7 ms·

"the encryption part of the certificate" is still there as far as the wifi packets leaving your laptop are concerned, and as far as the poorly/maliciously confi

by modoc 18y ago

"the encryption part of the certificate" is still there as far as the wifi packets leaving your laptop are concerned, and as far as the poorly/maliciously configured linux router in the backroom of the coffee shop are concerned. So, is it 100% secure? No. Is there still a reasonably high barrier of entry to getting your CC number/bank login? Yes. That's like saying if you were using one of the weak Debian ssh keys, you might as well be using telnet. It's simply not true. The effort to steal your info is at least an order of magnitude (if not more) higher, even with weak ssh keys. The same situation applies here.

tptacek 18y ago
You made the same point a few minutes ago, and I replied to it; long story short, you're not correct.
nailer 18y ago
tptakec is 100% correct, but I like to explain stuff to people: The packets leaving your laptop are protected from being eavesdropped by third parties, but the party you're sending your banking password to is some asshole who now apparently runs a CA, and just issued a certificate telling your web browser he's your bank.
- modoc 18y ago
  The scenario under discussion (at least I as understood it from this particular thread of comments) is if we don't revoke all the compromisable certs. The scenario is NOT that I am connected to an attacker who has successfully used this attack against me. Under that scenario, then you've already lost your data (although I'd still hold it's better to have your CC stolen by one person, rather than two), so yes, that's bad. However, that's not the scenario that I've been discussing here. This thread came under the debate about the risks and issues with revoking all those certs immediately, versus not.
  - tptacek 18y ago
    If you're saying, "we shouldn't do anything rash to mitigate an attack that requires Arjen Lenstra and a specially tuned cluster of PS3s to accomplish", then that makes sense. If you're saying, "we shouldn't do anything rash because certificates don't break encryption, only authentication", then you are perpetuating a really dangerous myth about SSL security.

by modoc 18y ago

tptacek 18y ago

You made the same point a few minutes ago, and I replied to it; long story short, you're not correct.

nailer 18y ago

tptakec is 100% correct, but I like to explain stuff to people: The packets leaving your laptop are protected from being eavesdropped by third parties, but the party you're sending your banking password to is some asshole who now apparently runs a CA, and just issued a certificate telling your web browser he's your bank.

modoc 18y ago
The scenario under discussion (at least I as understood it from this particular thread of comments) is if we don't revoke all the compromisable certs. The scenario is NOT that I am connected to an attacker who has successfully used this attack against me. Under that scenario, then you've already lost your data (although I'd still hold it's better to have your CC stolen by one person, rather than two), so yes, that's bad. However, that's not the scenario that I've been discussing here. This thread came under the debate about the risks and issues with revoking all those certs immediately, versus not.
- tptacek 18y ago
  If you're saying, "we shouldn't do anything rash to mitigate an attack that requires Arjen Lenstra and a specially tuned cluster of PS3s to accomplish", then that makes sense. If you're saying, "we shouldn't do anything rash because certificates don't break encryption, only authentication", then you are perpetuating a really dangerous myth about SSL security.