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A worry is that this kind of Chinese capability could quickly turn any conflict into a war for national survival on both sides. That’s how nuclear use starts to
by ls612 2y ago
A worry is that this kind of Chinese capability could quickly turn any conflict into a war for national survival on both sides. That’s how nuclear use starts to enter the table. A conventional war in the Pacific doesn’t threaten the survival of either state. But conventional bombing of mass civilian targets absolutely does. My assumption was always that the US would at most only ever target military targets on the mainland not civilian or industrial ones. But a Chinese escalation to civilian CONUS targets would imply total war.
- maxglute 2y agoAny attack / effort to degrade PRC mainland will warrant proportional response on CONUS. This is PRC seeking reciprocal homeland disruption capabilities, which US currently frequently threatens against PRC in public facing writings and discourse (high level political/military figures), i.e the ENTIRE point of threatening CONUS at scale is to deter US by making potential conflict a fight for US national survival, not just current conception that it's an asymmetric fight for PRC survival while US can enjoy undisrupted CONUS resource autarky and serenity. Like what entire fixation over Malacca/SLOC blockade against PRC calorie/energy import but also an attack (blockade = legal war) on PRC civilians, and mainland ability to sustain war. IMO not possible to seperate military targets and civilian targets especially with respect to war industrial base in peer level attritional conflict. Merely PRC having CONUS strike capabilities means IT MUST BE used in response to PRC mainland strikes or efforts to degrade mainland i.e. PRC populous is simply not going to allow CCP to not attack CONUS if mainland attacked, knowing PLA has CONUS strike capabilities. It's basically locking in / predetermining likely escalation responses IF US attacks mainland (again, including SLOC disruption). The escalation game is, if US tries to degrade mainland PRC energy/calorie even via SLOC disruption, PRC will attempt to degrade CONUS energy/calorie. The proportionality isn't you sink my tankers, I sink your tankers which you are less reliant on, it's you take away X% of my energy, I take away X% of yours. And CONUS strike also gives PRC ability to ALSO escalate conventionally, it's asking is trading my J20 plant worth you losing F35 plants that underpins NATO air power... what about boeing, nvidia, facebook, apple, payment processor infra... there are all these hegemonic crown jewels US have that has disproportional value vs PRC losing comac, smic, huawei or wechat pay. Does US really want to put all that on the line for TW, for East Asia? Would US like to gracefully abdicate East Asia and settle just being a regional + atlantic hegemon? Or US can risk fight a proper existential war where both sides has high chance of getting reset to pre industrial conditions. And short of nuclear MAD who who will reconstitute faster. Who can rebuilt power plants, industries, shipyards, lay new naval hulls faster than the other. Upping the ante to existential national survival tier total war on BOTH sides instead of (currently commonly perceived) just PRC side is the goal. The goal is to make US planners / Americans worry as much as they think PRC planners / Chinese worry.
- ls612 2y agoIn a total war short of nuclear exchange the US has asymmetric ability to reach out and touch Chinese mainland targets than China does to the US. Much like in the world wars Germany could menace allied shipping but the Entente/Allies could completely blockade Germany. China may be able to deny the sea near the Chinese coast to the USN. The USN can deny the whole ocean outside the A2AD bubble to the PRC. China might be able to use conventional ICBMs to strike the US mainland. The US can use everything from long range cruise missiles to stealth bombers with 40 tons of ordnance per sortie to strike the Chinese mainland. I’d suggest that short of nuclear use the US maintains substantial escalation dominance even in optimistic PRC scenarios where they start the war with 1-2 Type 4 strike groups.
