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If the context starts with the Budapest Memorandum, then you mention "other agreements", it's natural to assume you meant legal agreements. And unless we're go
by aguaviva 2y ago
If the context starts with the Budapest Memorandum, then you mention "other agreements", it's natural to assume you meant legal agreements.
And unless we're going to talk about legal agreements -- none of this dissecting of what was said verbally or how it was understood at the time has any bearing on how the West should respond to the current situation. Now that Russia has made unilateral decision to move the relationship beyond merely "adversarial", and into the realm of outright aggression.
- vkou 2y agoI don't think splitting hairs about "Oh, that was just a broken promise, not a broken contract" is the win that you're looking for, when it comes to answering the question of "Did NATO behave in an antagonistic/untrustworthy/threatening manner against Russia during its decade of weakness." You ask about olive branches, I give you examples, you say that those examples were legally allowed. Okay, sure, they were, but that's got nothing to do with the price of butter. Just because you can do something from a position of strength doesn't mean doing it was a good idea, or served your long-term aims in a relationship.
- aguaviva 2y agoIt can certainly be argued that NATO expansion was bad policy, intrinsically antagonistic, and basically in the wrong spirit of the way the world should have re-organized itself post-1989. That's actually my gut feeling as well. But it doesn't rise to level of casus belli or even a rational reason for Russia to feel directly (tangibly) threatened. And it's definitely not the "reason" Putin started the war. And you're leaving out other stuff, such as the fact that Yeltsin greenlighted the earliest round of new admissions (PL, CZ, HU), and that Gorbachev himself downplayed the significance of the expansion issue during negotiations to which you are referring -- as he made clear in that famous RBTH interview: "The topic of 'NATO expansion' was not discussed at all, and it wasn't brought up in those years. I say this with full responsibility. Not a single Eastern European country raised the issue, not even after the Warsaw Pact ceased to exist in 1991. Western leaders didn't bring it up either." And that while it was a constant source of tension and grumbling -- the NATO issue never seemed to matter all that much to Russia until the Rose and Orange revolutions in 2003/2004. That's what really started to make Putin's back arch -- not any paramount concerns about NATO expansion itself. As far as "antagonistic" is concerned, I think there's a much stronger case to be made in regard to the intentional decision by US policy makers not to provide extensive economic aid (a "Marshall Plan") to its former adversary, its insistence on shock reforms, and so on. But this is another topic. And it's not as if Russia didn' also "behave in an antagonistic/untrustworthy/threatening manner" against its would-be benefactor during its hour of need.[0][1] [0] - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Aldrich_Ames https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Aldrich_Ames [1] - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_Hanssen https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_Hanssen
- HellDunkel 2y agoConflating „broken promises (by individuals)“ and „broken agreements“ is not ok. It takes huge efforts and many people to get an agreement signed and it must mean something. If you decide to call that „hair splitting“ it makes it impossible for me to take your reasoning seriously.