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The U.S. needs to pay more attention to electronic warfare
- arter4 2y agoI'm not sure how the author seems to know the Chinese EW playbook. Is there any open source (as in OSINT) material on this?
- earthworldpsion 2y agoWhile not a direct source, the China Aerospace Studies Institute provided a translation of the 2020 Science of Military Strategy that you could reasonably infer the EW strategy from: https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/CASI/Display/Article/2913216/in-their-own-words-2020-science-of-military-strategy/ https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/CASI/Display/Article/291321...
- arter4 2y agoInteresting, thanks!
- S3N7 2y agoBlack Hat Asia had a section on China's military operations recently: https://youtu.be/braWTvU15QE https://youtu.be/braWTvU15QE I have had it in my back log since it's posting on YouTube, so I can't make any promises to it's contents.
- arter4 2y agoInteresting, thanks!
- thrill 2y agoThere's lots of OSINT but finding something particular might be difficult - you could contact the author (his twitter is in the article) or you can find various materials at the Defense Technical Information Center, such as https://discover.dtic.mil/results/?q=china+electronic+warfare https://discover.dtic.mil/results/?q=china+electronic+warfar...
- oldpersonintx 2y ago[dead]
- maxglute 2y agoSomeone linked airforce university below, they have alright series "in their words" (or something similar) to translate recent-ish writings. There was entire sections on PLA military writings in PRC book stores that one could just go in and buy, not sure what the situation is anymore.
- zombiwoof 2y ago[flagged]
- bbqfog 2y agoThe number of board members and executives with open allegiance to Israel is far more concerning.
- wyldberry 2y ago"far more concerning". Israel, not a peer adversary to the US. China is. So no, it is not more concerning.
- bbqfog 2y agoSpeak for yourself. Israel is most certainly an adversary for everyone in the US who values democracy and free press.
- FactKnower69 2y agoAs long as we're comparing ways in which China and Israel differ, I wonder how many US state governments require all government employees and contractors to sign a loyalty oath to China? Less than the majority of states, you think? https://www.newsweek.com/pro-palestinian-protest-states-colleges-illegal-bds-1895292 https://www.newsweek.com/pro-palestinian-protest-states-coll...
- janalsncm 2y agoDoubly so we should worry about the ability of our education system to produce technical talent. The workforce is the engine that makes everything else possible. So it should be very troubling that college attendance is down lately.
- daniel_reetz 2y agoAgree, but colleges aren't the only vehicle to produce a technical workforce. If the US wants to be competitive going forward, we are going to need alternate tracks for technically minded folks - think apprenticeships and certification programs in addition to our universities.
- taeric 2y agoI don't necessarily disagree with the general statement. Yes, we should pay attention to electronic warfare. I do take some issue with the implication that the agencies don't? Reminds me of students going off about how "nobody is doing anything about climate change," which is demonstrably false. At least the security stuff is less visible, I suppose. I'm not trying to argue for a blank check for US agencies to do things without doing any disclosure. But, I am also not entirely clear how to get better transparency at home with no reasonable expectation of it afar?
- halJordan 2y agoI had the same reaction. EW is a high effort area right now and it was even before Feb22. And this "new" focus is on defending ew. The US has been and remains the far and away leader in electronic attack.
- ethbr1 2y agoCitation? I know there's a lot of work on SEWIP Block 3, but Russian ground forces have effective and powerful systems.
- mikewarot 2y agoTo encourage hacking and innovation here in the US, it might be wise for the FCC to allow amateur radio to start using encryption and carrying private non-commercial traffic.
- LegionMammal978 2y agoHow would they enforce non-commercial use?
- nine_k 2y agoHow would it encourage innovation? If you need an encrypted channel, you can use the internet, including the mobile phone data access; GSM modems are not that expensive. If you need to have an encrypted radio channel far from mobile network coverage, without identifying yourself in any way, who are you hiding from? Because a communication channel to a remote weapon would look much like that. Note that you can still use cryptography to ensure the integrity of your messages, by signing them.
- mikewarot 2y ago>who are you hiding from? We expect privacy in everything else, why not telecoms? As far as ID goes, we're required to transmit our call signs (mine's KA9DGX), those could be in the clear. You're not likely to get a bunch of us old timers using it for much more than extending networks to the neighbor, barn, etc. If there happens to be an encrypted signal, let's say a connection to an HTTPS web site... that's encryption, and illegal to send via ham radio. If we're able to do such things, we could then look into all sorts of other uses, like monitoring crops in the fields, metropolitan scale community networking, etc.
