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Compression Dictionary Transport
- deleted 2y ago[deleted]
- hedora 2y agoI’m guessing the primary use case for this will be setting cookies. (Google fonts or whatever sends different dictionaries to different clients, the decompression result is unique per client). I wonder what percentage of http traffic is redundant compression dictionaries. How much could this actually help in theory?
- JoshTriplett 2y ago> I’m guessing the primary use case for this will be setting cookies. There's a huge difference between "this could potentially be used to fingerprint a client" and "this will primarily be used to fingerprint a client". There are many potential fingerprinting mechanisms that rely on tracking what the client already has in its cache. Clients could easily partition their cached dictionaries by origin, just as they could partition other cached information by origin, and that would prevent using this for cross-origin tracking. This proposal would help substantially with smaller requests, where a custom dictionary would provide better compression but not better enough to offset the full size of the dictionary.
- derf_ 2y ago> I wonder what percentage of http traffic is redundant compression dictionaries. How much could this actually help in theory? A lot of times you will send a (possibly large) blob of text repeatedly with a few minor changes. One example I've used in practice is session descriptions (SDP) for WebRTC. Any time you add/remove/change a stream, you have to renegotiate the session, and this is done by passing an SDP blob that describes all of the streams in a session in and out of the Javascript Session Establishment Protocol (JSEP) API on both sides of the connection. A video conference with dozens of participants each with separate audio and video streams joining one at a time might require exchanging hundreds or even thousands of SDP messages, and in large sessions these can grow to be hundreds of kB each, even though only a tiny portion of the SDP changes each time. Now, you could do a lot of work to parse the SDP locally, figure out exactly what changed, send just that difference to the other side, and have it be smart enough to patch its local idea of the current SDP with that difference to feed into JSEP, test it on every possible browser, make it robust to future changes in the SDP the browser will generate, etc. OR You could just send each SDP message compressed using the last SDP you sent as the initial dictionary. It will compress really well. Even using gzip with the first ~31 kB of the previous SDP will get you in the neighborhood of 200:1 compression[0]. Now your several-hundred kB SDP fits in a single MTU. I'm sure WebRTC is not the only place you will encounter this kind of pattern. [0] Not that either gzip or using part of a document as a dictionary are supported by this draft.
- toast0 2y ago> Now, you could do a lot of work to parse the SDP locally, figure out exactly what changed, send just that difference to the other side, and have it be smart enough to patch its local idea of the current SDP with that difference to feed into JSEP, test it on every possible browser, make it robust to future changes in the SDP the browser will generate, etc. I work with WebRTC outside a browser context, and we signal calls with simpler datastructures and generate the SDP right near the WebRTC Api. Our SFU doesn't ever see an SDP, because SDP is a big messy format around simpler parts --- it's easier to just communicate the simpler parts, and marshal into SDP at the API border. Even for 1:1 calls, we signal the parts, and then both ends generate the SDP to feed to WebRTC. IMHO, you're going to have to test your generated SDPs everywhere anyway, regardless of if clients or servers generate them. Well managed compression would certainly help reduce SDP size in transit, but reduce, reuse, recompress in that order.
- bawolff 2y agoSheesh, the google conspiracy theories are getting out of hand. Why would you use this for setting cookies when you could just use cookies? If for some reason you dont want to use real cookies, why wouldnt you just use the cache side channel directly? This doesn't really add any fingerprinting that doesnt already exist.
- giantrobot 2y agoBecause groups want to track people without cookies. This re-introduces the problem of shared caches. Site A can know if someone visited Site B by whether or not they have the dictionary for some shared resource. Site A never has to show a cookie banner to do this tracking because there's no cookie set. This is just reintroducing the "feature" of cross-site tracking with shared caches in the browser.
- bawolff 2y agoAre you sure? I would assume that available dictionaries would be partioned by site (eTLD+1).
- patrickmeenan 2y agoNope. The dictionaries are partitioned the same way as the caches and cookies (whichever is partitioned more aggressively for a given browser). Usually by site and frame so there are no cross-site vectors that it opens.
- jepler 2y agothis was my first thought as well. Authors just acknowledge it and move on; it's not like shopify and google care whether there's another way to successfully track users online. 10. Privacy Considerations Since dictionaries are advertised in future requests using the hash of the content of the dictionary, it is possible to abuse the dictionary to turn it into a tracking cookie.
