5 ms·

A blockade is like the least likely thing to happen. Taiwan has years of foods & oil stored up already, so it would take a very long time to be effective. Meanw

A blockade is like the least likely thing to happen. Taiwan has years of foods & oil stored up already, so it would take a very long time to be effective. Meanwhile I've seen projections that China's economy would immediately shrink 9% without Taiwanese chips. It would be a very slow burn with a long payoff for China, if ever. What's worse for China is that it would give the US time to put ships in exactly the position that it wants, then fire first. The US Navy could take a couple weeks to get all of their forces in alignment, then fire at will. The Chinese navy would be a sitting duck in a blockade- naval engagements favor the party who's willing to attack first, like a gunfighter in the old west. I don't necessarily think that the US can win a shooting war in the Pacific, I just think that a blockade is the least likely scenario. Instead China would go with an active invasion force for Taiwan and pre-emptively missile Guam, US bases on Japan, South Korea, etc. They could definitely win that way- but they'd definitely lose if they only blockaded and didn't actually take the opportunity to shoot first

maxglute 2y ago
> TW stores TW food security and energy with strategic storage factored in is weeks. Also most likely stores will go boom, along with most of TW defensive infra. IMO biggest poor thinking in strategic writings is blockade is non kinetic, PRC not stupid enough to blockade TW and not defang island first. Hitting energy infra for refrigeration and water infra and timer starts ticking even sooner. IMO it's pretty obvious US/west going to lose more than PRC if 90%+ of highend semi already largely denied to PRC is gone. > sitting duck PLAN isn't going to do any of the blockading, it's going to be coast guard since PRC will treat it as a civil (war) law enforcement. But ultimately, US-PRC war isn't just a naval engagement, it's whole of military systems engagement, PRC has more landbased fires that can destroy USN than PLAN does. Nevermind enagaging PLAN ships means USN has to be within 1-2IC, aka within PRC A2D2 bubble. It doesn't matter USN shoots first, because PLA ISR will pickup launches and PLArocketforce will shoot minutes after, (assuming PLAN doesn't immediately counter fire) before USN ordnance even reaches target, or US shooters get away. In the end everyone will have a bunch of dead ships. PRC gladly trade PLAN for USN since US hegemony loses more without navy vs PRC. Who also has 600x more ship building to reconstitute navy. >blockade is the least likely scenario I think blockade should assumed default because it's so easily executable and starts timer on potential TW capitulation. It should be assumed that it's baseline response, on top of other scenarios, i.e. taking out US+partner war making abilities within 1IC. Whatever else happens, including nothing, the blockade will be happening on the background.
- ls612 2y ago
  Preemptively striking USN/USAF bases and forces in the first island chain is on one hand game-theoretically correct for the Chinese side as their goal is to win fast. On the other hand though, the one way to well and truly wake up the sleeping giant and unite it against you like nothing else can is to kill thousands of sailors and airmen on Day 1, as Japan learned the hard way. And much like Japan, the PRC can be strangled in a long drawn out naval conflict from outside of its A2AD bubble. China is not food or energy independent, imports most of its base metals for production uses, and Russia can only provide so much over land. There is no substitute for middle eastern oil or Australian and Brazilian iron for the PRC. All plausible scenarios of PRC victory in a Pacific escalation scenario have the flaw of the Chinese side assuming "We blow up all the US military assets in the region and the USA gives up". As soon as the US starts to fight back and move its economy to a war footing China will face the same crushing resource shortages that ruined Imperial Japan, while conversely there is little to nothing they can do to prevent the US from continuing to import every raw material it needs to fight and win a war.
  - maxglute 2y ago
    > game-theoretically correct I think it maybe game theoretically correct after certain conditions met (points below), but it also opens all sorts of pyrrhic/pyrrhic conditions vs trying to convince US+co to giveup via making intervening in East Asia pyrrhicly difficult in first place. > PRC can be strangled ... > flaw US can increasingly be comparably strangled with conventional icmbs/prompt global strikes hitting US energy infra. People conflate expeditionary naval+air with the generalized goal of force project which is to degrade adversary homeland serenity, which PRC is going to increasingly do with missiles. People conflate resource autarky with resource security, realisitically vs PRC with conventional prompt global strike, US security exposure is basically Saudi - can have all the resources in the ground, but doesn't matter if it cannot be protected. Blockading ships or hitting energy producing infra is just disrupting warmaking on different points in supply chain. The biggest flaw in US strategic thinking, assuming PRC does not, and will not have CONUS strike options. Reality is once they do at scale (and they are pursuing this), US ability to intervene limited because they have to game theory loss of CONUS serenity and all the hegemonic benefits that entails, and whether that's worth it for TW, or east asia security presence. IMO that's PRC's medium term deterrance buildup/gametheory: 1. Build nuclear parity for conventional faceoff 2. Build out rocket based prompt global strike 3. Wait for US to accept there's little chance of winning IndoPac, and trying risks US homeland serenity at scale 4. Aim for regional hegemony -> slowly push US out of TW intervention then JP/SKR/PH etc

