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I have to say I'm immediately skeptical when someone with a background in computation confidently declares that X (for any value of X) is fundamentally computat

I have to say I'm immediately skeptical when someone with a background in computation confidently declares that X (for any value of X) is fundamentally computation.

fsckboy 2y ago
> someone with a background in computation confidently declares that X (for any value of X) is fundamentally computation. I have to say I'm skeptical when anybody with a background solely in the monasteries of the "materialist interpretation" of the Matrix declares that even energy is a form of matter. There's even a guy in the Matrix who says that so many Matrices have been built within the Matrix experimentally, that with all probability he lives in one of those. (I'm not just making a formulaic joke; I believe the informational/computational universe is a much better explanation of everything we see. I'm not saying digital computers, or quantum computers, not trying to shoehorn anything; the computer has the nature of our universe. But you know how when we shake hands, at a particle level we have to reinterpret to where our hands don't actually touch, our electrons repel each other, and perhaps some jump the gap? that is more informational than it is material; there is no need for the imagining of material quantum-bollards interacting; we do physics with math (abstract) not billiard balls (physical). Mind-body problem? there is no mind-body problem if the body is as abstract as the mind. Or rather, there still are some mind-body questions, but they doesn't seem as intractable.)
- roywiggins 2y ago
  I'm just saying, if someone works with hammers every day, and publishes some writing about how everything is nail-shaped, this might be more influenced by their experience with hammers than you'd like
- discreteevent 2y ago
  A naturalist account of the limited, and hence reasonable, effectiveness of mathematics in physics. - Lee Smolin (he's a physicist) https://arxiv.org/abs/1506.03733 https://arxiv.org/abs/1506.03733
  - fsckboy 2y ago
    I'm talking about the effectiveness and reasonableness of data, algorithms, and computation (with massively parallel execution, infinite precision analog, etc) in doing away with a need for "material". Humans have an intuition for the existence of "material" because on our scale, we can reach out and touch something. But on the femto or atto scale, this does not happen, or when it does happen, we describe it with quantum collision math. So why cling to this intuition? I'm simply saying that an immaterial universe with the same properties such that it is isomorphic to the universe that most believe we live in is a better thought experiment to carry in your head. For one, you'll stop thinking "mind body problem, what is mind such that it is not body?" instead you'll say "well, body is not, so it must be the same substance as mind, it's not really that strange after all. It's VMs all the way down"
  - Animats 2y ago
    Although Smolin doesn't mention it, that may be part of his reaction to string theory. String theory was a mathematical edifice which purported to explain some major issues in physics, and, for a while, dominated the field. But it wasn't supported by experimental evidence.[1] Smolin argued against string theory for a long time.[2] This seems related. The classic assumption of physics is that, at some level, things are simple. For a long time, that worked. From F=ma to Maxwell's equations, the basic rules were short, and most results corresponded to those rules. Engineering is based on those rules. Quantum mechanics had people upset for decades, but it was eventually understood reasonably well, and led to another generation of engineering that worked. But basic physics has been somewhat stuck for decades now. There's still no unified field theory. Smolin is suggesting that maybe there are no underlying simple rules. [1] https://arstechnica.com/science/2023/01/requiem-for-a-string-charting-the-rise-and-fall-of-a-theory-of-everything/ https://arstechnica.com/science/2023/01/requiem-for-a-string... [2] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Trouble_with_Physics https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Trouble_with_Physics
