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OK, but my question remains: what is it that the author thinks is particularly unusual about this image? I'm not a nuclear scientist, but I did study nuclear p
by gnfargbl 2y ago
OK, but my question remains: what is it that the author thinks is particularly unusual about this image?
I'm not a nuclear scientist, but I did study nuclear physics to master's level. To my eye, there's nothing at all interesting about this image. It looks like informed speculation. Without any confirmation that this is a real weapons design (and I see no reason at all to believe it is) then it tells us absolutely nothing which hasn't been in the public domains for decades.
> As he's blogging about this it's almost certain he has had real current working nuclear weapons experts from his contact list read the advances and not disagree.
That seems extremely unlikely to me. People who have held the appropriate clearance to verify whether this is or is not representative of a real weapon, do not tend to casually liaise with someone who has spent their career attempting to prise open that veil of secrecy. In fact, their own careers and liberty depend on not making such personal connections.
- nmadden 2y agoThe article goes into a lot of detail about why the author thinks its unusual.
- defrost 2y agoAs nmadden noted there's a lot of detail in the article . > That seems extremely unlikely to me. None the less his nuclearsecrecy blog has been about for many many years and he's had a great deal of contact with people who have walked up to the line. It's not that uncommon for historians to have neither confirm nor deny but we can understand various silences relations with experts - even the OG Manhatten Project had embedded historians and archivists who toed the line on handling and preserving materials and held long meetings on what to release | not release and when. There are even a few DoE employed HN users here who know their areas of expertise and comment right up to the point where they shut up (an often shut down | change accounts) - they don't say what they shouldn't but they have chatted until they don't anymore .. which is interesting in itself.
- gnfargbl 2y agoThere's a lot of detail about why the author thinks it is notable that Sandia released this image. There's very little about what it is in this image itself that the author finds interesting, save for some comment about a dip which could be intended to focus neutron flux from the primary to the secondary. I feel that's the kind of thing an appropriate undergraduate would imagine in a short amount of time.
- rsfern 2y agoI think you’re just looking for the surprise factor in the wrong place. The notability is all about Sandia’s public release criteria, which are pretty much orthogonal to whether or not the information is publicly known. I don’t think the author finds any particular detail interesting or new in and of itself, they even compare to other public illustrations that have the kind of detail you are talking about.
- deleted 2y ago[deleted]
- renhanxue 2y agoThe author is a historian whose main published work is the book Restricted Data: The History of Nuclear Secrecy in the United States. He isn't very interested in the information itself; he's interested in where it comes from and in the process that led to its release. It's notable not because it contains interesting information, it's notable because it seems like it might represent a radical break with established patterns in US government procedures with regards to restricted data (which is a special and very weird kind of classification that only applies to nuclear secrets). In other words: the author is interested in the institutions and policies that manage nuclear secrets, not so much in the secrets themselves. In a different post[0] regarding a fumbled redaction that released similar information about what a warhead looks like, he had this to say: > It’s also just not clear that these kinds of [declassification] mistakes “matter,” in the sense of actually increasing the danger in the world, or to the United States. I’ve never come across a case where some kind of slip-up like this actually helped an aspiring nuclear weapons state, or helped our already-advanced adversaries. That’s just not how it works: there’s a lot more work that has to be done to make a working nuke than you can get out of a slip-up like this, and when it comes to getting secret information, the Russians and Chinese have already shown that even the “best” systems can be penetrated by various kinds of espionage. It’s not that secrets aren’t important — they can be — but they aren’t usually what makes the real-world differences, in the end. And these kinds of slip-ups are, perhaps fortunately, not releasing “secrets” that seem to matter that much. > If anything, that’s the real critique of it: not that these mistakes happen. Mistakes will always happen in any sufficiently large system like this. It’s that there isn’t any evidence these mistakes have caused real harm. And if that’s the case… what’s the point of all of this secrecy, then? > The most likely danger from this kind of screw up is not that enemy powers will learn new ways to make H-bombs. Rather, it’s that Congressmen looking to score political points can point to this sort of thing as an evidence of lax security. The consequences of such accusations can be much more damaging and long-lasting, creating a conservatism towards secrecy that restricts access to knowledge that might actually be important or useful to know. [0]: https://blog.nuclearsecrecy.com/2021/05/17/how-not-to-redact-a-warhead/ https://blog.nuclearsecrecy.com/2021/05/17/how-not-to-redact...