- maxglute 2y agoLast reply then I need to dip. >The USN can deny the whole ocean outside the A2AD bubble to the PRC Prompt global strike means USN can be sunk / denied globally, hence "global" strike. But without even hitting combatant hulls, consider typical USN fleet has ~1 week endurance and needs to be replenished at sea to sustain ops. All those replenishment ships... of which we're really talking about fast supply T-AOES... USN has like 4... that's all the fast replenish to support all Of USN. Then there's ~20 slower oilers that's not fit for high tempo ops. All these replenishment are constantly stationary to restock, sometimes daisy chained at sea, but eventually logistics chain ends on land, which means many opportunities to hit. That's where "prompt", as 10s of minutes to target, part comes in. Effectively renders entire USN (or any US hardware that's stationary in open for <30m) one time deployment assets. Yes, there's have nuclear carriers, and some SSNs, but carriers likely won't operate without escorts, and can't sortie without replenishment aviation fuel / munitions. SSN but #s of conventional SSN small, magazine depth limited, currently takes multi weeks to reload (but still dangerous). Naval hulls themselves can't hide at sea forever, eventually they need to be brought into drydock for maintainence, but the second the do, can get hit. Virtue of subs is they can go straight into tunnels. This is also assuming PRC doesn't extend kill chain of ICBMs (which R&D hint they are) to hit moving targets at sea, really just extend current IRBM tech for hemisphere+ A2D2, then there's no where for USN to hide. Now if carrier groups can be rendered ineffective globally, and 1IC is saturated with PRC precision fires (see PRC cruise missile gigafactory churning 1000 components a day), then US loses substantial ability to deliver large % of power projection fires to PRC mainland. Global strike cam also kill stealth bombers in hardened shelters, but granted shelters can be upgraded (or moved into mountains, ditto with SSNs) to protect bomber size assets (not naval unless subsurface), HENCE IMO there's a reason B21 is the only program that's going smoothly vs shipbuilding/NGAD, because CONUS based projection most survivable. Sprint to 100 B21s by 2050s is to make up for loss of projected carrier fires made ineffective due to modern missiles+A2D2. Breaking bombers follows similar attrition game of PRC long range strike picking off logistics of aerial tanking, like naval replenishment, but there's 100s of tankers (vs 10s for naval) i.e. for a few stealth bombers with limited aggregate payload, i.e. 9 active B2s trying to drops ~90 TLAMs every few days is... not really a lot when there are like 100,000s-1,000,000s of aim points on PRC mainland, meanwhile interception rate of subsonic cruise missiles approaching 100% with modern missile defense, which PRC can likely gigafactory interceptors as well (along with ISR to track). The numbers are not substantial even if accounting for B21 acquisitions on horizon. Subsurface balance depends on time horizon of conflict, see Bohai expanding SSN production to 6+ per year. How would this work out in practice, unless US preemptively starts war with PRC on immediate horizon, PRC has benefit of deciding when to move on TW / confront US. Likely will wait 5+ years for nuclear build up, build out renewable / EV resiliency, hammer out more SSNs and rocket force, bluewater replenishment - PLA still very much amidst building spree. If US tried to blockade PRC shipping then (nvm that there's not remotely enough USN+CG hulls or replenish to sustain blockade), imo how things unfold: in critical SLOCs, i.e. MENA to Malacca, PLAN will escort shipping and run the blockade and dare US to enforce. Depending on state of PLA replenishment fleet, ability to retrofit temporary oilers to extend blue water range, they'll also station PLA aboard ships for trip wire. If shooting pops off, aforementioned escalation cycles starts, and USN breaks because PRC breaks USN's very vunerable bluewater sustainment system - basically the entire systems confrontation/destruction warfare they've been honing for past 10+ years precisely for this problem. There's also escalations like hitting US offshore platforms as prelude to hitting CONUS energy supplies if sufficient PRC energy disrupted. And the very real possibly of simply dragging a 1IC US partner into fight (likely JP) and trigger US security committment... to fight within A2D2 where US weakest. And JP, as an island (and SK, PH) will start way before effects of blockade on PRC could take effect. Yes all of PLAN likely be sunk, along with lot of PRC shipping and energy infra, but end of day, feasible for PRC to deal proportional damage to CONUS, all while dismantling US East Asian security architecture. Which circles back to: >In a total war short of nuclear exchange the US has asymmetric ability to reach out and touch Chinese mainland targets than China does to the US. Note how vunerable US force projection platforms logistics are... how degradable they can be because frankly they're not designed for adversaries with capabilities to disrupt the logistics tail that sustains them in mind. A substantial amount of CONUS ability to deliver fire to PRC can be rendered ineffective simply because they rely on delivery platforms that cannot be properly sheltered/protected outside of perfect missile defense, in which case it's back to attrition / magazine depth game. Alternatively, PRC spamming conventional road mobile ICMBs = they can be be stored/protected easily. Much of production chain of 60ftx6ft diameter icbm missiles can also be moved underground, with historic precedent (see PRC third front). Their launchers/TELs chasis can be built cheaply in the 100,000s. Cannot do that with bombers and ships. Assuming any forethought/planning/stockpile, it's not inconceivable that PRC will have asymmetric CONUS strike advantage because US ability to mainland strike is largely not survivable while PRC's is. The reason being US never needed to protect logistiscs tail closer to CONUS at scale, and didn't need to because the entire point of expeditionary platforms is get into adversaries face so they can't reach tail, hence now sunk cost into these systems, vunerable in world where improved rocketry can hit them. So TLDR in conventional total war, I would not be surprised if US asymmetric ability to deliver more fires using vunerable, reusable platforms gets rapidly disabled, and PRC comes out ahead in the long range fires numbers because (imo) prompt global strike missile complex / much more survivable and appropriate for peer level attrition fight where you can't expect munition delivery platforms to survive. Smart move is make munitions their own delivery platforms, hence prompt global strike icbms.