4 ms·
There is actually no way to avoid this, aside from setting the Fee nearly to the reward. It's essentially MitM all the way down. even the private mempool can
by Jerrrrrrry 2y ago
There is actually no way to avoid this, aside from setting the Fee nearly to the reward.
It's essentially MitM all the way down.
even the private mempool can attempt a double-spend with a larger fee, get one transaction ahead, then try to maintain an edge long enough to be the "longest branch" for consensus - the 51% attack only needs 33% in reality, much less when your the private mempool that can take advantage of the birthday paradox to jump two blocks ahead.
you have to literally mine your own coin with the reward transaction included.
of course, zpk+ would solve this issue entirely.
Alice and Bob wouldn't ever doubt each other again.
- kfrzcode 2y agoOf course, you could avoid this entirely with Hedera HBAR and fair consensus on the hashgraph. But the puzzles are on BTC where the money is.
- sourraspberry 2y agoIsn't this a bit insane? Does this not imply the entire Bitcoin protocol is fundamentally flawed?
- loopdoend 2y agoNo because it is not normal to have such low entropy for private keys. It wasn't designed with these puzzles in mind, nor should it be.
- fernandopj 2y agoYour reply and Jerrrrrrry's closed this understanding for me. The attack itself can't be mitigated because there's the incentive to try to force the blockchain with your own theft block because your fee is much higher for what appears to be the same transaction. But this attack, like you said, is only feasible for this niche domain of low entropy private keys.
- Workaccount2 2y agoThe bitcoin protocol isn't fundamentally flawed, but it is fundamentally outdated. If it wasn't for public bitcoin/crypto FOMO, bitcoin would have been deprecated years ago.