- patrickmeenan 2y agoWhich is why they are treated as if they are cookies and are cleared any time the cache or cookies are cleared so that they can not provide an additional tracking vector beyond what cookies can do (and when 3rd party cookies are partitioned by site/frame, they are also partitioned the same). There are LOTS of privacy teams within the respective companies, W3C and IETF that have looked it over to make sure that it does not open any new abuse vectors. It's worth noting that Google, Mozilla and Apple are all supportive of the spec and have all been involved over the last year.
- patrickmeenan 2y agoSorry, I should provide more context. The language in the IETF draft is a bit generic because it is a HTTP spec intended to be used more broadly than just web content in browsers and each should evaluate the risks for their use case. For browsers specifically, the fetch spec changes will be explicit about the cache clearing and partitioning (partitioned by both top-level document site and frame origin). You can see Chrome's implementation here: https://source.chromium.org/chromium/chromium/src/+/main:net/shared_dictionary/shared_dictionary_isolation_key.cc https://source.chromium.org/chromium/chromium/src/+/main:net... The fetch spec changes are in progress (just documenting, the discussions have already happened). You can follow along here if you'd like: https://github.com/whatwg/fetch/issues/1739 https://github.com/whatwg/fetch/issues/1739
- SahAssar 2y agoThis follows the same origin rules as cookies and caching, so it is not useful for tracking anymore than those already are. As the when this is useful there are many examples: * Map tiling (like OSM, mapbox, google maps, etc.) often have many repeated tokens/data but the tiles are served as individual requests * Code splitting of CSS/JS, where they share a lot of the same tokens but you don't want to have to load the full bundle on every load since much of it wont be used * Any site where the same terms and/or parts are recurring across multiple pages (for many sites like IMDB or similar I'd guess 80% of the HTML is non-unique per request) This has been tried before with SDCH which unfortunately died, hopefully this goes better.
- patrickmeenan 2y agoFWIW, this addresses the BREACH/CRIME issues that killed SDCH by only operating on CORS-readable content. It also solves the problem that SDCH had where the dictionary would be forced on the response and the client would have to go fetch it if it didn't have it before it could process the response. The tooling for generating dictionaries is also WAY better than it was back in the SDCH days (and they are a much cleaner format, being arbitrary byte strings that Brotli and ZStandard can back-reference). Lots of people involved in working on it were also involved with SDCH and have been trying to find a workable solution since it had to be turned down.
- magicalist 2y ago> I’m guessing the primary use case for this will be setting cookies. The cache is partitioned by document and resource origins, so you might as well just use first party cookies at that point (or etags if you insist on being sneaky).
- freeqaz 2y agoThis is the link you want if you want to read the actual meaty contents of this page. Took me a sec to find. https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-httpbis-compression-dictionary-19 https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-httpbis-com...
- deleted 2y ago[deleted]
- wmf 2y agoInteresting that they removed SDCH in 2017 and now they're adding it back. Let's hope this version sticks.
- devinplatt 2y agoI was curious about this given what happened with SDCH. Here is what Wikipedia[0] says > Due to the diffing results and the data being compressed with the same coding, SDCH dictionaries aged relatively quickly and compression density became quickly worse than with the usual non-dictionary compression such as GZip. This created extra effort in production to keep the dictionaries fresh and reduced its applicability. Modern dictionary coding such as Shared Brotli has a more effective solution for this that fixes the dictionary aging problem. This new proposal uses Brotli. [0]: https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/SDCH https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/SDCH
- patrickmeenan 2y agoSDCH was removed when SPECTRE became a thing (CRIME/BREACH) because it was open to side-channel attacks. Yes, it had other problems, not the least of which was that it would block the processing of a response while a client fetched the dictionary, but the side-channel attacks were what killed it. The compression dictionary transport work addresses all of the known issues that we had with SDCH and we're cautiously optimistic that this will be around for a long time.
- londons_explore 2y agoThis is going to go the same way as HTTP/2 Server Push (removed from Chrome in 2022). Great tech promising amazing efficiencies and speedups, but programmers are too lazy to use them correctly, so they see barely any use, and the few places it is used correctly are overshadowed by the few places it is used wrongly hurting performance. Lesson: Tech that leads to the same page loading slightly faster generally won't be used unless they are fully automatic and enabled by default. Http push required extra config on the server to decide what to push. This requires extra headers to determine what content to compress against (and the server to store that old/common content). Neither will succeed because the vast majority of developers don't care about that last little bit of loading speed.
