2 ms·

A high-altitude detonation is not a "World War" Obviously (as in very obviously) this wouldn't be the big one in itself, but an entirely possible provocation t

A high-altitude detonation is not a "World War" Obviously (as in very obviously) this wouldn't be the big one in itself, but an entirely possible provocation that could shove things in that direction. China is a significant inhibiting factor, but one factor among many. "Client state" is a caricature, the relationship is more complex than that. Also, no one is "pushing Russia's back against the wall" in Ukraine, there are no M1A2s speeding to Moscow It doesn't need to be tanks speeding to Moscow. A major shift in the ground situation Ukraine's favor (effectively signaling an eventual Russian defeat) could do the trick. Also no one said this was presently happening, so your use of the present tense is puzzling here. Putin is perfectly rational. He isn't simply "irrational", but he definitely isn't "perfectly rational" either. Otherwise, he wouldn't have bullied his own advisors to a point where they were afraid to express their own opinions (or even provide rational assessments) in regard the neat little plan he decided to roll into action in the Fall of '21. And what he apparently does in all seriousness believe about his own manifest destiny (as the restorer of the Motherland's natural position of greatness) definitely isn't rational. There's also the matter of his successors, who won't be nearly as smart, and will likely be far less rational. The empty threats are working (as evidenced by this thread), I guess everyone who doesn't agree with your assessments is either paralyzed by irrational fears, and/or a useful idiot, or just looking for a cop-out.

dgroshev 2y ago
> an entirely possible provocation that could shove things in that direction How? What plausible pathway do you see between Russia exploding a nuke over Novaya Zemlya and their suicide by American nuclear response? > A major shift in the ground situation Ukraine's favor (effectively signaling an eventual Russian defeat) could do the trick. I don't understand what trick. Russia directly attacking NATO? They'd get pulverised, and they have no forces left. Russia committing a suicide by launching a strategic attack on the US over Donbas? That's implausible. They just lost a chunk of Russia proper and took it on the chin. > I guess everyone who doesn't agree with your assessments is either paralyzed by irrational fears, and/or a useful idiot, or just looking for a cop-out. I see how it's easy to interpret the earlier reply personally, my bad, sorry. I was referring to the people establishing the narrative (media, politicians, and people with large platforms). It's self evidently working! A direct confrontation with Russia (a country with an economy smaller than Italy's, glaring manpower problems, and largely depleted army) evokes the idea of WW3, but I see very few people talking about the very likely war over Taiwan (with a much, much, much more powerful country) in "WW3" terms. This narrative doesn't make any logical sense, we just got used to it, even though it's not grounded in reality.
- aguaviva 2y ago
  Why are you picking the oblique and obviously implausible case of Putin trying to "scare" the West by detonating a device on his own territory (and as far away from his adversaries as possible)? What people are worried about is a low-yield device over the Black Sea or the North Sea, say. The "pathway" is that any deployment of a device will at the very least trigger a suite of necessary countermeasures on both sides (moving assets around and so forth), greatly increasing the risk of misperceptions and panic reactions. I don't understand what trick. Russia directly attacking NATO? The "trick", by which I mean outcome simply, of pushing the regime into an (acutely) fatalistic mindset. The reaction doesn't have to be a direct attack on NATO. It could be some other form of escalation (of the sort they might have ruled out otherwise). It doesn't even have to be an action taken by Russia. It could a matter of China looking at the situation and thinking, in terms of the move they've always been threatening to make, "now or never". I'd rather not delve into scenarios; I'm just advocating that we observe the cautionary principle here. We agree that the risk is overstated, and that the aggressor's threats are mostly bluster. But it's definitely not negligible risk, in my view; probably on the order of 3-5 percent per year. As high as at any time since the Cuban missile crisis, in any case.
  - dgroshev 2y ago
    > a low-yield device over the Black Sea or the North Sea How is it different? What "panic reactions"? What "panic reaction" can connect a low-yield explosion over Black Sea and a suicidal strategic strike on the continental US? > I'm just advocating that we observe the cautionary principle here "The cautionary principle" is only applicable if you disregard hundreds of thousands of killed and maimed Ukrainians, millions of refugees, unknown number of abducted children, and entire cities raised to the ground. Letting a genocide continue for years is not a default safe option. Again, I invite you to reflect on this exchange: you'd "rather not delve into scenarios", but when weighing what's basically just vibes against very material, prolonged, ongoing suffering of the second largest country in Europe you decide to advocate for vibes. Putin's bullshit has already won and his deterrence succeeded, because you give it enough credibility (whilst refusing to outline a credible scenario) to talk about "WW3" as a real risk worth more than dead and maimed Ukrainians.

