5 ms·
This analysis leaves out the fact that Pavel Durov is, with Telegram, in approximately the same position Ladar Levison was with Lavabit. Unlike Meredith Whitake
by tptacek 2y ago
This analysis leaves out the fact that Pavel Durov is, with Telegram, in approximately the same position Ladar Levison was with Lavabit. Unlike Meredith Whitaker, Durov actually is in a position to furnish documents to the French government, where he has citizenship. He's in that position because he has repeatedly made deliberate product decisions, to the bafflement of cryptographers around the world, to keep himself in that position.
If you literally have plaintext documents responsive to criminal inquiries in a jurisdiction you are subject to, we don't reach the "internet censorship wars". You're in a place not dissimilar to a 1970s telephone company; the "random people can't simply declare themselves above the law wars". Don't be in that place. Encrypt end-to-end.
- cperciva 2y agoIndeed. Two of the more common questions I get with Tarsnap are Q. How do I know that Tarsnap is secure? A. Read the source code. Q. Ok, but you're really smart, what's stopping you from putting in a backdoor and hiding it really well? A. I don't want to get tortured, and ensuring that I can't decrypt your data protects *me*.
- daliusd 2y agoIMHO second answer does not hold water. If you will end up in situation where you are tortured they will torture you until you will you say how to add the backdoor.
- tptacek 2y agoHis point is that he can't backdoor it: you can read the code before you install it. I'd go further, and say that this is true of anything end-to-end encrypted, open-source or not, because it's not 2002 anymore and reversing ordinary client software is table stakes. (I'd still rather run something open source, ceteris paribus).
- inopinatus 2y agoFeeding the paranoia above is that cperciva would verifiably be the smartest person in the room. A canny torturer would respond to this bringing in djb as the primary instrument of torture. "First one to break or weaken scrypt or 8-round salsa20 gains their freedom". The loser is forced to give talks at AWS marketing conferences for the rest of their natural
- h0l0cube 2y ago> A canny torturer A canny torturer would read the Smart People on a public forum red-teaming cperciva's mind.
- cperciva 2y agoReversing ordinary client software is table stakes, sure. I'm not so sure about reversing client software which has a deliberately hidden backdoor. (You can hide a backdoor in source code too, of course, but I think it's easier to hide one in a binary because you could e.g. ensure that a buffer overflow overwrites cryptographic keys, where a C compiler would have the freedom to change the memory layout.)
- tptacek 2y agoWe can just disagree here for now, since we agree directionally, and I think people should use Tarsnap.
- dragonwriter 2y agoNot being able to "backdoor it" (presuming this means "exploit a backdoor the torturer presumes you have already put into it") does not prevent you from getting tortured to backdoor it. All it does is, should that occur, prevent you from giving the torturer what they want to end the torture. OTOH, convincing the torturer by, among other means, public statements in advance that you have failed to consider this anhd believe that not having that ability prevents torture, and that for this reason you do not have it, might prevent torture. But that's a big gamble on potential future torturers believing your public statements of motivation.
- willsoon 2y agoNo, he won't, because there is no back door. Or yes, because his torturer-contractor thinks there is. Either way, the last part of your sentence doesn't hold water.
- cperciva 2y agoI could be coerced into adding a back door in future versions of Tarsnap, yes. But I can't be coerced into adding a backdoor into past versions of Tarsnap, because I don't have a time machine.
- fragmede 2y agoCoerce you into sending something like "All users must upgrade to client version xyz because of a backdoor discovered by the NSA in the encryption used in older clients. I'm not allowed to tell you what it is, however, rest assured, the latest versions do not have this vulnerability." (but do have a backdoor that I've been tortured into adding). And then wait for a scheduled backup with the backdoored client. Though XZ says that's impossible, so I won't lose sleep over that scenario.
- cperciva 2y agoI am confident that if I sent a message like that, the top application security and cryptography experts in the world would collectively descend on the Tarsnap source code to figure out what changed.
- vizzah 2y agoColin, have you thought to decrease storage pricing, it hasn't been reviewed for ~10 years and Tarsnap costs are currently very prohibitive.. :(
- aftbit 2y agoAgreed. Honestly, I really wish the Tarsnap server was open source. I imagine it has not been released as such because that would probably hurt the business a lot, especially given that the costs per GB are currently approximately 50 times more than I would pay for simple object storage on B2. I built our company's first backup solution on Tarsnap, but when I projected out what deploying that to our entire fleet would cost, I rebuilt on Restic. We currently pay something like $250/mo for our backups, as opposed to the approximately $12,500/mo they would cost on Tarsnap.
- whs 2y agoIt could be designed that doing so will generate some alarm to other people. For example, the backdoor do not exists and it has to be developed, so the attacker has to keep them hostage for some period of time and loved ones may report a missing person. The software then might have to be signed with a key that generate alert to the whole engineering team, which someone else in the company may investigate the unauthorized release as cyberattack. Perhaps the release signing key is physically stored in the office (eg. Yubikey) which also require the attacker to perform a heist in the office. Surely some three letters organization probably could pull that off, but it add risk to their operation that the operation could be leaked.
- cperciva 2y agoSurely some three letters organization probably could pull that off, but it add risk to their operation that the operation could be leaked. This is basically a point I've made in a few of my talks about security and cryptography: The point of cryptography isn't to guarantee that your data is safe; it's to raise the cost of an attack to the point where a potential attacker decides not to attack. In particular, there's usually a human involved somewhere (sending or receiving information, or both) and humans are squishy and fragile; but torturing people attracts far more adverse attention than torturing data.
- kstenerud 2y agoOr, you know, hire ANOTHER software engineer to add the backdoor. Probably cheaper and less hassle and less illegal. In either case, you'd have to fool the internet army, who are watching the source code of projects such as this like a hawk.
