> Surprisingly, candidates from wealthy families performed worse during this round. This is counterintuitive, especially when compared to contemporary education

> Surprisingly, candidates from wealthy families performed worse during this round. This is counterintuitive, especially when compared to contemporary educational systems where socioeconomic background often correlates positively with educational access and performance. Our research revealed a negative correlation in imperial China. > We attribute this to the emperor’s reluctance to appoint officials from independent power bases to central government positions. The final round selected the most important officials for the imperial court - those who would design future keju examinations, advise the government, and have direct access to the emperor. This system effectively marginalized the nobility and successful merchants. This is a pretty brilliant mechanism: an emperor normally draws a certain amount of jealousy and hate from the nobility and successful merchants, but by promoting rustic wonks over them via this system, might the emperor have been playing "let's you and him fight": diverting their animosity onto a bunch of "academic, gate-keeping, elites"?