter-value.
- madink 2y ago> Military forces with occupational capacity are concerned with counter-force, not counter-value. Indeed, that's why the french nuclear doctrine is counter-value.
- a_vanderbilt 2y agoThere is a "European dimension" that I think you may not be considering. The state has maintained some ambiguity regarding doctrine, but it is largely regarded to be against strategic targets - including targets of mixed value. Geographic proximity limits their ability to lean one way or the other compared to say, the United States. A land invasion of France is a distinct possibility they must be prepared to counter. Could you care to link a source for my edification?
- mikestew 2y agoIf you know why the Black Hills in NC would be targeted... By which I'm sure you mean the Black Hills of South Dakota: https://www.blackhillsbadlands.com/parks-monuments/minuteman-missile-national-historic-site https://www.blackhillsbadlands.com/parks-monuments/minuteman...