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"Conspicuously absent from their recommendations was any discussion about user interface design. Of their seven safety recommendations, six involve training."

"Conspicuously absent from their recommendations was any discussion about user interface design. Of their seven safety recommendations, six involve training." Yes. That's because if your ship is going left and you can't figure out why when there's an interface clearly showing why (ie one engine input is higher then the other), it is a training and/or procedure issue. The author then goes on to state that during steering control transfer, the checkbox is automatically unchecked. So the engine input UI is 100% not at fault here.

moring 2y ago
Finding something or someone to blame -- whether it is an operator, the UI, training, whatever -- typically halts all insight-gaining processes, and is therefore not recommended. Especially if that something is "100% to blame".
jchung 2y ago
> 100% not at fault When something significant goes wrong, it’s almost never due to a single cause; multiple factors and confounding elements are usually at play. We build better-performing systems when we examine various contributing factors and proximal causes. The OP's argument is that the interface does not "clearly" indicate that one engine input is higher than the other. After reading the article and reviewing the interfaces, I have to say: the OP’s argument is quite compelling. While training is undoubtedly important and should be included in the safety recommendations, the OP makes a strong case that design improvements should also be considered as part of the safety recommendations.
VBprogrammer 2y ago
The box is only unchecked because of the curious decision to allow transferring of a single prop / engine which I'm not convinced has any real value. One thing that isn't stated is what the state of the redundant thrust slider is when the inputs are ganged together. In the physical implementations I've seen the redundant lever is usually moved to neutral and it's not inconceivable that this was carried into the digital UI. In that case failing to spot the fact that there was a differential thrust involved because of the lack of a checkbox might be much more understandable.

moring 2y ago

Finding something or someone to blame -- whether it is an operator, the UI, training, whatever -- typically halts all insight-gaining processes, and is therefore not recommended. Especially if that something is "100% to blame".

jchung 2y ago

> 100% not at fault When something significant goes wrong, it’s almost never due to a single cause; multiple factors and confounding elements are usually at play. We build better-performing systems when we examine various contributing factors and proximal causes. The OP's argument is that the interface does not "clearly" indicate that one engine input is higher than the other. After reading the article and reviewing the interfaces, I have to say: the OP’s argument is quite compelling. While training is undoubtedly important and should be included in the safety recommendations, the OP makes a strong case that design improvements should also be considered as part of the safety recommendations.

VBprogrammer 2y ago

The box is only unchecked because of the curious decision to allow transferring of a single prop / engine which I'm not convinced has any real value. One thing that isn't stated is what the state of the redundant thrust slider is when the inputs are ganged together. In the physical implementations I've seen the redundant lever is usually moved to neutral and it's not inconceivable that this was carried into the digital UI. In that case failing to spot the fact that there was a differential thrust involved because of the lack of a checkbox might be much more understandable.