4 ms·

The usual consensus I've heard is that UAC is always on even after turning the slider all the way off, while using the admin account doesn't use UAC (changing t

by ChoGGi 2y ago

The usual consensus I've heard is that UAC is always on even after turning the slider all the way off, while using the admin account doesn't use UAC (changing the EnableLUA in reg also works).

variadix 2y ago
Apparently just running the process as Admin works as well
Wowfunhappy 2y ago
This is the first I'm reading that UAC has a performance impact and I'd like to know more. I have a PC that I literally use for single player games and nothing else (I do not have a web browser installed, or even Steam, games are installed from a network share). I have no use for UAC and I'd like to squeeze everything out of my CPU.
- fuzzy2 2y ago
  If it has a performance impact, that's not on Windows but the software. Many games are really really badly made software, so that's not surprising. UAC is the single greatest security improvement Microsoft ever created.
  - voxic11 2y ago
    UAC is not a security boundary. Its only there to prevent the user from accidentally making changes to the system that they didn't intend, but it provides no security except from your own mistakes. Its so much not considered a security boundary that microsoft doesn't even offer a bug bounty for UAC bypasses.
    - justsomehnguy 2y ago
      > Its only there to prevent the user from accidentally making changes to the system that they didn't intend, but it provides no security except from your own mistakes If you somehow bypass UAC and gain the Administrators-level access then you already run with Administrator level privileges in the first place, just with a medium mandatory level. A rope on the edge of a cliff isn't there to prevent you from falling, it's there to notify you what you should be careful. Rope works. UAC works.
    - fuzzy2 2y ago
      Oh, user separation is not a security boundary? I was not aware! Let’s all work as root then! /s The fact that this was the norm on single-user Windows workstations until Windows Vista is astonishing, to say the least. How anyone could want that back is beyond me. It enabled malware to compromise the entirety of the computer with ease. No exploits or anything required! Certainly not one of these pesky UAC prompts! Can you still shoot yourself in the foot with UAC? Yes. You own the PC. You should be able to shoot yourself in the foot, by willingly deciding to. Not accidentally.
      - actsof 2y ago
        From https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/troubleshoot/windows-server/windows-security/disable-user-account-control https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/troubleshoot/windows-serve... >One of the common misconceptions about UAC and Same-desktop Elevation in particular is: it prevents malware from being installed, or from gaining administrative rights. First, malware can be written not to require administrative rights. And malware can be written to write just to areas in the user's profile. More important, Same-desktop Elevation in UAC isn't a security boundary. It can be hijacked by unprivileged software that runs on the same desktop. Same-desktop Elevation should be considered a convenience feature. From a security perspective, Protected Administrator should be considered the equivalent of Administrator. By contrast, using Fast User Switching to sign in to a different session by using an administrator account involves a security boundary between the administrator account and the standard user session. UAC is not a security boundary, it's not the same thing as sudo on Unix. You only have a security boundary in place if Windows asks you for a password when trying to run as Administrator.
        nerfnet 2y ago
        > UAC is not a security boundary You might be mistaken because what you are quoting specifically talks about Same-desktop Elevation. While on Windows, UAC uses Secure Desktop by default, which is by definition a security boundary. > You only have a security boundary in place if Windows asks you for a password when trying to run as Administrator. Per the last sentence of the information that you quoted: > By contrast, using Fast User Switching to sign in to a different session by using an administrator account involves a security boundary between the administrator account and the standard user session. Fast User Switching requires the user to enter the administrator credentials in the UAC prompt.
  - deleted 2y ago
    [deleted]
  - Wowfunhappy 2y ago
    This is why I mentioned that the PC in question is a gaming box exclusively. There's really nothing to steal here. Maybe you could plant a virus on my network drive to leap to other computers, but that seems pretty far fetched, especially since any software is coming from that drive in the first place.
ZoomerCretin 2y ago
Is there any good reason for Microsoft to not open-source Windows? They are dangerously close to creating the Year of the Linux Desktop if they continue proving Wirth right.
- NavinF 2y ago
  > They are dangerously close to creating the Year of the Linux Desktop How much do you wanna bet? I don't see that happening in the next decade

by ChoGGi 2y ago

The usual consensus I've heard is that UAC is always on even after turning the slider all the way off, while using the admin account doesn't use UAC (changing the EnableLUA in reg also works).