- nine_k 2y agoEncrypted but not anonymous is rather fine in my book. But it, importantly, would turn a public space (frequentcy range) into a private space. The payload could become commercial ("dirt-cheap IoT connectivity in remote locations!"), and that may soon crowd the space. Every transmitter would still represent a minuscule, fair share of the airtime / bandwidth, so there'd no one to ban. Same with CB: I'm fine with sending some digital data over it, as long as the format remains open, content unencrypted, and voice comm remains possible. Well, in a pinch, run an ssh session over it. But everybody will understand that your circumstances are extraordinary. We have few public spaces, and such reserved, commonly accessible areas should remain, if for nothing else then for maintaining an extra communication channel for extreme circumstances. Search and rescue operations, wildfire monitoring when the normal means of monitoring fail, reporting and coordination in disaster areas, things of such sort. I'm all for business and took part in running several small businesses. Still I think that not everything should be devoted to commerce; the common public spaces, like the ham radio bands, public parks, or public sidewalks, add resilience to the society. They are easy to lose, harder to reinstate.
- parsimo2010 2y agoThis is a guest post from a CEO of a US chip company, advocating that the US needs to invest money in US chip companies. So the message may not be incorrect, but it’s got some notable bias. Things I noticed: 1. Glinert somehow manages to advocate for continued funding of US chip manufacturers without mentioning the CHIPS Act of 2022 which allocated over $50 billion in new funding for this exact thing over the next 10 years or so. Does Glinert think this is the right amount, or does he want it to be increased? 2. Glinert mentions some scary scenarios, such as China’s rapidly increasing EW capability completely disabling the US in a future conflict, and even shows a couple of diagrams. But nowhere has he mentioned any of the US programs that have implemented electronic protection (EP) measures in just about every military system with a radar or wireless communication system. I’ll admit that the details of most of these programs are classified, but the article doesn’t even mention that the US has been continuing to invest in EP as well as its own EW systems. This feels a little one sided. 3. Glinert, the CEO of a tech company (aka non-traditional defense contractor) argues that the US government should be working more directly with Silicon Valley instead of with major defense contractors. Great news! There is a contract vehicle called an Other Transaction Authority (OTA), where the distinguishing requirement is that a non-traditional defense contractor must perform a non-trivial amount of work on the contract, and the acquisition corps of each service is using them a lot. The traditional prime contractors are still getting a lot of business, but there is plenty of opportunity for a chip company to get in on government money (provided they are offering something the government has asked for). 4. I’ll admit that Glinert’s point about autonomy being important is probably correct. I don’t want to seem like I totally dismissed the article. The government is certainly working on it, time will tell whether these autonomous systems work out well or not. 5. Hot-swapping chips is already done in most systems- it’s called “line replaceable modules,” which simplify maintenance as well as enable upgrades. Many military systems get upgraded throughout their service life, and those include computational upgrades along with engines and whatnot. Bottom line: if you’re not an insider this article probably gave you a lot to think about. If you are an insider you probably noticed a lot of stuff wasn’t mentioned, and it’s not just because of classified info. The US has been paying attention to electronic warfare, and will continue to do so. What the US won’t do is take wild risks like a SV startup- national security is higher stakes that don’t allow staking everything on a moonshot. If your company wants to play in that space, you have to demonstrate that you can deliver, or you have to convince a larger company like Lockheed Martin or Northrop Grumman to take you on as a subcontractor.
- maxglute 2y agoScenario in OP Is kind of stupid, if PRC decides to blockade TW, they're not going to depend on EW to deter USN, they're just going to mine the shit out of area. US+partners has functionally nonexistent demining capability relative to what PRC can lay (USN couldn't even keep up with token desperate Iraq mining in Gulf), which is to say no one (except PRC utilizing civilian ships in contingency) has such capability at scale, and only in the specific context of aggregating repurposed hulls direct off her shores. The reality is if PRC wants to blockade TW, there's not a thing anyone can do about it. Realistically there's not even a thing US can even try to do about it. PRC executing WW2 operation starvation on TW, a smaller geography to cordon sanitaire, with PRC's magnitude greater industrial output and closer logistics tail relative to US vs JP. The math isn't just bleak, it's almost a solved equation. "How can we win". Of course no one is going to admit it can't be done. But still very useful to hammer these hypothetical scenarios to direct industrial policy.