dgroshev 2y ago

> an entirely possible provocation that could shove things in that direction How? What plausible pathway do you see between Russia exploding a nuke over Novaya Zemlya and their suicide by American nuclear response? > A major shift in the ground situation Ukraine's favor (effectively signaling an eventual Russian defeat) could do the trick. I don't understand what trick. Russia directly attacking NATO? They'd get pulverised, and they have no forces left. Russia committing a suicide by launching a strategic attack on the US over Donbas? That's implausible. They just lost a chunk of Russia proper and took it on the chin. > I guess everyone who doesn't agree with your assessments is either paralyzed by irrational fears, and/or a useful idiot, or just looking for a cop-out. I see how it's easy to interpret the earlier reply personally, my bad, sorry. I was referring to the people establishing the narrative (media, politicians, and people with large platforms). It's self evidently working! A direct confrontation with Russia (a country with an economy smaller than Italy's, glaring manpower problems, and largely depleted army) evokes the idea of WW3, but I see very few people talking about the very likely war over Taiwan (with a much, much, much more powerful country) in "WW3" terms. This narrative doesn't make any logical sense, we just got used to it, even though it's not grounded in reality.

aguaviva 2y ago
Why are you picking the oblique and obviously implausible case of Putin trying to "scare" the West by detonating a device on his own territory (and as far away from his adversaries as possible)? What people are worried about is a low-yield device over the Black Sea or the North Sea, say. The "pathway" is that any deployment of a device will at the very least trigger a suite of necessary countermeasures on both sides (moving assets around and so forth), greatly increasing the risk of misperceptions and panic reactions. I don't understand what trick. Russia directly attacking NATO? The "trick", by which I mean outcome simply, of pushing the regime into an (acutely) fatalistic mindset. The reaction doesn't have to be a direct attack on NATO. It could be some other form of escalation (of the sort they might have ruled out otherwise). It doesn't even have to be an action taken by Russia. It could a matter of China looking at the situation and thinking, in terms of the move they've always been threatening to make, "now or never". I'd rather not delve into scenarios; I'm just advocating that we observe the cautionary principle here. We agree that the risk is overstated, and that the aggressor's threats are mostly bluster. But it's definitely not negligible risk, in my view; probably on the order of 3-5 percent per year. As high as at any time since the Cuban missile crisis, in any case.
- dgroshev 2y ago
  > a low-yield device over the Black Sea or the North Sea How is it different? What "panic reactions"? What "panic reaction" can connect a low-yield explosion over Black Sea and a suicidal strategic strike on the continental US? > I'm just advocating that we observe the cautionary principle here "The cautionary principle" is only applicable if you disregard hundreds of thousands of killed and maimed Ukrainians, millions of refugees, unknown number of abducted children, and entire cities raised to the ground. Letting a genocide continue for years is not a default safe option. Again, I invite you to reflect on this exchange: you'd "rather not delve into scenarios", but when weighing what's basically just vibes against very material, prolonged, ongoing suffering of the second largest country in Europe you decide to advocate for vibes. Putin's bullshit has already won and his deterrence succeeded, because you give it enough credibility (whilst refusing to outline a credible scenario) to talk about "WW3" as a real risk worth more than dead and maimed Ukrainians.