I disagree. You don't need organisations that assign hierarchical unique identifiers in the form of DOIs if you just identify papers based on their hash. You

I disagree. You don't need organisations that assign hierarchical unique identifiers in the form of DOIs if you just identify papers based on their hash. You don't need publishers to verify identity via centrally assigned ORCIDs if every scientist can just sign their papers with their self generated public key. You don't need proof of publication at a specific time via a journal, if you have a bunch of publicly available nodes that can notarize your papers hash with a publication timestamp. You don't need peer review, if you establish a culture of rebuttal and confirmation papers that use the previous infrastructure to form a web of trust, where every scientist can see an individualy computed trustworthyness score for every paper that they read, based on the transitive trust of the peers that they personally deem trustworthy. You don't need long term archival at libraries and journals, when you have a decentralized distributed hash table, where public institutions and individuals can contribute storage space to store blobs of papers and scientific data, that can be retrieved by their hash. We think too small compared to what's possible. And we completely ignore the attack vectors that the current non-cryptographic identifiers, systems and institutions have. The issue is only a political one precisely because established players don't want to give up their power or even learn new ways.