This one couldn't have been stolen, because puzzles multiple of 5 (125, 130, 135...) have had their public key already published in 2019 (IIRC), so everyone—the

This one couldn't have been stolen, because puzzles multiple of 5 (125, 130, 135...) have had their public key already published in 2019 (IIRC), so everyone—the solver and blockchain listeners—has equal advantage. Puzzle #130 uses a secp256k1 private key with 130 unknown bits. It takes 2^65 work to brute force. When the solver posts their transaction to withdraw the funds, the public key included in the blockchain was already known. It doesn't provide new information. With puzzle #67 the public key in the transaction becomes known to all when the solver attempts to withdraw the funds, so some people rushed to compute (in 2^33.5) the private key and manage to find it in seconds/minutes.