3 ms·
You aren't, for the same reason you aren't going to retain safety in an airplane or a nuclear reactor when men with guns are shooting people and pushing random
by TeMPOraL 2y ago
You aren't, for the same reason you aren't going to retain safety in an airplane or a nuclear reactor when men with guns are shooting people and pushing random panels (and/or the other way around).
Even with "defense in depth", there's clear separation between parts that do the important stuff, and parts that protect the parts that do the important stuff from being used against the rules.
I'd go as far as dividing cybersecurity into two major areas of concern:
1) The part that constrains software systems to conform to some make-believe reality with rules stricter than natural -- this is trying to make the abstract world function more like physical reality we're used to;
2) The rules and policies - who can access what, when, why, and what for.
Area 1) should very much be a bolt-on third-party thing everyone should ideally take for granted. Area 2) is a responsibility of each organization/project individually, but it also small and mostly limited to issues specific to that organization/project.
It maps to physical reality like this:
Area 1) are the reinforced walls, floor and ceiling, and blast doors that can only be opened via a key card[0];
Area 2) are the policies and procedures of giving and revoking keycards to specific people in the company.
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[0] - Or by crossing some wires deep in the reader, because accidents happen and cutting through blast doors cost money. I.e. real-life security and safety systems often feature overrides.