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> The idea is that the law would be more responsive to changing times, and that it could be simpler, since it wouldn't need to encode obscure technical standard
by tourmalinetaco 2y ago
> The idea is that the law would be more responsive to changing times, and that it could be simpler, since it wouldn't need to encode obscure technical standards.
No, the idea was to supply more power to unelected officials who are not under the scrutiny of the people. Said unelected officials being bought for by various private interests and ruling in their favor whenever and however possible, regardless of the constitution.
> However, the Supreme Court decided… transfer that authority to unelected judges.
No they didn’t. The authority went back to where it belonged, the legislative branch. The legislative branch has no power to defer legislation to anyone but themselves.
> [The FTC] doesn't have the authority to regulate non-compete clauses
They do; in regards to the federal law as it is written, of which there are no laws currently. If they wish to see non-competes die (and I would like for them die) then they have to do it properly: by getting a law made. Not by making a “ruling” which has no legal standing in a post-Chevron world.
- aidenn0 2y ago> No they didn’t. The authority went back to where it belonged, the legislative branch. The legislative branch has no power to defer legislation to anyone but themselves. Chevron deference has little to do with the legislative branch's power to delegate authority (and nothing at all to do with the legislative branch's power to explicitly delegate authority). It was about the judiciary not overturning a "reasonable interpretation" of ambiguities in the law by an agency, under the assumption that any ambiguities are implicit delegations of authority. Overturning Chevron merely means that a judge can decide which of multiple reasonable interpretations of the law most represent Congress' intent, rather than deferring to the reasonable interpretation chosen by the agency. To quote Chevron: > Sometimes the legislative delegation to an agency on a particular question is implicit rather than explicit. In such a case, a court may not substitute its own construction of a statutory provision for a reasonable interpretation made by the administrator of an agency.