- morpheuskafka 2y ago> There are even a few DoE employed HN users here who know their areas of expertise and comment right up to the point where they shut up (an often shut down | change accounts) It seems like one could pretty easily build a database and track online commenters that are government affiliated. I've seen several on reddit from various three letter agencies (see r/TSA, r/1811, r/securityclearance, r/cbpoapplicant/). They usually try to self-limit what they share, but inevitably say things that aren't approved to be public. If you gathered a database of posts across these forums, it would be easier to reconstruct info across different sources. Regularly scraping the site and flagging whatever gets deleted by the mods to read is also a good strategy, as they do often remove posts for being too sensitive. You could also identify patterns of content they engaged with that resulted in information disclosure. For example, there used to be a CBP officer on Reddit that had offered on at least one occasion to look up someone's PASSID in their internal systems because their GE application had gotten stuck in processing. Someone could make a similar post to solicit them to "help" them with a similar situation as a means of info gathering. As you said, what they don't share is often informative as well. For example, someone asked that account what it meant when the officer said they "had three BTPs" and sent them to secondary; his response was that it was too sensitive to disclose. I can't find the term in any public docs, so the existence of this procedure itself is info that could be valuable to a threat actor. They could also just try posting about the same thing until someone different reveals slightly more info. These internal acronyms can also be used as a shibboleth when posting to subconsciously make people more comfortable sharing info in response. If the term is internal, and you ask a question to a "fellow employee" online, they may disclose things that they think you already know. You can find a lot of info about the systems they use in public PIA/SORN notices. Unclassified codenames can also be used as a Google search tactic to uncover content posted by insiders and filtering out news articles and other public results. For example, this Quizlet user is easily searchable given the plethora of military acronyms, and contains information about the location of wiring inside a naval facility and the structure of classified satellite networks: https://quizlet.com/578117055/tcf-specific-flash-cards/ https://quizlet.com/578117055/tcf-specific-flash-cards/ , https://quizlet.com/414907821/eiws-study-guide-here-it-is-bois-and-gals-flash-cards/ https://quizlet.com/414907821/eiws-study-guide-here-it-is-bo..., https://quizlet.com/463959814/scif-flash-cards/ https://quizlet.com/463959814/scif-flash-cards/. Now Google some of those terms and find more Quizlets: https://quizlet.com/593984066/osi-308-odin-sphere-enclaves-flash-cards/ https://quizlet.com/593984066/osi-308-odin-sphere-enclaves-f..., https://quizlet.com/595864454/transport-layers-flash-cards/ https://quizlet.com/595864454/transport-layers-flash-cards/. This one has info about hidden security features on a USAF ID badge authorizing access to parked aircraft (logo mistakes and base name spelled with 1 for L): https://quizlet.com/763351519/response-force-member-knowledge-security-forces-qc-questions-flash-cards/ https://quizlet.com/763351519/response-force-member-knowledg.... Even detailed descriptions of agency procedures by the public is valuable, if summarized and put into a database. Inevitably, things are overheard or observed each time one interacts with security forces. Everything from their facial expression, how much they are typing, etc. can reveal how you are perceived. On Chinese social media, for example, there is a lot of discussion of US immigration procedures and which ports/offices are perceived as most strict. One could run statistics based on others posts about visa and entry denials to identify weaknesses and reconstruct non-public procedures. For example, this thread discusses a TSA procedure I saw myself: https://old.reddit.com/r/tsa/comments/14l1ca1/what_is_the_box_wrapped_in_tsa_stickers_ive_seen/?rdt=39645 https://old.reddit.com/r/tsa/comments/14l1ca1/what_is_the_bo.... One respondent says it is sensitive, and another tries to deflect the question by saying it is to "weight down light things" while also admitting it "distinguishes the bag for the X-ray operator." It's pretty obvious that the "paper weight" (the code name which someone helpfully shared) contains the image of a prohibited item (or a known pattern) to test that the X-ray operator is paying attention; the tray was sent to secondary but not actually searched beyond removing the object. This comment (https://www.reddit.com/r/tsa/comments/1clxfn8/comment/l2wox2n/ https://www.reddit.com/r/tsa/comments/1clxfn8/comment/l2wox2...) indirectly confirms that TSA does collaborate with law enforcement to help forfeit cash which was the subject of a recent lawsuit by the Institute for Justice, by saying "there was no need to notify anyone because they traveling domestically," implying that they do notify LE if international.
- scubbo 2y ago> walked up to the line I'm not familiar with that idiom, and searching for it only gives me "Walk the line" - what does it mean?
- Merad 2y agoTo "cross the line" means that you went too far, in this context meaning that someone revealed secrets or otherwise talked about things that they shouldn't reveal. So to walk up to the line means that the person was willing to talk about the topic or share their knowledge, but did so without "crossing the line."
