4 ms·

> This feels like a "my secure compartments are all connected together" moment. If Microsoft want to verify that they're in an all-Microsoft boot chain, sure, w

> This feels like a "my secure compartments are all connected together" moment. If Microsoft want to verify that they're in an all-Microsoft boot chain, sure, whatever, fine. But somehow the compromise of any loader allows compromise of Windows? Exactly how would you propose starting software securely from an unknown environment? > Back when all this was being introduced I felt that (a) secure boot increases the risk of locking you out of your machine and/or data loss So does a password and encryption.

skywhopper 2y ago
> Exactly how would you propose starting software securely from an unknown environment? Accept that it’s impossible?
- wongarsu 2y ago
  So don't do secure boot at all rather than saying "when one step in the boot chain is compromised that can compromise all later steps"? How is that a better security model?
- eightysixfour 2y ago
  Okay, so then you need to know the environment, which leads us to secure boot. It isn't perfect, but it is better than nothing.
- warkdarrior 2y ago
  Giving up is certainly an option, but it is not the preferred option for some people (myself included). A partial option is definitely better than giving up, as long as it is well understood. In this scenario, people who are ready to give up can simply stop updating their software, which will solve their issue. YMMV of course.
throwawayqqq11 2y ago
What you need is source of trust and right now its signatures which are outsise of the users control. A 5 cent hardware button which gives you a small time windows to install a new trusted bootloader could achieve the same thing without trusting microsoft.
- kevingadd 2y ago
  This doesn't actually address some of the scenarios SB is intended for. I.e. you're an IT administrator, you manage a fleet of 1000 machines, you want to ensure that they are all running secure bootloaders and secure kernels and secure software, top to bottom. In that scenario, every end user having a little "security vulnerability" button they can press if they get bored (or feel like being malicious) isn't appealing. Having to send someone out to press the button at a thousand desks in order to update the bootloader? Also not appealing.

skywhopper 2y ago

> Exactly how would you propose starting software securely from an unknown environment? Accept that it’s impossible?

wongarsu 2y ago
So don't do secure boot at all rather than saying "when one step in the boot chain is compromised that can compromise all later steps"? How is that a better security model?
eightysixfour 2y ago
Okay, so then you need to know the environment, which leads us to secure boot. It isn't perfect, but it is better than nothing.
warkdarrior 2y ago
Giving up is certainly an option, but it is not the preferred option for some people (myself included). A partial option is definitely better than giving up, as long as it is well understood. In this scenario, people who are ready to give up can simply stop updating their software, which will solve their issue. YMMV of course.

throwawayqqq11 2y ago

What you need is source of trust and right now its signatures which are outsise of the users control. A 5 cent hardware button which gives you a small time windows to install a new trusted bootloader could achieve the same thing without trusting microsoft.

kevingadd 2y ago
This doesn't actually address some of the scenarios SB is intended for. I.e. you're an IT administrator, you manage a fleet of 1000 machines, you want to ensure that they are all running secure bootloaders and secure kernels and secure software, top to bottom. In that scenario, every end user having a little "security vulnerability" button they can press if they get bored (or feel like being malicious) isn't appealing. Having to send someone out to press the button at a thousand desks in order to update the bootloader? Also not appealing.