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Physics is an empirical inquiry into the structure, composition and dynamics of the observable usensorium we inhabit. I find it just short of hybris to entertai
by lokimedes 2y ago
Physics is an empirical inquiry into the structure, composition and dynamics of the observable usensorium we inhabit. I find it just short of hybris to entertain any promise that the outcome can be more than a metaphor of the underlying reality.
The whole quagmire of “the measurement problem” in quantum mechanics seems to largely come from misunderstanding Bohr’s philosophical objections on this difference between a theory of the measurable and the interpretation of the theory’s internal mechanics as evidence of the true reality it models.
Givens that twentieth century physics (apart from General Relativity) is based on Bohr’s foundation, no wonder people get confused.
The mathematization of physics hasn’t helped either. That Bell’s theorem “proves” something is language applicable to a mathematical structure, not to the physical world itself.
- elashri 2y agoWhy can't you just shut up and calculate? /s
- lokimedes 2y agoExactly
- DiscourseFan 2y agoformulas are meaningless without concepts
- gpderetta 2y agoc.f. "The unreasonable effectiveness of mathematics in the natural sciences" (https://www.maths.ed.ac.uk/~v1ranick/papers/wigner.pdf https://www.maths.ed.ac.uk/~v1ranick/papers/wigner.pdf)
- DiscourseFan 2y ago> It is even possible that some of the laws of nature will be in conflict with each other in their implications, but each convincing enough in its own domain so that we may not be willing to abandon any of them. We may resign ourselves to such a state of affairs or our interest in clearing up the conflict between the various theories may fade out. We may lose interest in the "ultimate truth," that is, in a picture which is a consistent fusion into a single unit of the little pictures, formed on the various aspects of nature. Mathematics alone cannot reflect on its conditions of possibility, and mathematical physics is as inept in that domain. The reason why the quantum physics vs. general relativity thing can't be resolved is not because we don't have the right math, its because to overcome it requires a paradigm shift away from the mathematization of physics, and to actually gain a familiarity with the conceptual apparatus that engendered these theories.
- ko27 2y agoIt's funny that you mention hubris and yet you fall victim to it by dismissing the measurement problem and Bell's theorem. It's true that our theories are not a perfect description of "true reality", but they do tell you something about what "true reality" must be. > That Bell’s theorem “proves” something is language applicable to a mathematical structure, not to the physical world itself. This is simply wrong, Bell's theorem definitely applies to the "physical world". A world that does not violate Bell's inequality would look vastly different to ours.
- lokimedes 2y agoMy point is that theorems are provable in a logical sense. How will you prove that the mathematical representation of an empirical measurement of nature is true in the same sense? Arguably this is down to philosophy of science, and I admit to take to the ideas of Karl Popper on falsification as a criterion for sound physical theories.
- simonh 2y ago>That Bell’s theorem “proves” something is language applicable to a mathematical structure, not to the physical world itself. Do you not accept the validity of experimental verification?
- lokimedes 2y agoAbsolutely, but tentatively. From the responses to my comment, it may seem pedantic, but it is the wording that strikes me. "Proof" belongs in a different category than experimental verification [1], as it imply logical consistency, or even an equivalence between the model and the object it attempts to model. So in mathematics, proofs make sense because it is dealing with relationships within a closed axiomatic structure. We haven't discovered the axioms of Nature, and therefore everything we propose, as a law, of nature rests on the relative foundation of our experiments. I guess what I'm trying to say is that if you are a hardcore empiricist (like Bohr, in a sense, were) reasoning beyond the measurable is not physics. That is why the Copenhagen Interpretation doesen't deal with what the probability distribution of a wave-function actually is, simply that it is a useful construct to represent the possible outcomes of a measurement, until an expectation value is calculated. Perhaps that is also why Wheeler's many-world interpretation got off to a bad start, as it didn't provide any new measurable predictions. [1] or rather lack of falsification, to adhere to https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Falsifiability https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Falsifiability