maxglute 2y ago

> TW stores TW food security and energy with strategic storage factored in is weeks. Also most likely stores will go boom, along with most of TW defensive infra. IMO biggest poor thinking in strategic writings is blockade is non kinetic, PRC not stupid enough to blockade TW and not defang island first. Hitting energy infra for refrigeration and water infra and timer starts ticking even sooner. IMO it's pretty obvious US/west going to lose more than PRC if 90%+ of highend semi already largely denied to PRC is gone. > sitting duck PLAN isn't going to do any of the blockading, it's going to be coast guard since PRC will treat it as a civil (war) law enforcement. But ultimately, US-PRC war isn't just a naval engagement, it's whole of military systems engagement, PRC has more landbased fires that can destroy USN than PLAN does. Nevermind enagaging PLAN ships means USN has to be within 1-2IC, aka within PRC A2D2 bubble. It doesn't matter USN shoots first, because PLA ISR will pickup launches and PLArocketforce will shoot minutes after, (assuming PLAN doesn't immediately counter fire) before USN ordnance even reaches target, or US shooters get away. In the end everyone will have a bunch of dead ships. PRC gladly trade PLAN for USN since US hegemony loses more without navy vs PRC. Who also has 600x more ship building to reconstitute navy. >blockade is the least likely scenario I think blockade should assumed default because it's so easily executable and starts timer on potential TW capitulation. It should be assumed that it's baseline response, on top of other scenarios, i.e. taking out US+partner war making abilities within 1IC. Whatever else happens, including nothing, the blockade will be happening on the background.

ls612 2y ago
Preemptively striking USN/USAF bases and forces in the first island chain is on one hand game-theoretically correct for the Chinese side as their goal is to win fast. On the other hand though, the one way to well and truly wake up the sleeping giant and unite it against you like nothing else can is to kill thousands of sailors and airmen on Day 1, as Japan learned the hard way. And much like Japan, the PRC can be strangled in a long drawn out naval conflict from outside of its A2AD bubble. China is not food or energy independent, imports most of its base metals for production uses, and Russia can only provide so much over land. There is no substitute for middle eastern oil or Australian and Brazilian iron for the PRC. All plausible scenarios of PRC victory in a Pacific escalation scenario have the flaw of the Chinese side assuming "We blow up all the US military assets in the region and the USA gives up". As soon as the US starts to fight back and move its economy to a war footing China will face the same crushing resource shortages that ruined Imperial Japan, while conversely there is little to nothing they can do to prevent the US from continuing to import every raw material it needs to fight and win a war.
- maxglute 2y ago
  > game-theoretically correct I think it maybe game theoretically correct after certain conditions met (points below), but it also opens all sorts of pyrrhic/pyrrhic conditions vs trying to convince US+co to giveup via making intervening in East Asia pyrrhicly difficult in first place. > PRC can be strangled ... > flaw US can increasingly be comparably strangled with conventional icmbs/prompt global strikes hitting US energy infra. People conflate expeditionary naval+air with the generalized goal of force project which is to degrade adversary homeland serenity, which PRC is going to increasingly do with missiles. People conflate resource autarky with resource security, realisitically vs PRC with conventional prompt global strike, US security exposure is basically Saudi - can have all the resources in the ground, but doesn't matter if it cannot be protected. Blockading ships or hitting energy producing infra is just disrupting warmaking on different points in supply chain. The biggest flaw in US strategic thinking, assuming PRC does not, and will not have CONUS strike options. Reality is once they do at scale (and they are pursuing this), US ability to intervene limited because they have to game theory loss of CONUS serenity and all the hegemonic benefits that entails, and whether that's worth it for TW, or east asia security presence. IMO that's PRC's medium term deterrance buildup/gametheory: 1. Build nuclear parity for conventional faceoff 2. Build out rocket based prompt global strike 3. Wait for US to accept there's little chance of winning IndoPac, and trying risks US homeland serenity at scale 4. Aim for regional hegemony -> slowly push US out of TW intervention then JP/SKR/PH etc