- swayvil 2y ago
  "intellectual" evolution seems composed of selecting a bias, then selecting a bias within that bias, and so on. It's a terribly reductive process. And the foundation of biases is deep and invisible. Moving in the opposite direction would reveal a lot.
bbor 2y ago
Fair enough in this particular case because they’re using it ontologically, but in general, you kinda gotta define terms if you want to engage in scientific discourse. Computation (and the corresponding synthesis, calculation) are slippery to be sure, but I didn’t even notice the definition it was so uncontroversial. It’s nothing like defining “person” or “consciousness” or “ego” up top, which is just as necessary (if you insist on using them) but about 100x more futile!
andoando 2y ago
I still don't understand what is formally meant by "computational". I assume it means "can be expressed algorithmically (by a series of rules)". If there are natural laws, then by definition isnt all of physics computational?
- deleted 2y ago
  [deleted]
- LegionMammal978 2y ago
  Supposing that there are natural laws, it might still be that there is no algorithm that can apply them in their entirety, if they depend on one or more undecidable problems. E.g., some people postulate that hypercomputation is physically possible, which by definition can't be expressed by an algorithm. But while the existence of such things can't be ruled out, I'd say we don't have any real evidence in favor of them. Alternatively, the natural laws might simply contain an infinite amount of information, which could never be stuffed into a finite algorithm. E.g., if the ratio between the electron mass and one of the quark masses is an uncomputable real number. Or if there are infinitely many laws, governing deeper and deeper structure ad infinitum past the subatomic level. The latter has some philosophical arguments against it (why would we apparently be near the top of the infinite structure?), but the former is consistent with the apparent continuum that physical constants reside in.
  - scottaino 2y ago
    Do you have any references or further readings about finite vs. infinite number of laws? Sounds interesting.
    - LegionMammal978 2y ago
      Nothing in particular, sorry. The closest would be the idea of a recursively axiomatizable theory in mathematics, which is one that can be fully evaluated, enumerated, etc. using a finite algorithm. Usually, such a theory is presented as a finite list of axioms and axiom schemata: a theory that is not recursively axiomatizable could not be presented in such a simple way.
theGnuMe 2y ago
The cell and cellular processes are computational fundamentally. They aren't, you know, magic.
- roywiggins 2y ago
  "cells are little computers that operate on DNA as machine code" is a really different claim from "the entire universe is fundamentally computational because Church-Turing." The article is talking about the first one. Even if the second is true, there is still a question about whether cells are "computational" in the same way computers are (little robots programmed by dna), or whether they're computational in the same way the photosphere of the Sun is (complex, chaotic physical processes). Which of those it is matters when we try to eg assign causation to how cells operate and make predictions about them.
  - theGnuMe 2y ago
    The first claim is valid. The machine code, however, builds the apparatus which “computes” according to the laws of physics/chemistry etc… But ultimately DNA is a functional encoding of computational processes. Whether those computational processes are “natural” is independent of the machine operating in that environment.

