But what conclusion this supports? Unity by itself was an argument for something else, wasn't it? So, what does this partial unification implies for that somet

But what conclusion this supports? Unity by itself was an argument for something else, wasn't it? So, what does this partial unification implies for that something else? That something else being qualia, in contemporary terms. That doesn't solve _the original question_, or _the hard problem_ in any way. It just breaks it down in a different way. It's ok, the hard problem is hard anyway. When reading it, I get a strong sense that the text softly implies qualia as an emerging phenomenon. A christmas-tree-like composition of smaller qualia units, those coming primarily from senses and building up into more elaborate experiences. However, the argument for qualia was never about individual senses. Thought experiments like "what is like to be a bat?" and "what if I see colors different from everyone else?" were never about individual, specific senses. It was never implied to be literally just about a single sense, but the experience of being as a whole. That idea of "being as a whole" already includes the unconscious-until-conscious experiences. Julian Jaynes puts the "light in the refrigerator" not as a stationary light, but a flashlight that you can swing around in a dark room: wherever you point it to something, that something becomes highlighted in your consciousness. In the same way as the "light in the refrigerator" experiment, when you're not pointing to something, it doesn't mean it's not there. The "flashlight in the dark room" thought experiment also brings up important questions, like: what if there's someone else in the room? How should we deal with things that seemingly move around? It also brings up the idea of object permanence to the context of consciousness. Are we just like small children too naive to perceive what it really is?