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It sounds like a lot of these habits TFA didn’t even want to do — these will fail Isn't that the whole selling point of these sort of systems/books etc? To mak
by dagw 2y ago
It sounds like a lot of these habits TFA didn’t even want to do — these will fail
Isn't that the whole selling point of these sort of systems/books etc? To make you a 'better' person by getting you to do all those things you know you should do, but just don't want to?
- somethingsome 2y agoI find there is a difference between 1. washing dishes by hand (supposing you don't like that but it's necessary) 2.Meditating The first one is an habit you create because you need it done and you want it to be less pain. The second one, if done for the wrong purposes of just 'wanting to improve oneself' it becomes a pain, because you know you don't really need it, but you force yourself to do it anyway. Of course, if meditation is one of your strong believes, this doesn't apply, but 'meditating' because 'some people say it will improve myself and it will create an healthy habit' is noy a good goal.
- CRConrad 2y agoActually, I found washing dishes one of the most meditative things I used to do out of habit. It was my wife who was all for getting a dishwashing machine, not me.
- somethingsome 2y agoYes I am also very mindful with my pans, the rest goes to the dishwasher ;)
- llamaimperative 2y agoThe concept of “wanting to do something” is complicated. What you typically see is a desire that someone has at long range (“I want to go to the gym tomorrow”) that undergoes preference inversion at close range (“it is now tomorrow, and I don’t want to go to the gym in the next 2 hours”) The point of habit formation regimes is to reduce the chances of this inversion, but if you pick up a regime and pursue habits that you conceive of yourself not even wanting to do, you are unlikely to succeed. There are plenty of habits you’d benefit from that you DO want to do, and you should start with those.
- CRConrad 2y ago> The concept of “wanting to do something” is complicated. Not really all that complicated, IMO, once you realise: We don't really want to do all the boring stuff that's supposed to be good for us, we just want to have done it. > What you typically see is a desire that someone has at long range (“I want to go to the gym tomorrow”) that undergoes preference inversion at close range (“it is now tomorrow, and I don’t want to go to the gym in the next 2 hours”) I've been to the gym a few times; it was boring. I don't want to go to the gym; I just want the strong and healthy body I could get from it. If or when the remote control for your body is invented, I'm going to be all over it: I'll just attach the electrodes to the back of my neck, set the little box to whatever weight regime I'll be on, and flick the switch to... Idunno, remote-control my computer and do some coding (OK, or browse HN as usual), while the box controls my grunting straining flabby old body to (re)gain some muscle. I suppose I'll leave the aural on, so I can hear if the grunting and straining gets too heavy; would be stupid to get myself a heart attack out of sheer lack of attention.
- llamaimperative 2y agoNo, people's preferences actually do alternate as a long-range goal becomes a shorter-range one. It has to do with the discount function we apply to the time dimension between us and a possible reward. This distinction is important because, as illustrated, your conception requires you to simply wait for things to come on autopilot (good luck!). My description of the problem points to a completely different strategy, which is the creation of precommitment devices. If you go to the gym solely powered by the goal of having a great body, it's very likely you'll fail that habit, per my earlier point. The far more resilient strategy is to find something you enjoy and actually desire about the actual behavior you're engaged in (which is working out, not having a great body). The outcome of a habit is merely exhaust, and the more you can perceive it that way, the better you'll be at building habits.