I have to say I'm immediately skeptical when someone with a background in computation confidently declares that X (for any value of X) is fundamentally computation.

fsckboy 2y ago

> someone with a background in computation confidently declares that X (for any value of X) is fundamentally computation. I have to say I'm skeptical when anybody with a background solely in the monasteries of the "materialist interpretation" of the Matrix declares that even energy is a form of matter. There's even a guy in the Matrix who says that so many Matrices have been built within the Matrix experimentally, that with all probability he lives in one of those. (I'm not just making a formulaic joke; I believe the informational/computational universe is a much better explanation of everything we see. I'm not saying digital computers, or quantum computers, not trying to shoehorn anything; the computer has the nature of our universe. But you know how when we shake hands, at a particle level we have to reinterpret to where our hands don't actually touch, our electrons repel each other, and perhaps some jump the gap? that is more informational than it is material; there is no need for the imagining of material quantum-bollards interacting; we do physics with math (abstract) not billiard balls (physical). Mind-body problem? there is no mind-body problem if the body is as abstract as the mind. Or rather, there still are some mind-body questions, but they doesn't seem as intractable.)

roywiggins 2y ago
I'm just saying, if someone works with hammers every day, and publishes some writing about how everything is nail-shaped, this might be more influenced by their experience with hammers than you'd like
discreteevent 2y ago
A naturalist account of the limited, and hence reasonable, effectiveness of mathematics in physics. - Lee Smolin (he's a physicist) https://arxiv.org/abs/1506.03733 https://arxiv.org/abs/1506.03733
- fsckboy 2y ago
  I'm talking about the effectiveness and reasonableness of data, algorithms, and computation (with massively parallel execution, infinite precision analog, etc) in doing away with a need for "material". Humans have an intuition for the existence of "material" because on our scale, we can reach out and touch something. But on the femto or atto scale, this does not happen, or when it does happen, we describe it with quantum collision math. So why cling to this intuition? I'm simply saying that an immaterial universe with the same properties such that it is isomorphic to the universe that most believe we live in is a better thought experiment to carry in your head. For one, you'll stop thinking "mind body problem, what is mind such that it is not body?" instead you'll say "well, body is not, so it must be the same substance as mind, it's not really that strange after all. It's VMs all the way down"
- Animats 2y ago
  Although Smolin doesn't mention it, that may be part of his reaction to string theory. String theory was a mathematical edifice which purported to explain some major issues in physics, and, for a while, dominated the field. But it wasn't supported by experimental evidence.[1] Smolin argued against string theory for a long time.[2] This seems related. The classic assumption of physics is that, at some level, things are simple. For a long time, that worked. From F=ma to Maxwell's equations, the basic rules were short, and most results corresponded to those rules. Engineering is based on those rules. Quantum mechanics had people upset for decades, but it was eventually understood reasonably well, and led to another generation of engineering that worked. But basic physics has been somewhat stuck for decades now. There's still no unified field theory. Smolin is suggesting that maybe there are no underlying simple rules. [1] https://arstechnica.com/science/2023/01/requiem-for-a-string-charting-the-rise-and-fall-of-a-theory-of-everything/ https://arstechnica.com/science/2023/01/requiem-for-a-string... [2] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Trouble_with_Physics https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Trouble_with_Physics
swayvil 2y ago
"intellectual" evolution seems composed of selecting a bias, then selecting a bias within that bias, and so on. It's a terribly reductive process. And the foundation of biases is deep and invisible. Moving in the opposite direction would reveal a lot.

bbor 2y ago

Fair enough in this particular case because they’re using it ontologically, but in general, you kinda gotta define terms if you want to engage in scientific discourse. Computation (and the corresponding synthesis, calculation) are slippery to be sure, but I didn’t even notice the definition it was so uncontroversial. It’s nothing like defining “person” or “consciousness” or “ego” up top, which is just as necessary (if you insist on using them) but about 100x more futile!

andoando 2y ago

I still don't understand what is formally meant by "computational". I assume it means "can be expressed algorithmically (by a series of rules)". If there are natural laws, then by definition isnt all of physics computational?

deleted 2y ago
[deleted]
LegionMammal978 2y ago
Supposing that there are natural laws, it might still be that there is no algorithm that can apply them in their entirety, if they depend on one or more undecidable problems. E.g., some people postulate that hypercomputation is physically possible, which by definition can't be expressed by an algorithm. But while the existence of such things can't be ruled out, I'd say we don't have any real evidence in favor of them. Alternatively, the natural laws might simply contain an infinite amount of information, which could never be stuffed into a finite algorithm. E.g., if the ratio between the electron mass and one of the quark masses is an uncomputable real number. Or if there are infinitely many laws, governing deeper and deeper structure ad infinitum past the subatomic level. The latter has some philosophical arguments against it (why would we apparently be near the top of the infinite structure?), but the former is consistent with the apparent continuum that physical constants reside in.
- scottaino 2y ago
  Do you have any references or further readings about finite vs. infinite number of laws? Sounds interesting.
  - LegionMammal978 2y ago
    Nothing in particular, sorry. The closest would be the idea of a recursively axiomatizable theory in mathematics, which is one that can be fully evaluated, enumerated, etc. using a finite algorithm. Usually, such a theory is presented as a finite list of axioms and axiom schemata: a theory that is not recursively axiomatizable could not be presented in such a simple way.

theGnuMe 2y ago

The cell and cellular processes are computational fundamentally. They aren't, you know, magic.

roywiggins 2y ago
"cells are little computers that operate on DNA as machine code" is a really different claim from "the entire universe is fundamentally computational because Church-Turing." The article is talking about the first one. Even if the second is true, there is still a question about whether cells are "computational" in the same way computers are (little robots programmed by dna), or whether they're computational in the same way the photosphere of the Sun is (complex, chaotic physical processes). Which of those it is matters when we try to eg assign causation to how cells operate and make predictions about them.
- theGnuMe 2y ago
  The first claim is valid. The machine code, however, builds the apparatus which “computes” according to the laws of physics/chemistry etc… But ultimately DNA is a functional encoding of computational processes. Whether those computational processes are “natural” is independent of the machine operating in that environment.