variadix 2y ago

Apparently just running the process as Admin works as well

Wowfunhappy 2y ago

This is the first I'm reading that UAC has a performance impact and I'd like to know more. I have a PC that I literally use for single player games and nothing else (I do not have a web browser installed, or even Steam, games are installed from a network share). I have no use for UAC and I'd like to squeeze everything out of my CPU.

fuzzy2 2y ago
If it has a performance impact, that's not on Windows but the software. Many games are really really badly made software, so that's not surprising. UAC is the single greatest security improvement Microsoft ever created.
- voxic11 2y ago
  UAC is not a security boundary. Its only there to prevent the user from accidentally making changes to the system that they didn't intend, but it provides no security except from your own mistakes. Its so much not considered a security boundary that microsoft doesn't even offer a bug bounty for UAC bypasses.
  - justsomehnguy 2y ago
    > Its only there to prevent the user from accidentally making changes to the system that they didn't intend, but it provides no security except from your own mistakes If you somehow bypass UAC and gain the Administrators-level access then you already run with Administrator level privileges in the first place, just with a medium mandatory level. A rope on the edge of a cliff isn't there to prevent you from falling, it's there to notify you what you should be careful. Rope works. UAC works.
  - fuzzy2 2y ago
    Oh, user separation is not a security boundary? I was not aware! Let’s all work as root then! /s The fact that this was the norm on single-user Windows workstations until Windows Vista is astonishing, to say the least. How anyone could want that back is beyond me. It enabled malware to compromise the entirety of the computer with ease. No exploits or anything required! Certainly not one of these pesky UAC prompts! Can you still shoot yourself in the foot with UAC? Yes. You own the PC. You should be able to shoot yourself in the foot, by willingly deciding to. Not accidentally.
    - actsof 2y ago
      From https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/troubleshoot/windows-server/windows-security/disable-user-account-control https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/troubleshoot/windows-serve... >One of the common misconceptions about UAC and Same-desktop Elevation in particular is: it prevents malware from being installed, or from gaining administrative rights. First, malware can be written not to require administrative rights. And malware can be written to write just to areas in the user's profile. More important, Same-desktop Elevation in UAC isn't a security boundary. It can be hijacked by unprivileged software that runs on the same desktop. Same-desktop Elevation should be considered a convenience feature. From a security perspective, Protected Administrator should be considered the equivalent of Administrator. By contrast, using Fast User Switching to sign in to a different session by using an administrator account involves a security boundary between the administrator account and the standard user session. UAC is not a security boundary, it's not the same thing as sudo on Unix. You only have a security boundary in place if Windows asks you for a password when trying to run as Administrator.
      - nerfnet 2y ago
        > UAC is not a security boundary You might be mistaken because what you are quoting specifically talks about Same-desktop Elevation. While on Windows, UAC uses Secure Desktop by default, which is by definition a security boundary. > You only have a security boundary in place if Windows asks you for a password when trying to run as Administrator. Per the last sentence of the information that you quoted: > By contrast, using Fast User Switching to sign in to a different session by using an administrator account involves a security boundary between the administrator account and the standard user session. Fast User Switching requires the user to enter the administrator credentials in the UAC prompt.
- deleted 2y ago
  [deleted]
- Wowfunhappy 2y ago
  This is why I mentioned that the PC in question is a gaming box exclusively. There's really nothing to steal here. Maybe you could plant a virus on my network drive to leap to other computers, but that seems pretty far fetched, especially since any software is coming from that drive in the first place.

ZoomerCretin 2y ago

Is there any good reason for Microsoft to not open-source Windows? They are dangerously close to creating the Year of the Linux Desktop if they continue proving Wirth right.

NavinF 2y ago
> They are dangerously close to creating the Year of the Linux Desktop How much do you wanna bet? I don't see that happening in the next decade