Okay, so you're referring to events later in March then (I thought you were referring to the situation just as the invasion was starting). According to the dra

Okay, so you're referring to events later in March then (I thought you were referring to the situation just as the invasion was starting). According to the drafts - these "security guarantees" were effectively a surrender, as Ukraine had to limit its army to some very small number making any type of resistance impossible. Strong agreement there. But isn't it also true that it was precisely the obviously flimsy and deceptive "security guarantees" (which apparently were buried in an annex of a much larger document) were (along with the territorial demands, and the atrocities happening on the ground) precisely what convinced the Ukrainian side to back out, once they found out about them? The point here is that I'm not sure it's fair to say they were giving serious consideration to a "surrender plan" as such. The impression I have is that they were hoping to find a way to negotiate a Russian retreat in exchange for more or less symbolic concessions (e.g. "Ukraine not join NATO"), but no territorial concessions or drastic reductions in armed forces (which seems not unreasonable if your country is being overrun, and you want to avoid the prospect the prospect of being at war indefinitely like it is now). But that once they found out about (and/or Putin's team shifted their terms to include) the "surrender bits", and the news of the atrocities in Bucha/Irpin started coming in, that's when the process broke down.