4 ms·
I think the point was that Flame was signed with a Microsoft key. It's true that key shouldn't have been trusted for what it was used for, and that the MD5 att
by nl 14y ago
I think the point was that Flame was signed with a Microsoft key.
It's true that key shouldn't have been trusted for what it was used for, and that the MD5 attack basically elevated the rights of the key, but the parent's point isn't 100% wrong (nor is it 100% right..)
- sseveran 14y agoFlame used a prefix collision attack that had not been seen before. The concept was demonstrated a couple of years ago but the attack itself was novel. http://arstechnica.com/security/2012/06/flame-crypto-breakthrough/ http://arstechnica.com/security/2012/06/flame-crypto-breakth...
- beagle3 14y agoWhile that's true, what enabled Flame to use that to sign code was a chain-of-trust mistake as nl pointed above -- and there's no guarantee that such chain-of-trust mistakes will not happen in the future.
- sseveran 14y agoChain of trusts always require the chain to be secure. In fact there will undoubtedly be future chain of trust attacks on certificates.