- magicalist 2y ago> Http push required extra config on the server to decide what to push. This requires extra headers to determine what content to compress against (and the server to store that old/common content). This does seem like an advanced use case you won't generally want to set up manually, but it is pretty different than push. Push required knowing what to push, which depends on what a page loads but also when the page loads it, which itself depends on the speed of the client. Mess that up and you can actually slow down the page load (like pushing resources the client already started downloading). Compression dictionaries could be as simple as vercel or whoever supporting deltas for your last n deployments, at which point the header to include is trivial.
- londons_explore 2y ago> Push required knowing what to push, Could have been as simple as once-per-resource webpack build step which detected all resources downloaded per-page (easy with a headless chromium), and then pushing all of those (or all of the non-cacheable ones if the client sends a recent cookie). Yet frameworks and build systems didn't do that, and the feature was never really used. > you can actually slow down the page load (like pushing resources the client already started downloading). Any semi-smart server can prevent that, because it already knows what is currently being transferred to the client, or was already transferred in this session. There is no race condition as long as the server refuses to double-send resources. Granted, some server side architectures make this hard without the load balancer being aware. This compression dictionary will see the exact same fate IMO.
- bcoates 2y agoAny evidence this actually causes material performance improvement? Pre-shared compression dictionaries are rarely seen in the wild because they rarely provide meaningful benefit, particularly in the cases you care about most.
- CaptainOfCoit 2y agoI guess you should outline the cases you care the most about, for anyone to be able to answer if there is any material performance improvements.
- hansvm 2y agoThe only requirements are serving a lot of the same "kind" of content, enough such (or for some other business reason) that it doesn't make sense to send it all at once, and somebody willing to spend a bit of time to implement it. Map and local geocoding information comes to mind as a decent application, and if the proposed implementation weren't so hyper-focused on common compression standards you could probably do something fancy for, e.g., meme sites (with a finite number of common or similar background images). Assuming (perhaps pessimistically) it won't work well for most sites serving images, other possibilities include: - Real-estate searches (where people commonly tweak tons of parameters and geographies, returning frequently duplicated information like "This historical unit has an amazing view in each of its 2 bedrooms"). - Expanding that a bit, any product search where you expect a person to, over time, frequently query for the same sorts of stuff. - Local business information (how common is it to open at 10am and close at 6pm every weekday in some specific locale for example). ... If the JS, image, and structural HTML payloads dwarf everything else then maybe it won't matter in practice. I bet somebody could make good use of it though.
- therein 2y agoYup, we did experiment with SDCH at a large social network around 2015 and it didn't massively outperform gzip. Outperforming it required creating a pipeline for dynamic dictionary generation and distribution.
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- dexterdog 2y agoWhy can't we implement caching on the integrity sha of the library so they can be shared across sites? Sure there is technically an attack vector there but that is pretty easily scannable for tampering by verifying with trusted CDNs. With something like that you could preload all of the most common libraries in the background.
- demurgos 2y agoThe problem are timing attacks leaking the navigation history. An attacker can load a lib shared with some other site. Based on the load time he may then learn if the user visited the target site recently.
- drdaeman 2y agoCan't we record the original download timings and replicate them artificially, with some noise added for privacy? Of course, with reasonable upper latency threshold (derived from overall network performance metrics) to prevent DoS on clients. While this won't improve load times, it can save bandwidth, improving user experience on slow connections. And most popular hand-selected library versions can get preloaded by the browser itself and listed as exceptions with zero added latency. Also, this way the networking telemetry would gain a meaningful purpose for end users, not just developers.
- manwe150 2y agoMy understanding had been that you get a double whammy of there being too many versions of the “common” dependencies, so it is already in-effect a per-site cache (or nearly so), but that uniqueness also means a fingerprint can be established with fairly few latency tests
- dexterdog 2y agoHow would you know the original site if it's a common asset?
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- kevincox 2y agoIt is interesting that a proxy won't be able to see the complete response anymore. It will see the dictionary ID and hash but without a copy the server's response won't be fully intelligible to it.
- patrickmeenan 2y agoIf the proxy is correctly handling the Accept-Encoding (rewriting it with only encodings that it understands), it can either remove the `dcb` and `dcz` encodings or it can check if it knows the announced dictionary and only allow them through if it has the dictionary. MITM devices that just inspect and fail on unknown content-encoding values will have a problem and will need to be updated (there is an enterprise policy to disable the feature in Chrome for that situation until the proxies can be updated).
- kevincox 2y agoThat's a good point. I meant to say proxies that don't alter the headers. These methods could easily be stripped if the proxy wants to ensure that it understands the response.