- hash872 2y agoA blockade is like the least likely thing to happen. Taiwan has years of foods & oil stored up already, so it would take a very long time to be effective. Meanwhile I've seen projections that China's economy would immediately shrink 9% without Taiwanese chips. It would be a very slow burn with a long payoff for China, if ever. What's worse for China is that it would give the US time to put ships in exactly the position that it wants, then fire first. The US Navy could take a couple weeks to get all of their forces in alignment, then fire at will. The Chinese navy would be a sitting duck in a blockade- naval engagements favor the party who's willing to attack first, like a gunfighter in the old west. I don't necessarily think that the US can win a shooting war in the Pacific, I just think that a blockade is the least likely scenario. Instead China would go with an active invasion force for Taiwan and pre-emptively missile Guam, US bases on Japan, South Korea, etc. They could definitely win that way- but they'd definitely lose if they only blockaded and didn't actually take the opportunity to shoot first
- maxglute 2y ago> TW stores TW food security and energy with strategic storage factored in is weeks. Also most likely stores will go boom, along with most of TW defensive infra. IMO biggest poor thinking in strategic writings is blockade is non kinetic, PRC not stupid enough to blockade TW and not defang island first. Hitting energy infra for refrigeration and water infra and timer starts ticking even sooner. IMO it's pretty obvious US/west going to lose more than PRC if 90%+ of highend semi already largely denied to PRC is gone. > sitting duck PLAN isn't going to do any of the blockading, it's going to be coast guard since PRC will treat it as a civil (war) law enforcement. But ultimately, US-PRC war isn't just a naval engagement, it's whole of military systems engagement, PRC has more landbased fires that can destroy USN than PLAN does. Nevermind enagaging PLAN ships means USN has to be within 1-2IC, aka within PRC A2D2 bubble. It doesn't matter USN shoots first, because PLA ISR will pickup launches and PLArocketforce will shoot minutes after, (assuming PLAN doesn't immediately counter fire) before USN ordnance even reaches target, or US shooters get away. In the end everyone will have a bunch of dead ships. PRC gladly trade PLAN for USN since US hegemony loses more without navy vs PRC. Who also has 600x more ship building to reconstitute navy. >blockade is the least likely scenario I think blockade should assumed default because it's so easily executable and starts timer on potential TW capitulation. It should be assumed that it's baseline response, on top of other scenarios, i.e. taking out US+partner war making abilities within 1IC. Whatever else happens, including nothing, the blockade will be happening on the background.
- vonnik 2y agoI have been involved in supplying non-lethal technology to Ukraine for the last 2+ years. While this excludes the "bullets, barrels or bombs" part of the killchain, it includes energy sources, ISR drones, telecommunication and EW equipment. I can confirm several assertions in Glinert's piece: - Russia has cutting-edge EW technology. Russia does not possess SOTA in many aspects of military tech, but it does in EW. - Ukraine is one theater, and maybe the main one, that shows us how drone-based warfare is evolving. Here's the way to think about EW. A drone-based war is a war conducted largely on the eletro-magnetic spectrum, because it is via that spectrum that radio-controlled drones are given instructions, how they retrieve data to navigate, and how they are jammed and spoofed. Jamming and spoofing are the primary drivers of so-called lethal autonomy, because all sides want to continue to use drones within GPS-denied/RF-denied bubbles. "Autonomy" is a continuum. At the low end, it involves inertial navigation that lets drones continue to move toward a target once they lose contact with navigation sats and/or their operators. And the higher-end, it allows them to identify targets based on pre-programmed patterns (e.g. "here's what an SU-47 looks like; if you see something like this after we launch you in the right direction, hit it"). The real problem with the US military is not that we're no longer on the cutting-edge of EW. In many senses, we are. It's that our military-industrial complex is bloated with slow procurement practices where new tech decades years if not decades to deploy. Those procurement practices are spec driven and follow a waterfall from those specs, which themselves take a long time to hammer out. For some people in tech, this may already raise a red flag. What we need are product and engineering teams or representatives in the field with users to observe their problems, hear their POVs, and devise better ways of doing things based on their knowledge of what's technically possible and quickly deployable. That is very rare. I have seen little of it Ukraine from any vendor or allied government. The nation(s) that can do that will win. War can be a tremendous technological accelerant, but many forces conspire to slow down product development, and the only forcing function is that the enemy is trying every day to kill you by responding to what you've got. I am deeply worried that the US military cannot build fast or buy cheap. Cheap is important, at least in Ukraine, because we are dealing with swarms of small devices in a war of attrition, and the side that runs out of money first loses.
- gherkinnn 2y agoThe War on the Rocks podcast recently published a related episode about "Cyber in the defence department" [0]. WOTR regularly features guests with deep expertise or of high calibre. Good stuff. 0 - https://warontherocks.com/2024/08/the-smartest-conversation-on-cyber-in-the-defense-department-youve-heard-in-a-long-time/ https://warontherocks.com/2024/08/the-smartest-conversation-...
- ein0p 2y agoThe US is not under threat and hasn’t really been since 1941. If there’s anything it needs to pay attention to it’s crime, infrastructure, affordability of medical care and housing, unsustainable government spending and so on.
- deleted 2y ago[deleted]