5 ms·

The alternative dystopia is one where the NSA can grab your laptop, rip out the storage, write some code into the boot chain, put the storage back, leave, and y

The alternative dystopia is one where the NSA can grab your laptop, rip out the storage, write some code into the boot chain, put the storage back, leave, and you have no evidence to know who did that. Signed code fixes this by requiring someone actually put their name to the code. If it's not someone I recognize, I don't boot. And yes, the NSA could theoretically compromise a signing key with a $5 wrench. But then they blow their cover. Signatures create a paper trail that makes plausible deniability vaporize.

userbinator 2y ago
The game is already over for those who worry about the NSA spying on them. Using Windows in its default form means Microsoft already has a full backdoor into your machine, authorised by none other than MS itself.
vuln 2y ago
I don’t know what country you live in but it’s impossible to decrease your attack surface when targeted by a Nation State Actor. Even more impossible if you live in the country in which the Nation State Actor controls through a plethora of agencies and relationships with corporations.
- computerfriend 2y ago
  It is usually possible to decrease your attack surface.
  - bigiain 2y ago
    Unplug all your computing devices, put them in a safe, embed the safe in concrete, drop it all in the sea.
    - bboygravity 2y ago
      Yeah that'll work for everybody who never ever touched any cloud service and who's friends and family never ever touched any cloud service (nobody in the real world).
    - fsflover 2y ago
      Just try Qubes OS with Heads.
dmbche 2y ago
I mean can you actually protect against the NSA? After Stuxnet, I fully trust that nation/state actors can infect whatever they put their mind to - I'd rather at least have control over my machine
- computerfriend 2y ago
  You can at least make it very expensive.
- bigiain 2y ago
  If your adversary is a nation state, you've already lost. Which gives me another opportunity to quote from my favourite Usenix paper: "In the real world, threat models are much simpler (see Figure 1). Basically, you’re either dealing with Mossad or not-Mossad. If your adversary is not-Mossad, then you’ll probably be fine if you pick a good password and don’t respond to emails from ChEaPestPAiNPi11s@ virus-basket.biz.ru. If your adversary is the Mossad, YOU’RE GONNA DIE AND THERE’S NOTHING THAT YOU CAN DO ABOUT IT. The Mossad is not intimidated by the fact that you employ https:// https://. If the Mossad wants your data, they’re going to use a drone to replace your cellphone with a piece of uranium that’s shaped like a cellphone, and when you die of tumors filled with tumors, they’re going to hold a press conference and say “It wasn’t us” as they wear t-shirts that say “IT WAS DEFINITELY US,” and then they’re going to buy all of your stuff at your estate sale so that they can directly look at the photos of your vacation instead of reading your insipid emails about them. " Figure 1: Threat: Ex-girlfriend/boyfriend breaking into your email account and publicly releasing your correspondence with the My Little Pony fan club Solution: Strong passwords Threat: Organized criminals breaking into your email account and sending spam using your identity Solution: Strong passwords + common sense (don’t click on unsolicited herbal Viagra ads that result in keyloggers and sorrow) Threat: The Mossad doing Mossad things with your email account Solution: • Magical amulets? • Fake your own death, move into a submarine? • YOU’RE STILL GONNA BE MOSSAD’ED UPON -- https://www.usenix.org/system/files/1401_08-12_mickens.pdf https://www.usenix.org/system/files/1401_08-12_mickens.pdf
  - Grimburger 2y ago
    > If your adversary is a nation state, you've already lost. Is that why it took 10 years to find Bin Laden, the most wanted man on Earth? Get the feeling intel agencies aren't as omnipotent or competent as they want people to believe.
itohihiyt 2y ago
Pretty sure the NSA as a government agency could make a US company do what you're suggesting for them.
- jazzyjackson 2y ago
  Whether the government was allowed to compel a company to write and sign code was going to be determined in the "Apple-FBI encryption dispute" but the FBI withdrew the day before the hearing since they had found another way to crack the phone without apple's help. I wonder if this will ever be re-litigated or the government just learned its easier to pay someone to write an exploit than it is to pay a company to write a backdoor. https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2016/03/deep-dive-why-forcing-apple-write-and-sign-code-violates-first-amendment https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2016/03/deep-dive-why-forcing-... https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Apple%E2%80%93FBI_encryption_dispute https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Apple%E2%80%93FBI_encryption_d...
jtriangle 2y ago
There's no state actor that any of that would protect against. You, and everyone else, is already compromised at a level so deep there is no hope of digging out if that is your adversary. What these technologies protect is market share, nothing more.
- jvanderbot 2y ago
  Strong assertions with no justifications. Targeted attacks against individuals or small groups from state actors are basically impossible to protect against. Widespread compromises of all operating systems at the boot level should be fought against. I don't really think malice explains Grub being limited b/c of Microsoft's software at the boot level. There's conflicting objectives at play, and that will inevitably produce, well, conflicts.
Two4 2y ago
Kompromat on a staff engineer is far more effective, sustainable and silent than a five-dollar-wrench attack
- red-iron-pine 2y ago
  kompromat? pffff money talks. somewhere there is someone who will take a bribe, and 300k to completely compromise every toolchain in the world is a pittance.
cesarb 2y ago
> the NSA can grab your laptop If the NSA grabbed your laptop, you've already lost. For instance, they could replace all input and output devices (keyboard, mouse, screen, audio, etc) with ones that not only log everything you do, but also allow them to remotely control your machine as if they were physically present. They could then pretend the laptop was opened (by falsifying the hall effect sensor which detects the lid state), power it on (by forging a press of the power button), log into your account (by replaying the password they logged earlier), and do anything they wanted, as if they were you. They could even use the camera to detect when you looked away for a second while logged into the laptop, and quickly do some input, bypassing any extra validation (like fingerprints or a smartcard) logging into your user account might have required. No need to modify or even touch the boot chain and storage.

