The article didn't even touch on the social factor of insurers and other types of middle managers uniformly pushing everyone to install an unnecessary RCE-based

The article didn't even touch on the social factor of insurers and other types of middle managers uniformly pushing everyone to install an unnecessary RCE-based piece of software to check off their finely crafted bullet points that demand centralized legibility at the expense of everything else. When Microsoft does something that knocks some large amount of systems out, it's at least understandable why such a monoculture exists. But this state of affairs was entirely self inflicted. And an article in CACM should really be addressing these factors, because everybody already knows Crowdstroke itself was supremely incompetent. The question is not how Crowdstroke can prevent this type of software bug from happening again, but rather how we as a society can prevent the creation of more centralizing companies like Crowdstroke, especially ones that leverage the regulatory apparatus to drive adoption of their top-down version of "security".