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This is just my opinion, but I think a lot of it has to do with requirements. NASA is first and foremost about prestige (even above science IMO. This is also -
by bumby 2y ago
This is just my opinion, but I think a lot of it has to do with requirements.
NASA is first and foremost about prestige (even above science IMO. This is also - again my opinion - why NASA hasn't been back to the moon in 50 years. There's little prestige to be gained for an expensive operation). With prestige as the backdrop, it makes them very risk adverse. There are layers and layers of requirements made to reduce risk. To their credit, SpaceX is willing to fail more than NASA and it allows them to iterate much faster.
This is also my opinion part of the reasons why NASA wanted the CCP to begin with: it allows them to skirt many of the requirements. The somewhat ironic part is that NASA pathways to alleviate those requirements, but it's somewhat common that project/programs want to go through the waiver process and formerly accept that risk.
There is a fairly well-known dynamic in govt contracting where a contractor low-bids to get the contract and then makes money on change-orders. If they were to accurately bid on all the NASA requirements, they risk their bid being so high they would never be awarded the contract. This is a similar dynamic to the traditional cost-plus contracting paradigm.
There is also some irony in that SpaceX may be the victims of the same dynamic. As failure occur, they may layer on more requirements that ultimately slow the process down (see the supplier quality issues related to an F9 strut failure). Given enough time, there is a risk that added requirements turn them into the dinosaurs they are replacing.
Also, as others have brought up, NASA has additional requirements they must manage (e.g., political risk) that SpaceX has less exposure to.
- JumpCrisscross 2y ago> NASA has additional requirements they must manage (e.g., political risk) that SpaceX has less exposure to This doesn't appear to be the issue with ML-2, whose problems are closer to Boeing's subcontracting addiction than e.g. the F-35's sticker-collection approach to manufacturing.
- bumby 2y agoI’m sorry, I don’t follow. Can you elaborate? Maybe I’m misunderstanding, but I think sub-contacting is heavily related to political risk mitigation, as it’s a method of spreading project money across many political districts. IMO NASA has done the same with their selection of major center locations. It doesn’t make a lot of logistics sense to have your biggest centers in CA, OH, VA, and TX but it makes a lot of political sense if your goal is to avoid large programs being mothballed.
- JumpCrisscross 2y ago> sub-contacting is heavily related to political risk mitigation, as it’s a method of spreading project money across many political districts Good point, I'm unclear whether Bechtel was awarded the contract by NASA/Congress after selecting its subcontractors or before. (And if having a roster of subcontractors was an implicit ask from NASA or a decision made by Bechtel to future-proof their contract.) We see something similar with Boeing, and while that was also partly politically motivated, there was also the financial desire to be asset light. The OIG's story about "one subcontractor, [to] which Bechtel allocated approximately 46 percent of the fabrication work to" selling off "all of its shop space to a non-NASA customer because Bechtel's steel fabrication plan lacked a signed contract with the subcontractor" forcing Bechtel "to find another subcontractor with available shop space" sounds like incompetence, not savvy politics [1]. [1] https://oig.nasa.gov/wp-content/uploads/2024/08/ig-24-016.pdf https://oig.nasa.gov/wp-content/uploads/2024/08/ig-24-016.pd... page 19