- MereInterest 2y agoI read it as being related to the "line in the sand" idiom. There exists some set of rules, the "line". Exactly what is and isn't allowed under those rules is a bit arbitrary, like the exact location where you would draw a line in the sand with your finger. What matters is that the line has been drawn, and everybody knows that the line may not be crossed. Under that metaphor, a person may stay very far from the line, to avoid accidentally stepping over it, or they may walk right up to the line. Metaphorically, the former would be a person who refuses to answer any questions about nuclear secrets, regardless of whether the question can be legally answered. The latter would be a person who knows exactly what can be legally answered, and will give as full of an answer as is allowed. They know where the line in the sand is, and have walked up to the line.
- scubbo 2y agoThat's helpful, thank you!
- fragmede 2y agoChatGPT's really good for that kind of a thing, but in this case it's a saying popularized by a Johnny Cash song about staying loyal and committed to his wife while being on the road and facing temptation.
- scubbo 2y ago
- jonstewart 2y agoRead the article?
- DoneWithAllThat 2y agoI’m sorry but all I can think of reading your comment is “but why male models?”.
- keepamovin 2y ago[flagged]
- gnfargbl 2y agoI'm not contemptuous or mocking, and I'm sorry it came across that way. I am annoyed at having my time wasted by what I feel is a clickbait article. Given the article title, the accusation of straw-manning is really unfair. Your comment would also have been better without the jab; if you're familiar with the field then we both know why I left science for software, and it isn't because of a lack of jobs.
- Cushman 2y agoGently: The snark you’re getting is undeserved, but you are doing the “but why male models?” thing. You gotta make a left turn here :) Let’s reset: Hey, did Sandia use a thermonuclear secondary in a product logo? Did they actually? Despite all the reasons they wouldn’t? If they did, why? Was it a mistake or on purpose? Neither one quite makes sense. Those are interesting questions! But there’s no alleged secrets leak, and there’s nothing else that’s interesting about that specific picture. You could say it’s implied somehow, but in that case you really got got by anti-clickbait. “Did Sandia use a thermonuclear secondary in a product logo?” is the whole riddle, and the answer is the whole blog post.
- keepamovin 2y agoWell, I think the (wouldn't really call it snark, more accurate dissection) is deserved, and instructive! But otherwise I think you're right. They are interesting questions, and gnarfgabrl (or whatever) seemed obtusely resistant, to the point of needlessly quarrelsome for quarrels sake, of appreciating that genuine interestingness.
- keepamovin 2y agoTo base an adjudication of the accusation of straw manning on an article title is proving my point so thanks. Hahaha! :) Your "apology" would be better (and real) without the mislaying of responsibility: you cannot be sorry for "how it came across" (ie, other people's reactions, not your responsibility). You can only be sorry, if you think you have something to be sorry for, for what you did. Otherwise it seems like a fake apology where you pretend the blame is other people's reactions, rather than how you acted. Hahaha! :) Get it? Yeah, anyway. :) I just felt you were being deliberately provocative based off an incomplete understanding/reading of the article, for attention (mocking genuine outrage). Which is basically live straw manning HN for selfish reasons, so I attacked with insight. Was i wrong?
- tgsovlerkhgsel 2y ago> OK, but my question remains: what is it that the author thinks is particularly unusual about this image? This is explained in the blog post: Publications generally avoid going anywhere near that level of detail, even if not representing actual/accurate data (to avoid the appearance of leaking anything sensitive even if it actually isn't - as the post explains).
- ethbr1 2y agoAka most of Congress doesn't have a background in nuclear physics but does want airtime. And everyone reacts when someone yells "Nuclear secrets!"
- aaron695 2y ago[dead]
- next_xibalba 2y ago> what is it that the author thinks is particularly unusual about this image? The level of detail, particularly the articulation of components/subsystems (primary, secondary, radiation case, interstage medium, tamper, fusion fuel, and a "sparkplug"). All according to the article. Per author, DoE has very strict guidelines on the depiction of nukes, and this image appears to violate those guidelines. The official depictions are often just simple shapes, like "two circles in a box," that do not convey any meaningful information about weapon design. I am speculating here, but it seems like DoE must believe that anything beyond simple shapes may provide bad actors (i.e. anyone but US Govt and allies) clues as to how to build a thermo-nuke.
- forgot-im-old 2y agoThe author should look into https://www.castelion.com/ https://www.castelion.com/ a company started by SpaceX employees and with deep connections to Elon's Starlink and Strategic Defense Initiative. They have some interesting images.
- next_xibalba 2y agoLink? I can't find any images that articulate a nuclear warhead like the one in OP's link.
- kstrauser 2y agoConclusion: that's a diagram of the obvious approach to building a thermonuclear device, which happens to be completely wrong for classified reasons, and if you pursue this design you're going to waste a decade before you figure out why.