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The problem are timing attacks leaking the navigation history. An attacker can load a lib shared with some other site. Based on the load time he may then learn
by demurgos 2y ago
The problem are timing attacks leaking the navigation history. An attacker can load a lib shared with some other site. Based on the load time he may then learn if the user visited the target site recently.
- drdaeman 2y agoCan't we record the original download timings and replicate them artificially, with some noise added for privacy? Of course, with reasonable upper latency threshold (derived from overall network performance metrics) to prevent DoS on clients. While this won't improve load times, it can save bandwidth, improving user experience on slow connections. And most popular hand-selected library versions can get preloaded by the browser itself and listed as exceptions with zero added latency. Also, this way the networking telemetry would gain a meaningful purpose for end users, not just developers.
- manwe150 2y agoMy understanding had been that you get a double whammy of there being too many versions of the “common” dependencies, so it is already in-effect a per-site cache (or nearly so), but that uniqueness also means a fingerprint can be established with fairly few latency tests
- dexterdog 2y agoHow would you know the original site if it's a common asset?
- josephg 2y agoNo need. Just make a custom asset referenced only by those sites, and get the browser to cache it.
- patrickmeenan 2y agoThere is some level of data exposure even if you can't tell which site, specifically, a user has visited. You can tell that "this user has been to at least one page that used X". Depending on what the common resource is, most people wouldn't necessarily care but there may be some cases where they would. If I can tell that you used facebook login at one point, even though it is used by a good chunk of the web, I could tailor a phish targeted at FB credentials for example.