- sandworm101 2y ago>> A. I don't want to get tortured, and ensuring that I can't decrypt your data protects me. There is a line in RickAndMorty about this, which I won't repeat here. To paraphrase: the one thing worse than bring tortured for information you have is being tortured for information you don't have.
- cperciva 2y agoRight, which is why I try to make it very clear to everyone that there's no point torturing me. The problem is if someone thinks you have information which you don't in fact have; if they know you don't have the information, why would they waste their time?
- adolph 2y agoQ. How do I know that Tarsnap is secure? A. Read the source code. This is a "good enough" but less than reassuring answer in the post-Solar Winds world. (It wasn't before, but less so since the advent of "package managers" and the like.) How would someone evaluate the quality and security of the build process and minimal dependencies (which might have their own problems [0])? As a non-security person thinking of how might one could evaluate this: Could adversarial builds (say performed in and using tools commonly available in several locations with different types of government spying) generate the same binary? Could that act as a sort of proof of an untainted toolchain? Or a canary for where a build process is tainted? 0. https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=39890817 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=39890817
- tptacek 2y agoTarsnap is usually installed from source.
- intunderflow 2y agoAs another HN user pointed out Telegram does not store messages in plaintext: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=41348228 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=41348228
- tptacek 2y agoThat user seems to be misinformed, and appears to be discussing client-server encryption, not end-to-end encryption. That's unsurprising, because, among the many decisions Durov has made that have baffled cryptographers, attempting to confuse users about the implications of E2E vs. client-server encryption is one of the most notorious.
- jiiam 2y agoJust to be clear, are you saying that his claim > Telegram uses the MTProto 2.0 Cloud algorithm for non-secret chats[1][2]. > In fact, it uses a split-key encryption system and the servers are all stored in multiple jurisdictions. So even Telegram employees can't decrypt the chats, because you'd need to compromise all the servers at the same time. is false? If so can you cite a source? (The claim is just a summary of the FAQ https://www.telegram.org/faq#q-do-you-process-data-requests https://www.telegram.org/faq#q-do-you-process-data-requests)
- mr_mitm 2y agoYes. An employee can impersonate a user by registering a device in their name and intercepting the confirmation code and then read all non secret chats and private groups of that user. At least one employee must have the ability to intercept the code. (Unless the user has 2fa enabled, but that is not the default configuration.) There are probably easier ways if we knew more about how the administrate their infrastructure.
- jiiam 2y agoMaybe? When you login from a new device you're asked to provide an OTP so maybe there is at least that layer of protection and, hopefully, requires some circumvention at the application code level. However I think the real question is: even if that's possible, can law enforcement compel Durov or an employee to do so?
- roenxi 2y agoWhile I agree that in many (all?) ways it is that simple, this is an area where there is a lot of scope for there to be unseen pressure from intelligence agencies. The French literally invented espionage (I choose my words carefully here) let alone whatever pressure comes at Telegram from elsewhere. It is hard to be confident in the whys of decision making around large communications tools and security. Although, ironically, if the French are arresting him now that says good things about Telegram and their willingness to dob customers in.
- boudin 2y agoIn a way ot reminds me of the Phantom Secure story. If you are suspected to purpusefully facilitate crime, you can be held responsible. This seems to be true as well in the US. In the phantom secure story the intent was crystal clear. In the Telegram case it seems that the refusal to cooperate with investigations cast enough doubts to arrest the CEO and put him in similar shoes. https://www.fbi.gov/news/stories/phantom-secure-takedown-031618 https://www.fbi.gov/news/stories/phantom-secure-takedown-031...
- tptacek 2y agoIt's so much worse than that (at least under US law, but I assume French law, which has fewer speech and evidentiary protections, is worse still). By putting himself in the position where he was clearly and straightforwardly able to furnish assistance to criminal investigations, he likely acquired some form of accomplice liability (or whatever equivalent they have in France) as soon as he refused to comply with a lawful order: the refusal itself is a purposeful facilitation. That's a distinction between end-to-end encrypted applications and cosmetically "secure" apps like Telegram.
- boudin 2y agoThat's what I meant, the lack of cooperation is what shows the lack of intent, in the end. I do not understand why this is turned around a "freedom of speech" thing as there is nothing about censoring speech in the first place, this all about criminal activity happening on the platform and the responsibility of the business behind the platform.
- Timber-6539 2y agoIf the data that the French government wanted was in plaintext they wouldn't need to use the $5 wrench. Also not sure why E2EE is the answer here, governments can pass laws as we have seen with the UK to water the encryption down.
- fvdessen 2y agoIt’s worse than that, the ‘find people nearby’ feature is a public drug and prostitution advertising billboard with zero moderation and has been for years. They’re in a closer position to silkroad than lavabit
- SSLy 2y agoI wish it was actual dealers and hookers, it's just spam bots.
- akho 2y agoFrom what I see in these threads, it mostly depends on whether your local police chooses to enforce drug laws.
- LtWorf 2y agoSo you mean telegram is a secure platform for drug dealers in areas where they can just go about in the streets and yell "I SELL DRUGS!"? Do we have any proof they aren't also doing that besides being on telegram and every other messenger?
- nom 2y agoWow I didn't know that feature even existed. Looks like it's full of bots though. I can imagine that makes it completely unusable for actual dealers.
- codedokode 2y agoWhile I heard about this feature I thought it was made to find friends or dates. What shows that the intended use is to faciliate drug trade? Also, in my country they usually just write the ordinary website name on the wall and add "VPN Tor" whatever that could mean. Maybe they try to hint that Tor and VPN are apps for drug trade? Do Tor and VPN have moderation and do they cooperate with law enforcement?