4 ms·
https://pages.nist.gov/800-63-3/sp800-63b.html#memsecret https://pages.nist.gov/800-63-3/sp800-63b.html#memsecret Basically, 8 characters or more, but prevent
by Morpholemew 2y ago
https://pages.nist.gov/800-63-3/sp800-63b.html#memsecret https://pages.nist.gov/800-63-3/sp800-63b.html#memsecret
Basically, 8 characters or more, but prevent the user from picking a password that appears on any of the leaked password lists. Store in pbkdf2 or better; use argon2id per https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/Password_Storage_Cheat_Sheet.html https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/Password_Stor...
That's it. Simple. No mandatory symbols. No mandatory changes after a period of time. A password strength estimation meter is optional.
If it needs to be more secure, I might require more minimum characters, but no other restrictions.
- lazide 2y agoAh, yet another standard. How many years do you think before it’s obsolete? Also, the ‘no previously leaked passwords’ are gonna piss off a lot of customers.
- smrq 2y agoI think you just picked up the goalposts and brought them home with you. Why ask for a standard in the first place?
- kevin_thibedeau 2y ago8 chars is not sufficient. The Hive strength estimates switched to Bcrypt this year but there are still weak systems out there and you should set passwords assuming MD5 which currently demands at least 12 chars for typical users.
- compootr 2y agoWhat's your opinion on zxcvbn[0]? It dynamically analyzes a password's cracking time, score, and gives feedback based on the password. imo it's a pretty good ux if used right [0]: https://github.com/dropbox/zxcvbn https://github.com/dropbox/zxcvbn
- lynndotpy 2y agoMisused, zxcvbn offers its own security issues. First, it's not either-or. You can match against zxcvbn strength and some passwordlist. Second, think of the output of zxcvbn as a very weak hash with a low collision rate. E.g. 'correct-battery-horse-staple' maps to an estimated 213811968952000000000 guesses. In addition to being potentially algorithmically reversible, attackers can simply perform an offline attack against the value 213811968952000000000. So, this metric should never be exposed (e.g. in log files, on screen, etc.) Third, having the estimated entropy helps a lot when password cracking. If you have the password hash digest and the zxcvbn metrics, then it makes the cracker's job much easier by reducing the search space. (Think, going from checking each molecule of an apple to checking only each molecule on the peel of an apple.) Further, it's not perfect. The zxcvbn library I used suggests 'correct-battery-horse-staple' is a very strong password!
- maratc 2y agoIt indeed is. The bad password you're thinking of is "correct-horse-battery-staple".
- lynndotpy 2y agoBoth are bad passwords, and zxcvbn states both are good. Try it here: https://lowe.github.io/tryzxcvbn/ https://lowe.github.io/tryzxcvbn/ Zxcvbn is imperfect by design. It's a tradeoff it makes for being fast and small.
- maratc 2y agoYou might want to re-read the introductory article [0] where the authors themselves look at that specific password. [0]: https://dropbox.tech/security/zxcvbn-realistic-password-strength-estimation https://dropbox.tech/security/zxcvbn-realistic-password-stre...