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This is a very weird page, as it seems to suggest that SAML is the only way to do single sign-on integration with IdPs like Okta. But modern systems all do OIDC
by tptacek 2y ago
This is a very weird page, as it seems to suggest that SAML is the only way to do single sign-on integration with IdPs like Okta. But modern systems all do OIDC, which is what you should do. You need a much better reason to support SAML than "the CISO wants it so they can use Okta", because the CISO can (and should) just use OIDC.
- stouset 2y agoIf your CISO wants to use SAML for anything, fire your CISO. Frankly I’d suggest the same thing about Okta but as bad as they are whatever you do to avoid them would probably be worse in practice.
- paulddraper 2y agoI gather that you've fired every CISO you've ever had.
- NewJazz 2y agoDo you mean chooses it over OIDC, or even when a product can only do SSO via SAML?
- ralala 2y agoOIDC is better when using the authorization code flow because it does not only rely on cryptography while validating the token. The relying party needs to talk to the IdP. This is better from a security perspective, because past vulnerabilities have shown, that implementing the cryptography right in every relying party is challenging. You can achieve similar security with SAML when using the artifact binding. Note: I work professionally with Keycloak and also offer reviews of OIDC and SAML implementations.
- tptacek 2y agoI don't think artifact binding really addresses many of the issues people are talking about when they suggest OIDC is categorically more secure than SAML.
- ralala 2y agoOIDC is newer and many of the issues with SAML were addressed in the architecture. However I’m curious to hear which attack vectors you are thinking about.
- tptacek 2y agoMost obviously, the precarity of XMLDSIG.
- ralala 2y agoThis is where artifact binding can greatly increase the security…. Browser sends artifact to RP, RP fetches assertion from IdP via HTTPs, afterwards verifies the signature. Signature verification is not implemented correctly? The attacker still needs to break HTTPS…. And then you would have a big problem anyway.
- tptacek 2y agoA common pattern of SAML vulnerability is one that allows logins from one org access to resources of another org, which is not mitigated by trusting IdP's.
- xnyan 2y agoSAML is an unfortunate a necessity in most enterprise environments. There’s almost always something, usually more than one, where SAML is the only option. I do think in 2024, everyone should also offer SAML alternatives in parallel .
- 2y ago
- 7bit 2y ago> But modern systems all do OIDC Factually incorrect
- xenophonf 2y ago> just use OIDC OIDC doesn't scale, and OIDC Federation is still in draft. SAML Federation is mature with wide support and good discovery UX thanks to SeamlessAccess. SAML has a variety of standard attribute bundles, entity categories, frameworks, and profiles covering important integrations, e.g., identity assurance. These are slowly being defined in (or ported to) OIDC. I like OIDC and think highly of the people working on it, but it's nowhere near as cut and dry as you suggest.
- tptacek 2y agoI don't know a lot of security engineers that agree, and while (as a SAML implementor) I have my own opinion, "don't do new SAML implementations" is mostly me parroting what I think is the consensus. I think... it probably is as cut and dry as I'm suggesting.
- Too 2y agoWhat about OIDC does not scale? The things you just listed sounds like unnecessary complexity that inevitably leads to the “too big standard” problem, where every vendor and id provider has their own half assed, incomplete and incompatible implementation of the standard, or worse - with security bugs. Something quite often seen with SAML. That’s not to say that oidc or oauth doesn’t have alignment issues. See https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=35713518 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=35713518 “We implemented OAuth for the 50 most popular APIs. TL;DR: It is still a mess”
- nmadden 2y agoThis cuts both ways. The last major revision of SAML predates the iPhone by several years. Things like PKCE, which are essential for security on mobile devices and in other cases don’t exist at all in SAML, yet the same attack vectors apply (plus a boatload more).
- mooreds 2y agoAnother thing to mention, as I have in the past[0], is that SAML is frozen in time and will no longer be updated. The link in that HN post has TLS errors now, but it says: > At the request of the members, the Security Services (SAML) TC has closed. 0: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=41056529 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=41056529 There are tons of orgs that have built SSO on SAML so it won't die for a long time, but it's a frozen standard. From my understanding, it's frozen because no one wanted to put in the time to improve it.