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> you cannot be too loose of a cannon at the top Meanwhile, in reality: “Are there any checks in place to keep the US President from starting a nuclear w
by defrost 2y ago
> you cannot be too loose of a cannon at the top
Meanwhile, in reality:
“Are there any checks in place to keep the US President from starting a nuclear war?”
What’s amazing about this question, really, is how seriously it misunderstands the logic of the US command and control system. It gets it exactly backwards.
The entire point of the US command and control system is to guarantee that the President and only the President is capable of authorizing nuclear war whenever he needs to. It is about enabling the President’s power, not checking or restricting him.
In a three part detailed longform:
The President and the Bomb (2016) https://blog.nuclearsecrecy.com/2016/11/18/the-president-and-the-bomb/ https://blog.nuclearsecrecy.com/2016/11/18/the-president-and...
Part II https://blog.nuclearsecrecy.com/2016/12/23/the-president-and-the-bomb-redux/ https://blog.nuclearsecrecy.com/2016/12/23/the-president-and...
Part III https://blog.nuclearsecrecy.com/2017/04/10/president-bomb-iii/ https://blog.nuclearsecrecy.com/2017/04/10/president-bomb-ii...
- JumpCrisscross 2y ago> entire point of the US command and control system is to guarantee that the President and only the President is capable of authorizing nuclear war whenever he needs to This may be necessary to ensure the deterrent is credible. But for first strike use, authorisation should require at the very least Congressional approval. (Not the whole Congress, obviously, but maybe the Senate Select and House Permanent Select Committees.) Ideally, all three branches of government.
- defrost 2y ago" should " Ah, should - imagine a world in which "should" carried sway. Meanwhile: Air Force Doctrine Publication 3-72 - Nuclear Operations (2020) POSITIVE CONTROL The President may direct the use of nuclear weapons through an execute order via the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the combatant commanders and, ultimately, to the forces in the field exercising direct control of the weapons. Page 21 of 29: https://www.doctrine.af.mil/Doctrine-Publications/AFDP-3-72-Nuclear-Ops/ https://www.doctrine.af.mil/Doctrine-Publications/AFDP-3-72-... For anybody in the chain that might question that, or want Congressional approval consider the fate of Harold Hering, the Major who was kicked out of the Air Force for asking a “dangerous question” while training to be a Missile Launch Officer at Vandenberg Air Force Base. Hering had asked, in essence, how could he, in his Minuteman missile bunker, know that an order to launch he received from the President had been a legal, considered, and sane one? The answer is, you don't, you just jump as high as you can. ( even if the guy telling you to jump is also telling you they're eating cats and dogs in Ohio )
- JumpCrisscross 2y ago> anybody in the chain that might question that, or want Congressional approval consider the fate of Harold Hering, the Major who was kicked out of the Air Force for asking a “dangerous question” while training to be a Missile Launch Officer at Vandenberg Air Force Base I mean, yes. Hering was in the chain of command. The nuclear chain of command. About the last thing you want in that chain is even a notion of a whiff of a perception that when the President says launch the missiles don't launch. It's completely different for e.g. the Congress to ask these questions. They don't because this isn't an issue Americans have cared about for a while.
- defrost 2y agoIf the President orders a launch, the military launches ... that's it. Congress can ask questions about that later, if they're still about - but they don't have a place in the chain between POTUS deciding to launch and the launch. Ordering a strike before any missiles have landed on US soil has been possible the entire time (ie ordering what would be an effective First Strike) and deemed neccessary as carrying out such orders after missiles have landed has been considered as likley too little to late - predicated on having accurate justification (knowledge of incoming missiles) etc. History has been littered with false alarmns that should have (but didn't) trigger a launch - that remains at the judgement of the serving POTUS who might be a combat veteran or a reality TV show host.
- JumpCrisscross 2y ago> If the President orders a launch, the military launches ... that's it Sure. That doesn't mean every launch must be legal or undeliberateable. > they don't have a place in the chain between POTUS deciding to launch and the launch Why not? The Constitution "vests in the Congress the power to declare war" [1]. It has largely delegated that power to the President. But the spirit of the War Powers Clause recognises that war is a major political decision with national consequences. So is a nuclear first strike. > Ordering a strike before any missiles have landed on US soil has been possible the entire time (ie ordering what would be an effective First Strike) Not what first strike means [2]. (You're describing launch on warning, which is firmly in the retaliatory column [3].) [1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/War_Powers_Clause https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/War_Powers_Clause [2] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/First_strike_(nuclear_strategy) https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/First_strike_(nuclear_strategy... [3] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Launch_on_warning https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Launch_on_warning
- maxglute 2y agoI think too much of US global security commitments that is underpinned by nuclear umbrella where non-nuclear partners are not going to feel assured about US strategic deterrence if posture shifts away from POTUS can smash red button in heat of the moment to maybe US will eventually retaliate with nuclear... after say warsaw has already been nuked... if there needs to be a committee to debate whether it's worth the risk to trade moscow for new york (which they may not). The lack of oversight is the point, therefore consistent "clarity" that POTUS, even if deranged, doesn't need to consult others. Because US partners _need_ to be assured that US nukes can be in the air in minutes to deter themselves from being nuked, and only way to ensure that perception is to remove all red tape when delegating nuclear authority. There can't be any official/public rhetoric to doubt US is capable of prompt retaliation, even if adversaries do not find posture credible (just like some don't find NFU credible). Hence the quibbing over verbiage on public facing US nuclear operations manual in other reply chain also largely doesn't matter - formal US nuclear operations documentation itself is ultimately philosophical/propaganda/strategic - we can pretend they actually define US nuclear authority - but IMO their primary purpose is inform adversary nuclear deterrence game theory. Ultimately we don't know what actual US nuclear operations procedure is/will be - there may very well be none-public nuclear operations that is much less flippant than one man decides to end the world, maybe adversary specific ones based on correlation of forces.
- protomolecule 2y agoSo you are saying that "US global security commitments" actually increase the danger of the global nuclear catastrophe. Doesn't look secure for me.