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> what is it that the author thinks is particularly unusual about this image? The level of detail, particularly the articulation of components/subsystems (prim
by next_xibalba 2y ago
> what is it that the author thinks is particularly unusual about this image?
The level of detail, particularly the articulation of components/subsystems (primary, secondary, radiation case, interstage medium, tamper, fusion fuel, and a "sparkplug"). All according to the article. Per author, DoE has very strict guidelines on the depiction of nukes, and this image appears to violate those guidelines. The official depictions are often just simple shapes, like "two circles in a box," that do not convey any meaningful information about weapon design.
I am speculating here, but it seems like DoE must believe that anything beyond simple shapes may provide bad actors (i.e. anyone but US Govt and allies) clues as to how to build a thermo-nuke.
- forgot-im-old 2y agoThe author should look into https://www.castelion.com/ https://www.castelion.com/ a company started by SpaceX employees and with deep connections to Elon's Starlink and Strategic Defense Initiative. They have some interesting images.
- next_xibalba 2y agoLink? I can't find any images that articulate a nuclear warhead like the one in OP's link.
- kstrauser 2y agoConclusion: that's a diagram of the obvious approach to building a thermonuclear device, which happens to be completely wrong for classified reasons, and if you pursue this design you're going to waste a decade before you figure out why.
- Titan2189 2y agoI would ask you to elaborate, but I guess that'd be pointless
- kstrauser 2y agoI don't work in or around this field and never have. You have as much knowledge about it as I do. That was just my interpretation of the situation, based on watching too many movies.
- tsss 2y agoMore likely is that the obvious approach is also totally the right approach and anyone with the relevant education could easily come up with it themselves, but the US government still censors it out of security theatre.
- pests 2y agoThe blog goes into detail about how releasing any wrong information or misinformation about a secret, still defines the bounds and brackets the real information, and allows eliminating possible options (as no agency would reveal the truth.) If that was the case, an actor could go "this is obviously not the way to build this, lets move on" so in a way, you have sped up the development. Just like saying, "We have 100,000 nukes" (a lie), everyone knows its a lie, which means we DO NOT have 100,000 nukes, as we wouldn't reveal the truth. Enough of these little "misinformations" get released, the closer to the truth someone can get.
- echelon 2y ago> which happens to be completely wrong Or simply suboptimal.
- numpad0 2y agoOr, there are 5 people doing this type of research across the world, 3 of them barely taking calls on iOS and the rest just finally managed to migrate from IRIX to Cygwin last year, and they are to take all necessary actions for operational security and talent acquisition.
- gnfargbl 2y ago> I am speculating here, but it seems like DoE must believe that anything beyond simple shapes may provide bad actors (i.e. anyone but US Govt and allies) clues as to how to build a thermo-nuke. And with good reason: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2003/jun/24/usa.science https://www.theguardian.com/world/2003/jun/24/usa.science It's a bit like the Egg of Columbus. Doing it the first time needs a team of visionary geniuses, but once the trick is known to work then even us pedestrians could manage it given enough time and resources.
- bobthepanda 2y agothe problem is usually getting the fissile material. as far as non-state actors go though, other types of WMD are probably more attainable. Aum Shinrikyo is probably the most infamous example where a cult manufactured multiple chemical weapons. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Aum_Shinrikyo#Tokyo_subway_sarin_attack_and_related_incidents https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Aum_Shinrikyo#Tokyo_subway_sar...
- Earw0rm 2y agoYes and no. For terrorism purposes, the primary (more or less the same as a "Hiroshima"-level "A"-bomb) would surely more than suffice. I'm sort of struggling to think why anyone other than a nation state (looking to prove itself worthy of a seat at various tables) would want to possess more bang than that. Granted there are a few nations at or close to A-bomb tech whom we would definitely not want having its bigger brother. Iran and NK especially.