userbinator 2y ago

The game is already over for those who worry about the NSA spying on them. Using Windows in its default form means Microsoft already has a full backdoor into your machine, authorised by none other than MS itself.

vuln 2y ago

I don’t know what country you live in but it’s impossible to decrease your attack surface when targeted by a Nation State Actor. Even more impossible if you live in the country in which the Nation State Actor controls through a plethora of agencies and relationships with corporations.

computerfriend 2y ago
It is usually possible to decrease your attack surface.
- bigiain 2y ago
  Unplug all your computing devices, put them in a safe, embed the safe in concrete, drop it all in the sea.
  - bboygravity 2y ago
    Yeah that'll work for everybody who never ever touched any cloud service and who's friends and family never ever touched any cloud service (nobody in the real world).
  - fsflover 2y ago
    Just try Qubes OS with Heads.

dmbche 2y ago

I mean can you actually protect against the NSA? After Stuxnet, I fully trust that nation/state actors can infect whatever they put their mind to - I'd rather at least have control over my machine

computerfriend 2y ago
You can at least make it very expensive.
bigiain 2y ago
If your adversary is a nation state, you've already lost. Which gives me another opportunity to quote from my favourite Usenix paper: "In the real world, threat models are much simpler (see Figure 1). Basically, you’re either dealing with Mossad or not-Mossad. If your adversary is not-Mossad, then you’ll probably be fine if you pick a good password and don’t respond to emails from ChEaPestPAiNPi11s@ virus-basket.biz.ru. If your adversary is the Mossad, YOU’RE GONNA DIE AND THERE’S NOTHING THAT YOU CAN DO ABOUT IT. The Mossad is not intimidated by the fact that you employ https:// https://. If the Mossad wants your data, they’re going to use a drone to replace your cellphone with a piece of uranium that’s shaped like a cellphone, and when you die of tumors filled with tumors, they’re going to hold a press conference and say “It wasn’t us” as they wear t-shirts that say “IT WAS DEFINITELY US,” and then they’re going to buy all of your stuff at your estate sale so that they can directly look at the photos of your vacation instead of reading your insipid emails about them. " Figure 1: Threat: Ex-girlfriend/boyfriend breaking into your email account and publicly releasing your correspondence with the My Little Pony fan club Solution: Strong passwords Threat: Organized criminals breaking into your email account and sending spam using your identity Solution: Strong passwords + common sense (don’t click on unsolicited herbal Viagra ads that result in keyloggers and sorrow) Threat: The Mossad doing Mossad things with your email account Solution: • Magical amulets? • Fake your own death, move into a submarine? • YOU’RE STILL GONNA BE MOSSAD’ED UPON -- https://www.usenix.org/system/files/1401_08-12_mickens.pdf https://www.usenix.org/system/files/1401_08-12_mickens.pdf
- Grimburger 2y ago
  > If your adversary is a nation state, you've already lost. Is that why it took 10 years to find Bin Laden, the most wanted man on Earth? Get the feeling intel agencies aren't as omnipotent or competent as they want people to believe.

itohihiyt 2y ago

Pretty sure the NSA as a government agency could make a US company do what you're suggesting for them.

jazzyjackson 2y ago
Whether the government was allowed to compel a company to write and sign code was going to be determined in the "Apple-FBI encryption dispute" but the FBI withdrew the day before the hearing since they had found another way to crack the phone without apple's help. I wonder if this will ever be re-litigated or the government just learned its easier to pay someone to write an exploit than it is to pay a company to write a backdoor. https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2016/03/deep-dive-why-forcing-apple-write-and-sign-code-violates-first-amendment https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2016/03/deep-dive-why-forcing-... https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Apple%E2%80%93FBI_encryption_dispute https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Apple%E2%80%93FBI_encryption_d...

jtriangle 2y ago

There's no state actor that any of that would protect against. You, and everyone else, is already compromised at a level so deep there is no hope of digging out if that is your adversary. What these technologies protect is market share, nothing more.

jvanderbot 2y ago
Strong assertions with no justifications. Targeted attacks against individuals or small groups from state actors are basically impossible to protect against. Widespread compromises of all operating systems at the boot level should be fought against. I don't really think malice explains Grub being limited b/c of Microsoft's software at the boot level. There's conflicting objectives at play, and that will inevitably produce, well, conflicts.

Two4 2y ago

Kompromat on a staff engineer is far more effective, sustainable and silent than a five-dollar-wrench attack

red-iron-pine 2y ago
kompromat? pffff money talks. somewhere there is someone who will take a bribe, and 300k to completely compromise every toolchain in the world is a pittance.

cesarb 2y ago

> the NSA can grab your laptop If the NSA grabbed your laptop, you've already lost. For instance, they could replace all input and output devices (keyboard, mouse, screen, audio, etc) with ones that not only log everything you do, but also allow them to remotely control your machine as if they were physically present. They could then pretend the laptop was opened (by falsifying the hall effect sensor which detects the lid state), power it on (by forging a press of the power button), log into your account (by replaying the password they logged earlier), and do anything they wanted, as if they were you. They could even use the camera to detect when you looked away for a second while logged into the laptop, and quickly do some input, bypassing any extra validation (like fingerprints or a smartcard) logging into your user account might have required. No need to modify or even touch the boot chain and storage.