3 ms·
My immediate thought at the start of this article was not DoS but more about harming the company using the chatbot (Company A) by increasing their chatbot bills
by sahmeepee 2y ago
My immediate thought at the start of this article was not DoS but more about harming the company using the chatbot (Company A) by increasing their chatbot bills. In many (most?) cases they will not be hosting their chatbot and will instead be getting it from a 3rd party provider (Company B) who may not even be truly hosting it either.
If the pricing structure is per conversation or per month it would harm Company B, but not the likely target, Company A. If it is paid per interaction it would harm Company A and benefit Company B who just get more paid work.
It feels a bit like cases of rivals clicking on each other's ads to cost them on ad spend, but presumably much lower value than ads.
You would think it would be easy to stop a conversation at n interactions via some other means than relying on the LLM itself, but then you also have to figure out how to stop the attacker just starting more conversations (or passing the output of one of your chatbot instances into the input of another)
- nkrisc 2y agoIf costs of outlier conversations are a concern but any party, they can just end the conversation after 1,000 or 10,000 responses or whatever. What human would ever reach that threshold? Surely no customer worth keeping, whatever you’re selling.